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Abstract 
 
For several decades now the gun control literature in the United States has continued to 
produce conflicting accounts in regards to the availability of firearms on the U.S’s high 
rate of homicide.  This thesis proposes that this conflict is, in part, due to the implicit and 
continued influence of Wolfgang’s (1958) ‘weapon substitution hypothesis’.  Wolfgang’s 
hypothesis proposes that the intentions of an assailant, whether they be to kill or injure, 
determined the weapon selected.  Since guns are recognised as being highly lethal, all 
assailants who use such weapons were believed by Wolfgang to have been highly 
determined to kill.  Among other negative effects, it is argued that Wolfgang’s hypothesis 
introduced a mind-set to this controversial research area that has continued to influence 
the opinions of academics from both sides of the debate.  This mind-set revolves around 
the consensually held belief that if a firearm assailant is believed to have been determined 
to kill then they would have been capable of killing in the absence of firearms.  
Importantly, this belief implies that the best possible predictor of lethal weapon 
substitution is if a firearm assailant is determined to kill.  This is unlikely to be true.   
 
Mischel (1968: 135) has argued: ‘A person's relevant past behaviours tend to be the best 
predictors of his future behaviour in similar situations.’  After adapting Mischel’s logic to 
fit the weapon substitution debate, the following predictor was produced.  The best 
possible predictor of lethal weapon substitution to non-firearm weapons is whether 
people who had killed with firearms were as experienced at killing victims with non-
firearm weapons as assailants who had actually killed with such weapons.  This predictor 
was further developed into a more workable methodology that was capable of testing the 
validity of both Wolfgang’s hypothesis and the consensually held belief it initiated.  This 
methodology involved a comparison of the previous serious to fatal violent non-firearm 
convictions between those most likely to be determined firearm and knife killers.  It was 
discovered that only 2.94 percent of those most likely to be determined firearm assailants 
and 25.23 percent of those most likely to be determined knife assailants had previous 
convictions for serious to fatal non-firearm assaults.  This result was statistically 
significant to the p< 0.005 (Z score=2.84).  After eliminating all other possible 
explanations for these results it was concluded that, in conflict with both Wolfgang’s 
hypothesis and the consensually held belief, not all determined firearm assailants are 
likely to be capable of lethal weapon substitution.  Furthermore, if some proportion of 
determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be capable of lethal weapon substitution, 
then those not so determined are likely to be even less capable.  Therefore, it was 
concluded that inhibiting all potential firearm assailants from accessing guns would be 
likely to reduce the overall rate of homicide.  However, this thesis was limited in being 
able to apply this conclusion to the United States because it was based on a New Zealand 
population.  Nevertheless, it is argued that the perpetuation of the consensually held 
belief has inhibited the best possible predictor of lethal weapon substitution from being 
applied to a research area where prediction is of paramount importance.  When the best 
possible predictor of lethal weapon substitution has not previously been applied, it 
therefore becomes more understandable why this research area is plagued by such 
controversy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
HOMICIDE AND FIREARMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN GUN 
CONTROL DEBATE 
 
 
One of the most persistent debates in the “weapons and crime” literature concerns 
an issue involving criminal motivations, and that is whether restrictions in the 
availability of firearms would cause the number of violent crimes to decrease…..it 
is self-evident that if there were no guns, then no crimes could be committed with 
them.  But a wide range of alternative weaponry would remain.  Would the people 
who presently kill…..in a “no-guns” condition, simply substitute some other 
weapon instead?  And if so, then what would be the effect?  Would 
death…..increase, decrease, or remain the same?  (Wright, Rossi and Daly, 1983: 
189) 
 
The above quotation alludes to one of the many complex issues involved in the 
international firearms debate.  It raises questions that will form the essence of this thesis.  
Firearm discourses on criminal motivation, gun availability and weapon substitution have 
produced contentious and highly politicised debates.  This thesis will present the modern 
discourse that has focused on whether or not firearms are predominantly responsible for 
the high rate of homicide in the United States.  It shall demonstrate the current conflict 
that exists between academics regarding the availability of firearms and the rate of 
homicide in this highly controversial research area.  This thesis will then argue that the 
lack of consensus that has continually plagued this research area stems in part from the 
powerful influence of the first solid contribution to this area of the American firearms 
debate.  That is, Wolfgang’s (1958) ‘weapon substitution hypothesis’ will be presented 
along with the variety of ways it has continuously thwarted progress in the homicide area 
of the firearms debate.  This presentation will firstly demonstrate how Wolfgang’s 
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hypothesis thwarted academic and political progress in the homicide area of the gun 
control debate up until the early 1990s.  Secondly, this thesis will then explore the 
possibility that the implicit and continued influence of Wolfgang’s weapon substitution 
hypothesis may be a significant contributor to the inconclusive nature of the modern 
American gun control debate surrounding homicide.  More specifically, it shall be argued 
that Wolfgang’s hypothesis introduced a mind-set into this controversial research area.  
As this mind-set has continued to influence researchers from both sides of the debate, 
Wolfgang’s study has inhibited the best possible predictor of weapon substitution from 
being introduced to the firearms debate.  Lastly, this thesis will introduce this predictor to 
aid a later analysis of original data gathered in New Zealand. 
 
Homicide In The United States 
 
The questions raised in the above quote by Wright et al. (1983) are of most interest to 
those nations with high rates of firearm homicide, for example, the United States of 
America.  In 1994 the United States had an overall homicide rate of 8.95 per 100,000 
(United Nations International Study of Firearm Regulations, 1998).  This overall rate of 
homicide was typically four to five times higher than all the other modern western 
industrialised nations.  Furthermore, Zimring and Hawkins (1997) point out that the 
current rate of homicide in the United States is equivalent to that of the top one-third of 
all undeveloped nations (also see United Nations International Study of Firearm 
Regulations, 1998).  According to the above United Nations research, 70 percent of 
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homicides in the United States involved firearms1.  The important and undeniable point 
to take from here is that, in comparison to all other modern western industrialised nations 
(and the majority of undeveloped ones too), the United States has an exceptionally high 
rate of firearm homicide.  That said, it is not surprising that scholars in the United States 
have produced substantial quantities of research examining the nexus between gun 
availability and homicide rates. 
 
Recent Research Suggesting Firearms Are Likely To Elevate The Rate of Homicide 
 
Research on the effects that state gun control measures have had on homicide rates in the 
United States has produced mixed results.  The inconclusive nature of such research 
centres on the geographical limitations confronting state legislation.  State firearm 
legislation in the United States has lacked uniformity.  As a result, guns could always be 
obtained from neighbouring states with more liberal gun control laws (Killias, 1990).  To 
overcome this confounding variable, Killias (1993) compared the household ownership 
of firearms in the United States, Australia, Canada and eleven European nations.  After 
matching each nation’s household gun ownership with its corresponding rate of 
homicide, Killias (1993: 1721) concluded that ‘the correlations detected in this study 
suggest that the presence of a gun in the home increases the likelihood of homicide’.  
Furthermore, Killias (1993) argued that in countries with low rates of firearm homicide 
there did not appear to be a compensatory increase in non-firearm methods of homicide.  
                                                 
1 More specifically, 6.24 out of a total of 8.95 per 100,000 homicides in the United States involved firearms 
(United Nations International Study of Firearm Regulation, 1998). 
 9
Therefore, in the absence of guns, assailants2 were not substituting firearms with other 
weapons to commit acts of homicide (see Lester, 1991).  However, it must be noted that 
Killias’ study did not control for confounding variables such as the violent tendencies of 
different nations. 
 
A more persuasive study suggesting that guns are largely responsible for the high rate of 
homicide in the United States was undertaken by Sloan, Kellermann, Reay et al. (1988).  
Sloan and others compared the rate of handgun homicide between two comparatively 
similar cities, in different countries, with very different laws affecting the general 
availability of firearms; namely Vancouver (with, relatively speaking, a low availability 
of firearms) and Seattle (with a high availability of firearms).  Although the two cities 
had similar crime rates for burglary, robbery, non-firearm assault and non-firearm related 
homicide, the rate of assault with a firearm and homicides involving handguns in Seattle 
was 7 and 4.8 times higher than in Vancouver (respectively).  As a result of these 
findings, Sloan et al. (1988: 1261) concluded that ‘our results suggest that a more 
restrictive approach to handgun control [in the United States] may decrease national 
homicide’.   
 
Centerwall (1991) alludes to methodological deficiencies in his critique of the research 
by Sloan et al. arguing that the two cities were not the same in every aspect except 
firearm availability because their ethnic diversities were fairly different, with Seattle 
having a larger African American and Hispanic population (also see Cook, 1991).  Killias 
                                                 
2 The word ‘assailant’ is frequently used throughout this thesis.  It is used to describe a person who has 
committed a homicide. 
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(1993: 1722) added to this criticism by stating that Sloan et al’s study ‘was based not on 
comparative survey data on gun control in the two cities but, rather, on the cities’ 
different approaches to gun control and on indirect measures such as the number of 
weapon permits issued and the proportion of suicides and homicides involving a firearm’. 
 
A particularly robust US study suggesting that a reduction in the availability of firearms 
would lead to a decrease in the rate of homicide was conducted by Cook (1982).  Cook’s 
‘relative vulnerability hypothesis’ has asserted that more vulnerable assailants tend to use 
the most lethal weapons, like guns, to kill less vulnerable victims.  In other words, 
physically weaker people are likely to depend on the most lethal weapons like guns, to 
hurt physically stronger people.  For example, Cook argued that women tend to rely on 
more lethal weapons like guns and knives to commit homicide on their male partners than 
men do to kill their female partners.  Moreover, Cook (1982: 256-257) argued that in 
brawls and arguments between two males: ‘The highest gun fraction (87 percent) 
involves elderly killers and youthful victims; the lowest gun fraction (48 percent) 
involves youthful killers and elderly victims.  Since age is highly correlated with strength 
and robustness, these results offer strong support for the ‘relative vulnerability 
hypothesis’.   
 
In light of this hypothesis, Cook predicted that homicides by relatively weaker assailants 
would decrease in the absence of guns.  This would include reductions in homicides 
committed by intimate females, youths and the elderly.  This study is important in that it 
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has produced compelling evidence to suggest that should the availability of firearms be 
reduced in the United States the rate of homicide would be very likely to decrease.   
 
Finally, a study conducted by McDowall, Loftin and Wiersema (1992) produced a 
convincing argument that reducing the general availability of firearms would be likely to 
reduce America’s high rate of homicide.  In six American cities a marketing campaign 
promoted that gun related crimes would receive enhanced mandatory sentences.  This 
information is believed to have encouraged some violent assailants to substitute guns 
with alternative types of weaponry.  Interestingly, there was a reduction in the overall 
rates of homicide in these cities.  As a result, McDowall et al. (1992: 390) have argued 
that:  
 
The only plausible interpretation of the results is that the reductions in gun 
homicide are due to the announcement of the laws.  Since there was no 
compensating increases in the number of homicides committed with weapons 
other than guns, these effects can be interpreted as truly preventive of homicides. 
 
However, due to some statistical limitations, the authors recommend caution in making 
generalisations from their results until further research has been undertaken. 
 
Recent Research Suggesting Firearms Are Unlikely To Elevate The Rate Of Homicide 
 
Although the majority of academic research suggests that guns are mostly responsible for 
the high rate of homicide in the United States (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997), a number of 
studies have come to a different conclusion.  As the following will demonstrate, this 
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research has suggested that firearms may actually reduce the current rate of homicide 
and/or may inhibit the rate from increasing further.   
  
In 1982 the Kennesaw town council in Georgia passed an ordinance that required all 
households to possess a firearm.  As a result, the burglary rate apparently experienced a 
dramatic decrease (Kates, 1989, cited in Cook, 1991).  Although others have argued that 
the decrease in burglary was not due to the ordinance3, authors such as Kleck (1988) 
have suggested that the arming of law-abiding citizens could be a solution to America’s 
violent and non-violent crime problem.  Based on a question about defensive gun uses 
from the1981 Hart poll, Kleck reinforced the above suggestion by concluding that there 
are about one million defensive gun uses per year in the United States.  However, the 
main problem with Kleck’s research is that, due to subjective variations in what 
constitutes a defensive gun use, the estimates can vary greatly.  For example, based on 
the National Crime Survey’s definition, Cook (1991) has estimated that there are only 
about 50,000 defensive gun uses per year involving violent crimes4.  At the other end of 
the scale, based on an average of 10 different nation-wide polls, Kleck and Gertz (1995) 
estimated there to be two and a half million defensive gun uses per year.  
 
Interestingly, Kleck and Gertz (1995) argued that from the two and a half million 
defensive gun uses, 400,000 believed that their firearms ‘almost certainly’ saved a life. 
This statement is important because if this 400,000 figure is correct, the wide availability 
of guns used for defensive purposes may be inhibiting the rate of homicide in the United 
                                                 
3 See McDowall, Wiersema and Loftin (1989, cited in Cook, 1991). 
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States from experiencing a substantial increase.  For example, if the disarming of citizens 
resulted in the deaths of only a small proportion of this 400,000 figure, the current rate of 
firearm homicide in the United States could experience a substantial increase.  The main 
limitation with Kleck and Gertz’s ‘400,000 saved lives’ estimate is that it is impossible to 
know if, in the absence of guns, the criminal attacks really would have ended in a fatality.  
 
Nevertheless, the evidence from research, like Kleck (1988), played an influential role in 
convincing over 30 American states throughout the 1990s to pass legislation that would 
enable law-abiding citizens to carry concealed handguns (Squires, 1999).  Also 
influential in these changes was the popular and appealing logic behind such laws: That 
is, because criminals are unable to tell which of their potential victims are armed and 
which are not, the fear of experiencing potentially lethal resistance may deter them from 
engaging in criminal activity (Lott and Mustard, 1997).   
 
Lott (1998) undertook the first in-depth evaluation of whether the popular ‘concealed 
carry laws’ have saved lives by deterring attacks by ‘would-be’ criminals.  More 
specifically, based on the number of concealed-carry permits issued in 3,054 counties 
across a 17-year period, Lott documented the effects that the carrying of concealed 
weapons have had on violent crime rates.  As a result, Lott (1998: 159) has concluded 
that: 
 
Allowing citizens without criminal records or histories of significant mental 
illness to carry concealed handguns deters violent crimes…..If the rest of the 
country had adopted right-to-carry concealed-handgun provisions in 1992, about 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Cook (1991: 56) has stated that this figure of 50,000 is likely to under-estimate the actual number of 
defensive gun uses because it ‘excludes almost all defensive uses against members of the same household.’ 
 14
1,500 murders…..would have been avoided…..[because] the deterrent effect 
of…..handgun laws is largest for violent crimes. 
 
Lott also argued that an armed citizenry would be the most cost-effective way to deal 
with the violent crime problem in America.  However, Squires (1999: 319) has critiqued 
the rigour of Lott’s methodology stating: 
 
Lott’s discussions of his multiple regression analyses are not for the statistically 
faint-hearted but, equally, a more informed readership is likely to feel rather 
dissatisfied by his presentation of results.  At first sight the findings appear 
impressive but there is seldom enough information available to be entirely clear 
about how these are derived. 
 
Furthermore, in conflict with Lott’s conclusion, McDowall Loftin and Wiersema (1995) 
found that in urban areas the carrying of concealed weapons do not reduce the rate of 
homicide.  Nevertheless, in contrast to the earlier conclusions drawn by Killias (1993), 
Sloan et al. (1988), Cook (1982) and McDowall et al. (1992); Lott (1998) argues that 
more guns in the hands of law abiding citizens would actually decrease (not increase) the 
current rate of homicide in the United States.  Moreover, estimates from Kleck and 
Gertz’s (1995) research would imply that homicide may significantly increase if guns 
were no longer available to citizens for protection. 
 
In conclusion, the majority of the modern research has suggested that reducing the 
general availability of firearms in the United States would be likely to reduce the current 
rate of homicide.  However, in conflict with these conclusions, some researchers have 
produced a highly influential argument with the American public that firearms may 
actually reduce or inhibit the rate of homicide from increasing further.  As mentioned 
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earlier, this thesis will argue that the lack of consensus that has continually plagued this 
research area is believed, in part, to have stemmed from Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon 
substitution hypothesis.  The following section will describe Wolfgang’s hypothesis, as 
well as the subsequent literature that was inspired by this important study.  The variety of 
ways in which Wolfgang’s hypothesis is likely to have continuously thwarted academic 
and political progress in this area of the firearms debate up until the early 1990s will then 
be presented.  
 
The Weapon Substitution Hypothesis: And Its Influence On The Direction Of Subsequent 
Research 
 
Wolfgang (1958) discredited the suggestion that guns elevated the rate of homicide.  He 
based his opinion on the following evidence.  During 1924 and 1926 the state of 
Pennsylvania had an overall homicide rate of 5.9 per 100,000.  Firearms were involved in 
68 percent of these homicides; yet between 1948 and 1952, Philadelphia (the state capital 
of Pennsylvania), had a similar homicide rate (6.1 per 100,000), with only 33 percent 
involving firearms.  Based on this evidence, Wolfgang (1958: 82) stated that: 
 
[W]hile the homicide rates for these two population units are similar, the 
proportionate use of firearms is quite dissimilar, being over twice as high for the 
state as for the city.  The hypothesis of a causal relationship between the homicide 
rate and proportionate use of firearms in killing is, therefore, rejected.  
 
As a result of the above conclusion, Wolfgang proposed the ‘weapon substitution 
hypothesis’.  This hypothesis posits that the intentions of an assailant, whether they be to 
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kill or injure, determines the weapon selected.  For example, if an assailant has a single-
minded, thoroughly ‘determined’ intent to kill their victim, they will seek out the kind of 
weapon that is most likely to ensure the desired outcome.  Because a gun is well 
recognised as being a highly lethal weapon, those intent on killing will, if it is available, 
seek out such a weapon.  If a firearm is not available, then this effective weapon will be 
substituted for the next most available and lethal weapon.  This hypothesis suggests that 
if an assailant did not intend to kill but only harm their victim, then they would have 
selected some other less lethal weapon (Wright et al., 1983).  Therefore, Wolfgang (1958: 
83) concluded: ‘It is the contention of this observer that few homicides due to shootings 
could be avoided merely if a firearm were not immediately present, and that the assailant 
would select some other weapon to achieve the same destructive goal.’  
 
Wolfgang (1958) argues that although most homicides in the United States involve 
firearms, the assailants who lethally use such weapons have a 'destructive goal'; if the 
guns were taken away, the destructive goal would still remain.  Wolfgang further argues 
that if assailants only intended to injure their victims then why would they select such a 
lethal weapon like a firearm?  Cook (1983: 56-57) provided an alternative way to 
appreciate the appealing nature of Wolfgang’s logic when he pointed out that: 
 
Husband and wife may exchange punches or throw dishes any number of times, 
yet refrain from reaching for the carving knife or shotgun.  These commonsense 
observations suggest that the assailant's choice of weapon is a good indicator of 
his intent in assault offenses.....the assailants' intent is a major determinant of his 
choice of weapon.  The assailant who clearly intends for his victim to survive will 
not fire a gun at him. 
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To summarise, Wolfgang (1958) argued that reducing the availability of firearms from 
American society would not reduce the rate of homicide because all firearm assailants 
have a destructive goal and are determined to kill.  If guns were no longer available to 
such assailants, they would substitute firearms with the next most lethal and available 
weapon and then kill their intended victims. 
 
However, Zimring (1968) disagreed with Wolfgang’s (1958) argument that all firearm 
assailants were determined to kill their victims.  Zimring argued that two (not one) 
categories of firearm assailants are likely to exist.  The first being Wolfgang’s 
‘determined’ to kill category.  The second were those firearm assailants whose actual 
intention was only to harm their victim, however, in the ‘heat of the moment’ this 
intention to harm was exceeded by the highly lethal nature of the firearm.  This type of 
assailant is commonly referred to in the literature as being ‘impulsively (or ambiguously) 
motivated’5. 
 
Why was Zimring’s (1968) suggestion that there may be two categories of firearm 
assailants (determined and impulsive), so important to this area of the firearms debate?   
It was important because if research was able to demonstrate that a significant proportion 
of firearm assailants were impulsively motivated, then such a finding would suggest that 
if these assailants did not have access to such lethal weapons, their victims would have 
                                                 
5 A statement taken by the New Zealand Police encountered during the data-collection process in this thesis 
demonstrates an example of somebody likely to be an ‘impulsively motivated’ firearm assailant.  After 
being presented with some irrefutable evidence by the police which identified the assailant’s guilt the 
assailant stated: ‘I got a beating from…..[the victim’s name]…..over the darts.  He knocked me down.  I 
went back to the room and got the shotgun, went back to the door and called him.  He turned and told me I 
didn’t have the guts to shoot.  I didn’t mean to kill him, I just pulled the trigger.’ 
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been much more likely to have survived.  Gabor (1994: 31) supports the logic behind this 
argument when he pointed out that: 
 
Discovering the relative proportions of these types [of perpetrators] is 
crucial…..[to this area of the firearms debate]…..as impulsive crimes, in which 
the perpetrator has no access to firearms, might result in less harm even if the 
perpetrator has the opportunity and inclination to substitute some other weapon. 
 
Although Zimring’s (1968) logic had the potential to demonstrate that the removal of 
guns could decrease the rate of homicide, its highly testable nature could also result in 
research demonstrating that most firearm assailants are actually highly determined killers.  
This was pointed out by Wright et al. (1983: 191) when they concluded: ‘If the 
proportion of homicides resulting from a single-minded [determined] intent to kill is very 
large, there is probably very little that could be done to prevent them.’  Such a finding 
would suggest that Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis was likely to be 
correct and that the removal of guns from society would result in no change to the current 
rate of homicide. 
 
So what did the research based on Zimring’s (1968) logic discover?  Zimring (1968: 722) 
himself first tested his own ‘proportion of determined versus impulsive assailants logic’ 
when he asked the following question:  
 
Do a significant proportion of homicides result from a less deliberate and 
determined intention?  If this question may be answered in the affirmative, and if 
the probable substitute for firearms in these situations is less likely to lead to 
death, then the elimination of guns would reduce the number of homicides.   
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Based on the above question, Zimring (1968) attempted to identify evidence that would 
firstly demonstrate that a significant proportion of firearm assailants were not, as 
Wolfgang (1958) had suggested, highly determined to kill their victims, but were actually 
‘impulsively motivated’.  Before Zimring could demonstrate that a significant proportion 
of firearm assailants were impulsively motivated he needed to identify an accurate 
measure of an assailant’s level of determination.  This was necessary to distinguish 
impulsively motivated from highly determined assailants.  Therefore, Zimring reasoned 
that if an assailant had a 'destructive goal' to end their victim's life, that is, they were 
highly determined to kill, surely such an assailant would have inflicted more than one 
wound to seal their victim’s fate.  Furthermore, if an assailant only shot their victim once, 
this, Zimring reasoned, would suggest that they were impulsively motivated.  Using the 
number of wounds inflicted as a measure of an assailant's level of determination, Zimring 
discovered that seventy percent of the victims in his sample killed by a firearm were only 
shot once.  Therefore, Zimring (1968: 724) argued: ‘that a significant proportion [of 
firearm homicides] do not result from an attack committed with the single-minded 
[determined] intention to kill.’  Consequently, Zimring conservatively argued that a 
significant proportion of this seventy percent were likely to be impulsively motivated 
assailants.  
 
After identifying that a significant proportion of firearm assailants were likely to have 
been impulsively motivated, the second piece of evidence that Zimring used to reinforce 
his earlier presented question was to identify which weapons impulsively motivated 
firearm assailants would be likely to turn to in the absence of guns.  That is, what was the 
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most probable substitute weapon likely to be?  With knives being the second most 
commonly used weapon of homicide in his sample, Zimring identified evidence that 
suggested, in the absence of guns, impulsively motivated firearm assailants would 
substitute guns with knives.  Zimring reasoned that if people who killed with guns and 
knives were similar types of people, then he could suggest that, in the absence of guns, 
impulsively motivated firearm assailants would probably turn to knives. To demonstrate 
this similarity, Zimring presented two lines of evidence: assailants using guns and knives 
were involved in proportionally similar types of altercations and used guns and knives in 
racially similar proportions6.  Based on these demographic similarities between people 
who killed using guns and knives, Zimring (1968: 726) concluded that ‘guns and knives 
are used by the same sorts of people’.    
 
Now that he had demonstrated that a significant proportion of firearm assailants appeared 
to be impulsively motivated and that, in the absence of guns, such people would probably 
substitute to knives; Zimring then needed to demonstrate that the knife was less lethal 
than the firearm.  Zimring (1968: 728) achieved this by identifying that ‘the rate of knife 
deaths per 100 reported knife attacks was less than 1/5 the rate of gun deaths per 100 
reported gun attacks’ – attacks involving guns appeared to be five times more lethal than 
attacks involving knives.  This finding was later replicated by several other studies7.  
 
                                                 
6 To elaborate, Wright et al. (1983: 200) describes Zimring’s (1968) results in the following way: ‘To show 
that they are not radically different, Zimring reports two additional bits of information: (1) that, in general, 
knife killings are accompanied by the same kinds of altercations as gun killings; and (2) that firearms and 
knives are used by whites and nonwhites in about the same proportions.’ 
7Vinson (1974) in Australia, Curtis (1974) in the United States and Hedeboe, Charles and Neilson (1985) in 
Denmark found guns to be three, two and fifteen times as deadly as knives (respectively).  In fact Cook 
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To summarise, Zimring (1968) argued that his research demonstrated, in contrast to 
Wolfgang’s (1958) substitute weapon hypothesis, that not all firearm assailants were 
determined to kill their victims.  This was due to the fact that a significant proportion of 
assailants in his sample who killed with guns were likely to be impulsively motivated.  In 
the absence of guns, this significant proportion of impulsively motivated firearm 
assailants would probably turn to the less lethal knife and many of the victims would 
have survived.  Therefore, in the absence of guns, the rate of homicide would be expected 
to significantly decrease.  Or, as Zimring (1968: 728) himself said, ‘These figures support 
the inference that if knives were substituted for guns, the homicide rate would drop 
significantly.’  It was this evidence that initiated the development of Zimring’s ‘weapon 
instrumentality effect’.  The weapon instrumentality effect proposed ‘that weapon 
dangerousness independent of any other factors…..[has]…..a substantial impact on the 
death rate from attack’ (Zimring and Hawkins, 1987: 18).  In other words, becoming a 
victim of homicide is largely a matter of chance in that the more lethal the weapon 
involved the more likely an attack will end in a fatality.  The weapon instrumentality 
effect has particular relevance to the firearm because of its incomparably lethal nature 
(see Cook, 1987). 
 
However, not all agreed with the methodology used by Zimring (1968) to support his 
weapon instrumentality effect.  For example, Wright et al. (1983) suggested that 
Zimring's criteria for identifying determined firearm killers may have grossly 
underestimated the actual proportion of such assailants.  As already mentioned, Zimring 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1987: 372) went even further by suggesting that ‘a gun is intrinsically more dangerous than other types of 
weapons.’ 
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reasoned that a highly determined assailant surely would have shot their victims two or 
more times to achieve their 'destructive goal'.  Wright et al. (1983) disagreed with 
Zimring's criteria arguing that a determined firearm assailant was likely to stop shooting 
when the victim was dead - and this may have been achieved with just one bullet.  
Therefore, some unknown proportion of all the assailants that Zimring had categorised as 
being impulsively motivated (because they only shot their victims once), may actually 
have been highly determined to kill their victims.  Therefore, due to Wright et al’s 
criticism, once again, it was possible that all of the firearm assailants in Zimring's sample 
may actually have been highly determined to kill (which is exactly what Wolfgang's 
(1958) weapon substitution hypothesis had proposed). 
 
Nevertheless, in theory, Zimring’s (1968) ‘proportional logic’ had the potential to 
demonstrate whether or not reducing the general availability of guns would or would not 
reduce the rate of homicide.  As a result, Zimring’s logic, to some extent, stimulated a 
new direction in research that attracted others to try and contribute by applying different 
methods to his ‘proportional logic’ (see Curtis, 1974; Vinson, 1974; Dansys Consultants 
Inc., 1992).  It is unnecessary to describe the results of these studies because as Wright et 
al. (1983: 203) have argued: ‘All such studies necessarily suffer from the same general 
problem, namely, that in the absence of direct information on the underlying motivations, 
these motivations must be inferred from the objective circumstances surrounding each 
case, an indirect and perilous inference.’   In other words, there is no objective way of 
knowing whether the assailant intended to harm or kill their victims at the time of the 
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attack8.  Due to this insurmountable methodological criticism, any attempts to shed light 
on the relative proportion of impulsive versus determined assailants was easily 
discounted by the critics.  For example, Kleck (1991: 169) uses this very criticism to 
discount Zimring’s research:  
 
[T]here is no reason, on the basis of Zimring’s evidence for believing that all, 
most, or even a large minority of gun killings are ….. [impulsively] ….. motivated 
…..  For all one can tell at this point, the majority of gun killers are, at the time of 
the attack, strongly motivated enough to kill even if no guns were available.  On 
the other hand, the opposite could also be true.  Existing evidence does not permit 
any strong conclusions one way or the other.   
 
The complete absence of any objective measures of an assailant’s intentions placed 
Wolfgang's (1958) hypothesis in an unusual position in research - it appeared to be 
impossible to discredit.  To clarify, typically in research it is easier to discredit than it is 
to prove an argument because only one example of conflicting information is required to 
discount the strength of an argument.  However, the research surrounding the proportion 
of impulsive versus determined assailants is limited in that all avenues of evidence 
surrounding motive are solely based on subjective sources of information.  Therefore, any 
evidence demonstrating that most assailants appeared to be impulsively motivated could 
be easily refuted because it was based on a subjective source of information.  Thus, with 
only subjective sources of data available Wolfgang's weapon substitution hypothesis 
managed to maintain its powerful influence on the homicide area of the gun control 
                                                 
8 In fact, Zimring (1968: 722) was well aware of this methodological limitation right from the beginning 
when he said: ‘[f]or obvious reasons, there are no precise data on the intentions of an attacker toward his 
victim - whether he wished to wound or injure, with some apprehension of the risk of death or some desire 
to kill, or whether he single-mindedly intended to kill at any cost.’ 
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debate up until the early 1990s9.  From the late 1960s up until the early 1990s, the 
seemingly undiscreditable nature of Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis 
went on to have a similar effect on both the academic and political debates surrounding 
gun control.  This effect on both the academic and political debates will be described in 
the following section.  
 
The Weapon Substitution Hypothesis: Inhibiting Progress In Both The Academic And 
Political Debates Up Until The Early 1990s 
 
The undiscredited status of Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis went on to 
have an important effect on the academic firearms debate surrounding homicide.  The 
hypothesis provided some academic critics with a generically applicable criticism that 
was capable of discounting the importance of the strongest ‘pro-control’ research.  To 
clarify, the strongest ‘pro-control’ studies up until the early 1990s continued to be 
                                                 
9 Since Zimring (1968) up until the early 1990s, the strongest objective attempt to overcome the 
methodological limitation that has protected Wolfgang's (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis from being 
tested was by Cook (1976, 1978, 1980a, cited in Wright et al., 1983). Cook proposed a potential solution 
that would isolate the lethal characteristics of firearms from the confounding effects of whether an assailant 
was determined or impulsively motivated.  Cook suggested that it would be possible to observe the lethal 
effects of firearms in comparison to non-firearm weapons if a type of crime involving such weapons had a 
fixed or constant motive.  Cook suggested that armed robbery might be such a crime – the motive would 
always appear to be economic gain.  Interestingly, Cook found that the fatality rate for firearm robberies 
was three times higher than non-firearm robberies (7.66 per 1000 versus 2.71 per 1000 respectively).  If the 
motive was constant, why was an armed robbery involving a firearm almost three times more likely to end 
fatally in comparison to a non-firearm robbery?  With the confounding effects of underlying motivations 
eliminated, the only plausible explanation was that the lethal characteristics of firearms, on their own, 
seemed to increase the chances of the robbery ending fatally.  This finding would suggest that the gun, not 
the assailant’s motive, was a more important factor in contributing to a fatal outcome.  However, Cook 
(1980a, cited in Wright et al. 1983) later questioned whether economic gain was the only motive in regards 
to robbery because some assailants, for example, killed their victims for the thrill of watching them die.  So 
motivation for this type of homicide was not always for economic gain.  This possibility resulted in Cook 
conceding that his results were not conclusive.  Thus, the uncertainty surrounding Wolfgang’s (1958) 
weapon substitution hypothesis was reinstated.  It is reinstated because, as Lester (1981: 7) has argued ‘it 
may be that robbers who are more intent on killing take a gun rather than that robbers with a gun are more 
likely to kill the victim because of the higher lethality of their weapon.’ 
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reduced to unimportance by the same criticism.  That is, pro-control research could not 
prove that, in the absence of guns, assailants with a preference to use guns were unlikely 
to engage in lethal weapon substitution.  The following is an example of this generic 
criticism being applied to pro-control research in the early 1990s.   
 
Earlier, Cook’s (1982) relative vulnerability hypothesis was presented.  This study 
asserted that more vulnerable assailants tend to use the most lethal weapons, like guns, to 
kill less vulnerable victims.  In other words, physically weaker people are likely to 
depend on the most lethal weapons to hurt physically stronger people. Cook (1982) 
predicted that in the absence of guns, homicides in the United States by relatively weaker 
assailants would decrease.  This would include reductions in homicides committed by 
intimate females, young people and the elderly.  This study argued that should the general 
availability of firearms be reduced in the United States the rate of homicide would be 
very likely to decrease.  Incapable of identifying any other criticisms with Cook’s 
research, Kleck (1991: 157) discounted the importance of Cook’s research because: 
 
These findings do not conclusively prove that guns facilitate attacks that would 
not otherwise have occurred.  It is possible that…..attackers who choose guns are 
so strongly motivated that, although they would prefer to use a gun, they would 
still attack without a gun, even with the odds against them. 
 
What Kleck (1991) is suggesting is that Cook’s (1982) relative vulnerability hypothesis 
only demonstrates that relatively weaker assailants have a preference for guns; it does not 
prove that in the absence of guns they would not substitute guns with other weapons.  
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Therefore, Kleck discounts the importance of Cook’s research because it is not capable of 
discrediting Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis.   
 
When the strength of the most robust ‘pro-control’ research could so easily be weakened 
by the same generic criticism it becomes more understandable that the United States 
Government has met great resistance to any attempts at introducing the kinds of gun 
controls frequently found in other developed nations.  With this generic criticism proving 
to be so effective at discounting the importance of the best ‘pro-control’ research, it was 
predictable that political agitators would soon take advantage of the conflicting nature of 
the academic debate. 
 
From the late 1960s the conflicting nature of the academic gun control debate was being 
promoted in the political gun control debate via a popular and powerful political slogan 
in the United States.  That is – ‘guns don’t kill people, people kill people’.  It is argued 
here that the undiscredited status of Wolfgang’s weapon substitution hypothesis was 
likely to have been the catalyst for this political slogan.  To clarify, a spate of political 
assassinations throughout the 1960s and the skyrocketing rate of homicide throughout 
this period caused the American public to become increasingly concerned about the 
possible negative effects that gun ownership appeared to be having on society (Hardy and 
Stompoly, 1974).  This ill feeling towards guns developed into a major concern for anti-
gun control groups.  For example, Kennett and La Verne Anderson (1975: 231-232) point 
out: ‘The 1964 issue of the Rifleman acknowledged: “never before has there been such a 
wave of anti-firearm feeling, or such vocal and almost universal demand for tighter 
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controls”’.  Fearing this concern might result in the introduction of restrictive gun control 
measures, anti-control groups started to lobby congress.   
 
According to Kennett and La Verne Anderson (1975: 233), these groups kept citing ‘a 
study…..by Professor Marvin E. Wolfgang’.  Not long after the lobbying ‘an editorial in 
The Nation assailed the pro-gun slogan “guns don’t kill people, people kill people”’ 
(Kennett and La Verne Anderson, 1975: 236).  This evidence demonstrates the likelihood 
of the political slogan having evolved from Wolfgang’s hypothesis.  Enhancing Kennett 
and La Verne Anderson’s evidence is the political slogan’s overtly obvious relationship 
with Wolfgang’s hypothesis.  For example, Wolfgang argued that people who kill with 
guns obviously have a ‘determined and destructive goal’, therefore, removing the guns 
will not remove the destructive goal - ‘people kill people’.  Others, like Zimring, argued 
that guns have highly lethal characteristics that enable people who react impulsively to 
kill - ‘guns kill people’.   
 
Although this political slogan is written to sound as if it is factually correct, the debate 
between Wolfgang (1958) and those who attempted to discredit his hypothesis never 
produced any strong evidence demonstrating that 'people kill people'.  It was just that, 
due to the aforementioned insurmountable methodological limitation, Wolfgang’s 
protagonists were incapable of discrediting his weapon substitution hypothesis. This was 
noted by Wright et al. (1983: 205-206) who said, it is not: ‘that Wolfgang's alternative 
hypothesis is true, but only that the studies most often cited as showing it to be false do 
not show this at all.’  The major implication stemming from this statement is that until 
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methodologically credible research was capable of substantiating otherwise, Wolfgang’s 
hypothesis, that is, all firearm assailants may be determined killers, would remain 
plausible.  As a result, for as long as the hypothesis remained plausible, the removal of 
guns could still potentially result in ‘people killing people’ – and, therefore, the rate of 
homicide would remain the same.   
 
This thesis would argue that, to some degree, the political slogan is likely to have 
inhibited the introduction of significant federal gun control measures in the United States.  
The reason being was that as the phrase became increasingly popular throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, the American public indirectly gained a great insight into the 
inconclusive nature of the academic debate between Wolfgang and those who had 
attempted and failed to discredit him.  Furthermore, the public understood the 
implications that stemmed from this fundamentally important but ultimately inconclusive 
research area.  In other words, via the political slogan, most Americans were well aware 
that removing guns from society may have no effect on reducing the rate of homicide 
because ‘guns don’t kill people, people kill people’.  Due to the American public being 
well aware of this possibility, it becomes more understandable why the United States 
Government and its citizens may have been apprehensive to reduce the general 
availability of firearms when such measures could potentially be a waste of time and 
money. 
 
Wolfgang’s Hypothesis In The 1990s: A Fading Force 
 
 29
The previous section argued that the undiscredited status of Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon 
substitution hypothesis was likely to have inhibited academic progress.  Furthermore, the 
influence of Wolfgang’s hypothesis via the political debate was also likely to have 
contributed to the relative absence of any significant federal firearm controls being 
introduced in the United States up until the early 1990s.  However, throughout the 1990s 
the powerful generic criticism10, would seem to have disappeared from the modern 
academic debate.  A review of the literature suggests that Kleck’s (1991) use of the 
generic criticism to discount Cook’s (1982) relative vulnerability hypothesis may have 
been the last time Wolfgang’s undiscredited weapon substitution hypothesis was used to 
discount solid pro-control research.  Furthermore the political slogan, that ‘guns don’t kill 
people, people kill people’, has not been as popular in the public debate surrounding 
firearms throughout the 1990s as it was in the 1970s and 1980s.  The following section 
will explore a number of possible reasons why Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution 
hypothesis no longer appears to be the force it used to be.  
 
The most probable reason for Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis having 
faded as an influential force in the modern gun control debate was because the 
overwhelming majority of the modern research supported Zimring’s (1968) weapon 
instrumentality effect11 (see Zimring, 1972; Cook, 1987; Kleck and McElrath, 1991; 
McDowall et al., 1992).  In particular, research conducted by McDowall et al. would 
seem to have undermined the validity of Wolfgang’s hypothesis.  As mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
10 That is, pro-control research could not prove that, in the absence of guns, assailants with a preference to 
use guns were unlikely to engage in lethal weapon substitution. 
11 That is, becoming a victim of homicide is largely a matter of chance, and the more lethal the weapon 
involved, the more likely an attack will end in a fatality. 
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the study by McDowall and others found that the promotion of enhancing mandatory 
sentences for gun related violent crimes could reduce the rate of homicide.  Although, as 
also mentioned, the authors did recommend caution in making generalisations from their 
results until further research had been undertaken – this finding appears to demonstrate 
that lethal weapon substitution was not occurring in the absence of guns (also see Pierce 
and Bowers, 1981).   
 
Furthermore, it did not help that Wolfgang himself later disowned the weapon 
substitution hypothesis.  For example, when anti-control groups were lobbying Congress 
in the late 1960s, they kept citing Wolfgang’s (1958) study as evidence that guns do not 
elevate the rate of homicide.  ‘So frequently was Wolfgang’s name involved that Senator 
Dodd put through a telephone call to him, and then interrupted a witness who had just 
cited the professor to announce: “He wants to be on the record as supporting the strongest 
possible Federal legislation restricting the use and distribution of firearms.”’ (Kennett and 
La Verne Anderson, 1975: 236).  Wolfgang not only disowned the weapon substitution 
hypothesis, he later published material that completely contradicted it12.  On the other 
hand, however, Zimring has continuously supported his weapon instrumentality effect 
(see Zimring and Hawkins, 1987; Zimring, 1995; Zimring and Hawkins, 1997).  Finally, 
Cook (1991:24) more concisely alluded to why Wolfgang’s weapon substitution 
hypothesis was no longer the force it used to be when he stated: 
                                                 
12 Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967: 141) argued ‘Probably fewer than five per cent of all known homicides 
are premeditated, planned intentional killings, and the individuals who commit them are most likely to be 
episodic assailants who have never had prior contact with the criminal law’.  So instead of arguing that all 
assailants are highly determined killers as he did in 1958, Wolfgang later argues that only five percent of 
assailants in the United States are likely to be premeditated and highly determined to kill.  This statement 
demonstrates that Wolfgang later favoured Zimring’s (1968) ‘proportional logic’ over his own weapon 
substitution hypothesis. 
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 [A]ll parties to the debate seem to have accepted the validity of the weapon 
instrumentality effect.  Thus there is a consensus among the researchers in this 
area that the type of weapon matters, not just as a signal of the intent…..of the 
assailant, but as a distinct causal factor.  
 
In other words, there is a consensus from both sides of the debate that, more often than 
not, ‘guns kill people’ and, not as Wolfgang (1958) had argued ‘people kill people’.  
However, it is important to note that evidence only suggests that Wolfgang’s hypothesis 
is unlikely to be true13.  To date, evidence has not been able to irrefutably discredit it and 
as a result Wolfgang’s argument still surfaces occasionally in the latest literature.  For 
example, Sherman (2000: 1193) has pointed out in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association that ‘it is still unclear how much substitution of guns from other sources has 
occurred to mitigate the effect of the blocked purchases on gun violence.’  Nevertheless, 
it would appear that the modern academic gun control debate is finally free from the 
shackles of Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis which has arguably 
inhibited the debate from experiencing much greater progress (particularly throughout the 
1970s and 1980s).   
 
Nevertheless, although the debate surrounding the availability of guns and homicide in 
the 1990s and beyond would appear to be free from the effects of Wolfgang’s hypothesis, 
as demonstrated earlier this area of the modern debate is still highly controversial (see 
                                                 
13 As pointed out by Zimring (1995: 7) in regards to the suggestive nature of the evidence: ‘While the 
affirmative answer most published research produced to this question did not satisfy all social science 
critics,…..most of the work…..is premised on the theory that gun use in …..assault elevates the rate of 
death and injury from that which would result if the same assailants had used other weapons.’  Also, 
Zimring and Hawkins (1997: 199) argue ‘The circumstantial indications that implicate gun use as a 
contributing cause to American lethal violence are overwhelming.’ (emphasis added). 
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Cook and Moore, 1995).  Although most of the academics whose research had a 
consistent ‘anti-control’ theme throughout the 1970s and 1980s eventually had to 
concede that Zimring’s weapon instrumentality effect was probably correct, these 
academics have not suddenly decided to side with the ‘pro-control’ perspective.  
Interestingly, these anti-control researchers have used the weapon instrumentality effect 
to enhance their original perspectives.  That is, they have conceded that guns are highly 
lethal instruments.  However, academics like Gary Kleck and Daniel Polsby are now 
arguing that the highly lethal nature of firearms, in the right ‘law abiding’ hands, are 
excellent tools for providing protection.  In other words, the anti-controllers are using the 
conclusions that developed out of a pro-control argument to support a new anti-control 
argument (further complicating the debate).   
 
More generally speaking, the modern debate surrounding the availability of firearms and 
homicide now centres on whether or not the cost of having guns in American society 
outweighs their benefits (see Polsby, 1995).  It seems the debate has returned to the 
original question of interest to this thesis – would fewer guns reduce, increase or result in 
no change to the current rate of homicide?  As mentioned, some have argued that more 
guns in the right hands may reduce the current rate of homicide (see Kleck, 1988; Polsby, 
1995; Lott, 1998), or may be inhibiting it from experiencing a significant increase (Kleck 
and Gertz, 1995).  However, the latest literature suggests that an overall reduction in the 
availability of handguns (the most commonly used firearm in lethal violence), would 
significantly reduce the current rate of homicide in the United States (Zimring and 
Hawkins, 1997).   
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 It seems the current methods for ascertaining whether or not the cost of having guns in 
American society outweighs the benefits are based on fairly subjective indicators.  For 
example, Kleck and Gertz’s (1995) research was based on the beliefs of defensive gun 
users that the intervention of their firearm ‘almost certainly’ saved a life.  Zimring and 
Hawkin’s (1997) conclusion is based on international comparisons that, while statistically 
convincing, can only suggest that reducing the general availability of firearms would 
reduce the rate of homicide in the United States.  In short, the modern debate, in terms of 
solid and irrefutable evidence, has barely experienced any significant progress.  This 
point is reinforced by Morgan (1999: 315) who argues that: 
 
[T]he US is enmired in a gun culture resistant to practically all attempts to restrict 
the liberty to own them.  Lethal violence spirals, but academic researchers seeking 
practical solutions must disentangle causal relationships if they are to have any 
hope of undermining the one-line slogans ('It is not guns that kill, but people') that 
dominate public debate. 
 
However, although the modern debate may believe itself to be free from Wolfgang 
(1958), the following argument will demonstrate that the weapon substitution hypothesis 
may play an important role in why the modern debate has been unable to disentangle the 
causal relationship between guns and homicide.  It is suggested here that unbeknown to 
academia, effects originating from Wolfgang’s hypothesis may be, in part, implicitly 
responsible for the continued absence of more solid evidence surrounding the probable 
effects that guns have on the rate of homicide in the United States.  The reasoning behind 
this assertion will be revealed in the argument below. 
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The Continued Influence Of Wolfgang’s (1958) Weapon Substitution Hypothesis On The 
Modern Gun Control Debate 
 
As outlined earlier, Wolfgang (1958) believed that all firearm assailants were determined 
to kill their victims.  And because they were determined, Wolfgang (1958: 83) argued 
that ‘if a firearm were not immediately present…..the assailant would select some other 
weapon to achieve their destructive goal.’  Zimring (1968) disagreed with Wolfgang that 
all firearm assailants were determined, believing only a proportion of assailants have this 
destructive goal to kill.  However, what Zimring (1968: 721-722) did agree with 
Wolfgang on was that ‘prohibiting [the proportion who were determined to kill from 
accessing] firearms would not have a substantial effect on homicide…..[because]…..they 
would resort to other weapons…..to achieve their intention’.  Initiated by Wolfgang and 
passed on to Zimring – the belief that all determined firearm assailants would be capable 
of lethal weapon substitution then seems to have spread to all the other major contributors 
to this area of the firearms debate.  For example, although they spent almost half a 
chapter of their book critiquing Zimring's (1968) research, Wright et al. (1983: 191) 
would seem to have agreed with the above quotes by both Wolfgang and Zimring when 
they suggested: 
 
People with a single-minded, thoroughly premeditated intention to kill will 
always find the means to do so, and if an efficient weapon such as a firearm is not 
around, the victim can always be poisoned, burned, stabbed, or, if all else fails, 
beaten to death with a stick.  It is obvious that homicides of this sort will not be 
prevented or even modestly deterred by any kind of firearms legislation, or, for 
that matter, any other kind of legislation.  There are simply too many objects in 
the world that can serve the purpose of destroying another human being.   
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Kopel (1992: 415) has also argued that: ‘Attempting to change the tool of determined 
criminals is likely [to be] an unproductive and dangerous enterprise.’  Kleck (1991: 197) 
demonstrated an opinion consistent with all of the above when he said: 
 
If every gun killer had, even for just a few minutes, a very strong aggressive drive 
and a single-minded intent to kill regardless of the risks and effort needed, then it 
would do no good to deprive them of guns - they would do whatever was 
necessary to kill their victims by other means in those few minutes.    
 
Although more carefully stated, Cook (1981: 74) maintained a similar perspective when 
he suggested that: ‘My conclusions can be briefly stated.  The likelihood of death from a 
serious assault is determined, inter alia, by the assailant's intent and the lethal nature of 
the weapon he uses.  The type of weapon is especially important when the intent is 
[impulsive].’  It could be argued that the reverse interpretation of Cook’s statement would 
be that when the intent of the assailant is unambiguous (or determined), the type of 
weapon would not be especially important. 
 
Despite their frequently conflicting opinions surrounding the firearms debate, the above 
authors provide an explicit consensus on one point - determined firearm killers would be 
more than capable of engaging in lethal weapon substitution.  Furthermore, the catalyst 
to this consensually held belief (as it will be described from this point onwards) can be 
traced back to Wolfgang’s (1958) influential hypothesis.  As mentioned earlier, due to an 
insurmountable methodological limitation, it was not possible to objectively identify the 
exact proportion of determined assailants 14.  With the proportion of determined 
                                                 
14 That is, precise objective data does not exist on whether or not an assailant was determined to kill their 
victim or only intended to injure them. 
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assailants not being able to be identified, the consensually held belief (that all determined 
firearm assailants would be capable of lethal weapon substitution), has been able to 
remain undisputed15. The following section will explore the probable validity this 
consensually held belief. 
 
Are All Determined Firearm Assailants Likely To Be Capable Of Lethal Weapon 
Substitution? 
 
There are a number of factors that are likely to make firearms both physically and/or 
psychologically easier to kill with in comparison to the other commonly used non-firearm 
weapons of homicide.  Eggers and Peters (1993: 199) capture the majority of these 
factors when they stated that: ‘[t]he use of a gun requires considerable less proximity, 
strength, agility, skill and squeamishness, and offers less opportunity for self-defence, 
than does the use of a knife or other [commonly used] weapon.’  Therefore, in the 
absence of guns, a determined assailant who would have preferred using a gun is likely to 
find it physically and/or psychologically more difficult to kill with one of the common 
non-firearm weapons of homicide (like a knife or bludgeoning object).  Interestingly, 
Wolfgang was familiar with this argument.  For example, Wolfgang (1958: 79) was 
aware that: ‘the small physical size of the assailant relative to that of his potential victim, 
or the assailant's physical repugnance to engaging in direct physical assault by cutting or 
stabbing his adversary may mean that in the absence of a firearm no homicide occurs.’  
                                                 
15 The consensually held belief differs from Wolfgang’s weapon substitution hypothesis in that Wolfgang 
believed all firearm assailants were determined.  In the consensually held belief some proportion of 
assailants were believed to be determined.  The proportion depended on a particular author’s subjective 
definition of who was and who was not likely to be determined to kill their victim/s. 
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However, Wolfgang discounted the validity of this argument due to his stronger belief 
that if a firearm assailant was determined to kill their victim, then their 'destructive goal' 
would enable them to overcome any potential physical and/or psychological barriers.  For 
example: ‘It is probably safe to contend that many homicides occur only because there is 
sufficient motivation.….and that the type of method used to kill is merely an accident of 
availability’ (Wolfgang, 1958: 79). 
 
Consequently, although Wolfgang (1958) agrees that killing someone physically bigger 
and/or using a common alternative weapon to a firearm, like a knife, is likely to be more 
difficult, he maintained that the assailant's determination to kill would still result in a 
fatality.  In addition, depending on their personal subjective definitions of who is and is 
not likely to be a determined firearm assailant, all of the other authors would appear to 
have based their aforementioned opinions on a similar line of logic. 
 
However, the validity of this logic must be questioned because what Wolfgang is 
suggesting is that being highly determined is all that is required to achieve something 
considered difficult.  This logic is equivalent to arguing that all that is required of a local 
soccer player to gain selection to a professional international team is for them to be 
highly determined.  More importantly, what Wolfgang has failed to recognise is that in 
anything considered to be a difficult achievement, regardless of whether it is a good or 
bad activity, there are always likely to be a greater number of people determined to 
succeed than there are actually capable of succeeding.   For example, playing soccer for a 
professional international team is obviously more difficult than playing for a local club 
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side.  Therefore, there are always a greater number of local players who are determined 
than there is actually capable of playing competitive international soccer.  The reason for 
there being more determined people than capable is that more is required of a person than 
mere determination to achieve something that is considered more difficult.   
 
How exactly does this soccer analogy relate to the firearms debate in the United States?  
Wolfgang (1958) admitted that killing with a physically and psychologically more 
demanding non-firearm weapon, such as a knife, is likely to be more difficult than killing 
with a gun.  And when this argument is combined with the logic that with anything 
considered difficult there are always more determined people than actually capable – then 
not all ‘determined’ and capable firearm assailants will necessarily be capable of killing 
with the more difficult commonly used non-firearm weapons.  In sum, more than mere 
determination is required of a firearm killer if they are to be capable of killing with the 
common non-firearm alternative weapons of homicide.  This is because such weapons are 
likely to be physically and/or psychologically more difficult to kill with.  It could be 
argued that if using a non-firearm weapon is only slightly more difficult than using a 
firearm, then most determined assailants who would prefer using a gun would still be 
capable of lethal weapon substitution.  This is true, however the point is – using one of 
the common non-firearm weapons is still likely to be more difficult.  Therefore, in 
conflict with the assertions from both Wolfgang’s hypothesis and the consensually held 
belief, not all determined firearm assailants would be capable of killing in the absence of 
guns.  As a result, Wolfgang’s hypothesis and the consensually held belief, which have 
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both proposed that all determined firearm assailants would be capable of lethal weapon 
substitution, is believed by the writer to be logically flawed.  
 
However, if the modern gun control debate has freed itself from Wolfgang’s (1958) study 
and the ‘determined’ assailant terminology that accompanied it, would this not suggest 
that the consensually held belief, although interesting, is now obsolete and irrelevant?  In 
other words, what is so important about a logically flawed consensually held belief when 
the concept of determination is no longer an important part of the modern gun control 
debate?  The following argument will demonstrate why the logically flawed consensually 
held belief is of fundamental importance to the lack of progress affecting the modern gun 
control debate.   
 
As mentioned previously, the consensually held belief suggested that all determined 
firearm assailants would be capable of lethal weapon substitution.  Importantly, this 
consensually held belief implies that the best predictor of lethal weapon substitution is if 
an assailant is determined to kill their victim.  With the consensually held belief having 
never been disputed, what also remained undisputed was the implied belief that the best 
predictor of lethal weapon substitution was if an assailant was determined to kill.  With 
the validity of the consensually held belief having been seriously cast in doubt, is it also 
possible that a firearm assailant’s determination to kill may not be the best predictor of 
lethal weapon substitution?  This writer believes so.  If a better predictor of whether or 
not a firearm assailant is likely to be capable of killing with a non-firearm weapon does 
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exist, what is it?  The answer to this question is probably easiest to explain by returning 
to the soccer analogy. 
 
Exactly how do professional soccer scouts predict which individuals are most likely to be 
capable of successfully undertaking the difficult task of playing professional soccer?  
Obviously, they base their selection on how capable the person is at playing soccer, and 
to do this they will review how the person has played soccer in the past.  In fact, using a 
person’s past behaviour to predict what they are likely to be capable of in the future is the 
most commonly used predictor in any selection process – it is the most commonly used 
because it tends to be the best predictor of future behaviour. This method was explicitly 
promoted in academic circles as the most accurate measure of predicting future behaviour 
in a highly influential psychology book written by Mischel (1968: 135) who argued: ‘A 
person's relevant past behaviours tend to be the best predictors of his future behaviour in 
similar situations.’  Furthermore, this method is not new to criminological discourse and 
has frequently been applied.  For example, Farrington (1989) used it to predict future 
violent behaviour in his sample of delinquent males (also see Glueck and Glueck, 1960; 
Tracey et al., 1990; Greenburg, 1991; Wintemute, Drake, Beaumont, Wright and Parham, 
1998).  Adapting Mischel’s predictor to fit this area of the gun control debate would 
produce the following previously untested question: before they killed their victims, were 
determined firearm assailants as capable as determined non-firearm assailants at killing 
with non-firearm weapons?  The following chapter on methodological issues will further 
develop this question.  
 
 41
To conclude this chapter, the logically flawed consensually held belief is of fundamental 
importance to the modern gun control debate, because, over the last 40 years it would 
seem to have inhibited the introduction of what this writer believes to be the best 
probable predictor of lethal weapon substitution.  If the best possible method for 
predicting future behaviour has never been applied to a research area where one would 
think that predicting behaviour is of the utmost importance, it becomes more 
understandable why this area of research may not have experienced greater academic 
progress.  Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the potential that Mischel’s 
(1968) logic has to offer this area of the gun control debate.   
 
This thesis intends to achieve this aim by applying Mischel’s predictor to directly and 
thoroughly testing both the validity of Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution 
hypothesis16 and the consensually held belief that it initiated.  Assuming that the 
evidence which eventually eliminated Wolfgang’s hypothesis from the modern literature 
is correct, this thesis intends to more conclusively eliminate and inhibit the weapon 
substitution hypothesis and the consensually held belief from further exerting their 
historically confounding influence on the modern gun control debate.  The following 
chapter will describe all aspects of the methodology that will integrate Mischel’s 
predictor so it is able to test the validity of both Wolfgang’s weapon substitution 
hypothesis and the consensually held belief that grew out of it. 
                                                 
16 It will be recalled that Wolfgang’s weapon substitution hypothesis was only removed from the modern 
gun control debate by evidence that suggested that it was unlikely to be correct (see Zimring, 1995). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
As discussed in chapter one, several authors have argued that all determined firearm 
assailants would, in the absence of guns, be capable of engaging in lethal weapon 
substitution.  This belief implied that the best predictor of lethal weapon substitution is if 
an assailant is determined to kill their victim.  However, Mischel (1968:135) has argued 
that ‘a person’s relevant past behaviour tends to be the best predictors of his future 
behaviour in similar situations’.  Therefore, based on their relevant past, an important 
question for this thesis was to identify whether determined firearm killers are as capable 
as determined non-firearm killers at killing with non-firearm weapons?  If we further 
adapt Mischel's predictor to better fit this question, the following could be argued.  That 
is, the best possible way to identify whether or not determined firearm killers were likely 
to be as capable of lethal weapon substitution using non-firearm weapons as determined 
non-firearm killers would be to compare the two types of assailants’ previous capabilities 
to kill with non-firearm weapons.  In short, this thesis intends to establish whether or not 
determined firearm killers are the same or different types of people as determined non-
firearm killers, similar in the most important way – a proven ability to have previously 
killed with non-firearm weapons.  
 
Although the above comparison would theoretically appear to be the most logical to 
undertake, as the following will demonstrate, it is not pragmatically possible.  Firstly, 
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before it is possible to undertake a comparison between determined firearm and non-
firearm assailants it is necessary to be able to identify determined assailants.  As 
previously mentioned, due to ambiguities surrounding the assailant’s intentions at the 
time of the attack, it is impossible to identify exactly who was, and who was not, a 
determined firearm killer.  As a result, there is a consensus in the literature that it is not 
possible to identify the exact proportion of determined versus impulsive assailants.  
However, as the following will demonstrate, there is an implicit agreement in the 
literature that it is possible to identify those who are most likely to have been determined 
killers.   
 
As mentioned earlier, Zimring (1968) reasoned that if an assailant was highly determined 
to kill, surely they would have inflicted more than one wound to ensure their victim did 
not survive.  Furthermore, Zimring reasoned that if an assailant only shot their victim 
once it would suggest that they were impulsively motivated.  These assumptions were 
criticised by Wright et al. (1983) who argued that it would have underestimated the exact 
proportion of highly determined firearm killers.  Importantly, this criticism by Wright and 
others implies that they believed Zimring’s method to be an accurate way of identifying 
those most likely to be determined firearm killers.  However, what they were critical 
about was that it would underestimate the exact proportion of determined firearm killers 
because some determined firearm assailants may have only required one bullet to cause 
the intended fatality.   
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However, for a methodology to be able to test whether or not ‘determined’ and capable 
firearm assailants are likely to have been as capable of killing with non-firearm weapons 
as determined non-firearm assailants, it must first be able to accurately identify 
determined firearm and non-firearm assailants.  Although Zimring’s method was 
incapable of identifying the exact proportion of determined firearm assailants, it was 
likely to have been capable of accurately identifying those most likely to have been 
determined firearm assailants.  Therefore, this writer believes Zimring’s method for 
identifying those most likely to being determined killers meets the requirements of the 
proposed methodology.  As a result, the proposed comparison will use the infliction of 
two or more wounds to identify those firearm and non-firearm assailants who were most 
likely to have been determined to kill their victims.  
 
Unfortunately, although Zimring’s (1968) method enables the identification of those most 
likely to be determined assailants, his multiple wound criterion may force the proposed 
comparison between firearm and non-firearm assailants to change.  To clarify, Zimring’s 
method requires that all non-firearm assailants used weapons or methods that involved 
the infliction of one or more wounds.  However, not all non-firearm weapons or methods 
of attack involve the infliction of one or more wounds.  For example, poisoning, 
suffocation and strangulation do not involve the infliction of one or more wounds.  With 
the identification of determined assailants being of critical importance to the comparison, 
it is therefore suggested that the proposed comparison be between firearm assailants and 
the most frequently used non-firearm weapon that is compatible with Zimring’s ‘wound’ 
based methodology for identifying those most likely to be determined assailants.  The 
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knife appears to best meet the above criteria given that it is the most commonly used non-
firearm weapon in the developed world17 and, as required by Zimring’s methodology, the 
knife involves the infliction of multiple wounds.  As a result, this thesis now intends to 
compare those most likely to be determined firearm assailants to those most likely to be 
determined knife assailants.  The two types of assailants will be compared on their 
previous capabilities to kill with non-firearm weapons. 
 
Again, there is another reason why the above comparison could not practically be 
undertaken in this thesis.  This relates to what Mischel has termed the ‘relevant past 
behaviour’ to the future behaviour attempting to be predicted.  Using ‘previously having 
killed with a non-firearm weapon’ as the relevant past behaviour would, from a statistical 
perspective, require having previously killed with a non-firearm weapon to be a 
reasonably common behaviour.  However, even for murderers, having previously killed 
another person with any type of weapon is fairly unusual.  This thesis simply would not 
have access to a sample that was large enough to detect a difference between firearm and 
knife assailants for the fairly unusual behaviour of having previous killed with non-
firearm weapons18.  Therefore, a more frequent yet relatively similar relevant past 
behaviour to having killed with a non-firearm weapon needed to be identified before the 
proposed comparison can be undertaken.   
 
                                                 
17 See Vinson (1974) for Australia, Miller and Russell (1996) for New Zealand, Hedeboe et al. (1985) for 
Denmark, and Zimring (1968) or Wolfgang (1958) for the United States. 
18Other researchers possibly interested in undertaking a replication of this study may have access to a 
sample that is large enough to undertake the more powerful comparison between those most likely to be 
determined firearm and knife assailants regarding their previous capabilities to kill with non-firearm 
weapons. 
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Arguably, a ‘relevant past behaviour’ that is much more frequent yet relatively similar to 
having previously killed with a non-firearm weapon may be found in an assailant's 
previous violent criminal conviction history relating to serious to fatal non-firearm 
assaults.  It could be argued that the most serious of previous convictions for violent 
crimes involving non-firearm weapons would be a more frequently occurring measure of 
whether someone was likely to have been capable of inflicting serious injuries with non-
firearm weapons.  Take for example a person most likely to be a determined firearm 
killer who had a previous criminal conviction for, say, ‘grievous bodily harm using a 
knife’. This conviction would strongly suggest that if a firearm had not been present 
when they later committed their homicide, such a person was likely to have been capable 
of engaging in lethal weapon substitution with a non-firearm weapon.  
 
As a result of the above qualifications this thesis will compare those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants to those most likely to be determined knife assailants.  The 
two types of assailants will be compared on their previous abilities to engage in acts of 
violence involving non-firearm weapons that are likely to have resulted in serious to fatal 
injuries to the victim/s.  More specifically, this measure of serious non-firearm 
capabilities will be based on the assailants’ non-firearm related serious violent criminal 
conviction histories.   
 
Although this comparison could potentially be undertaken, there is a confounding 
variable that affects the use of criminal conviction histories as a measure of violent non- 
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firearm capabilities.  This confounding variable is likely to unfairly reduce the chances of 
the proposed comparison finding a statistically significant difference.  That is, criminal 
conviction histories typically do not start recording an assailant’s violent past until they 
are 17 years old.  Therefore, if an assailant was in their early teens when they killed their 
victim they may have been too young to have had their violent criminal past officially 
recorded.  Take for example one of the events in this thesis where a 15 year-old assailant 
stabbed an 11 year old child.  Although the assailant was well known to the local police 
as being a violent person, his official adult criminal conviction printout did not reveal 
such a violently capable person.   
 
Furthermore, using criminal conviction histories as a measure of violent non-firearm 
capabilities is unlikely to be an accurate measure for assailants in their late teens.  This is 
because such assailants are unlikely to have had the time to accumulate enough previous 
non-firearm convictions that would be representative of their actual non-firearm 
capabilities.  To further illustrate this point, a 25 year-old assailant will have had nearly a 
decade to accumulate enough previous non-firearm convictions to accurately demonstrate 
their non-firearm capabilities.  However, an 18-year-old assailant will only have had a 
year to demonstrate their non-firearm capabilities.  In short, using criminal conviction 
histories as a measure of violent non-firearm capabilities is only likely to be accurate for 
older assailants.  This writer would argue that an assailant would probably be old enough 
to have developed a criminal conviction history that would be representative of their non-
firearm weapon capabilities if they were over 19 years old of age. 
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Therefore, this thesis now intends to compare those most likely to be determined firearm 
assailants (over 19 years old) with those most likely to be determined knife assailants 
(over 19 years old).  The two types of assailants will be compared on their previous 
capabilities to engage in acts of violence involving non-firearm weapons that are likely to 
have resulted in serious to fatal injuries to the victim.  The measure of serious non-
firearm capabilities will be based on the assailants’ non-firearm related serious violent 
criminal histories. 
 
Undertaking this comparison between those most likely to be determined firearm and 
knife assailants (over 19 years old), in terms of their previous serious to fatal violent non-
firearm convictions, would result in three possible outcomes.  As described below, each 
outcome would have different implications on the rate of homicide. 
 
i) The first possible outcome of the proposed comparison would be if those most 
likely to be determined firearm assailants were found to have very similar levels 
of past criminal convictions for serious non-firearm assaults in comparison to 
those most likely to be determined knife assailants.  This result would suggest that 
determined firearm assailants, in terms of being capable of undertaking very 
violent non-firearm attacks, are similar types of people to determined knife 
assailants.  Such a finding would indicate that removing guns from society would 
result in no change to the homicide rate because determined firearm assailants are 
likely to be similar types of people as determined knife assailants.  They would be 
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similar in terms of being capable of inflicting serious injuries using non-firearm 
weapons. 
 
ii) The second possible outcome of the proposed comparison would be if those most 
likely to be determined firearm assailants were found to have significantly more 
past criminal convictions for serious non-firearm assaults in comparison to those 
most likely to be determined knife assailants.  Such a finding would suggest that 
determined firearm assailants, in terms of being capable of undertaking violent 
non-firearm attacks, are likely to be even more capable than determined knife 
assailants of engaging in serious acts of non-firearm violence.  As a result, 
removing guns from society would result in no change to the homicide rate 
because determined firearm assailants are likely to be as, if not more, capable than 
determined knife assailants at inflicting serious injuries with non-firearm 
weapons. 
 
iii) The third possible outcome would be if those most likely to be determined firearm 
assailants were found to have significantly less past criminal convictions for 
serious non-firearm assaults in comparison to those most likely to be determined 
knife assailants.  Such a finding would suggest that determined firearm assailants 
were unlikely to be as capable as determined knife assailants at inflicting serious 
injuries with non-firearm weapons.  As a result, removing guns from society 
would result in the rate of homicide decreasing.  The rate of homicide would be 
expected to decrease because determined firearm assailants would not be as 
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capable as determined knife assailants at inflicting serious injuries with non-
firearm weapons. 
 
Now that the reader has been presented with the three potential outcomes and their 
implications on the homicide rate, Hypothesis 1 will be presented below. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Based on Eggers and Peters’ (1993) argument that non-firearm weapons are likely to be 
physically and/or psychologically more difficult to injure a victim with, the following is 
hypothesised.  This author hypothesises that those most likely to be determined knife 
assailants (over 19 years old) will be more likely to have previous serious violent non-
firearm convictions in comparison to those most likely to be determined firearm 
assailants (over 19 years old).  Furthermore, this difference in previous serious violent 
non-firearm convictions will be statistically significant. 
 
Sample Selection Process 
 
Since 1988 the Criminal Investigation Branch of the New Zealand Police have collected 
annual demographic information and an overall outline on every homicide where the 
police charged an assailant/s with committing murder.  These books, called C.I.B. 
Murder Books19 were used by this thesis to identify each event where the police charged 
                                                 
19 A more detailed description of the C.I.B Murder Books will be presented following the sample selection 
process. 
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a person/s with murder.  Also included in the C.I.B Murder Books were events where the 
assailant had committed a homicide/suicide or, as yet, had not been apprehended by the 
police.  Between 1988 and 1998 these books identified that the New Zealand Police had 
investigated 584 homicides20.  However, one major obstacle in undertaking research into 
homicide is that quantitative analysis is made difficult due to the existence of multiple 
assailants and/or victims and/or weapons.  In an attempt to keep the proposed comparison 
simple while also trying to maintain a low exclusion rate, the current study dealt with 
each of these obstacles in the following ways: 
 
Events Involving Multiple Assailants: In such events all the assailant information was 
based on the single assailant that was identified as being most responsible for delivering 
the lethal blow/s.  Identifying this single assailant was based on the ‘case summary’ 
section in the C.I.B Murder Books or, if this failed, information from the Coroner's Files 
recorded in the Miller Survey Sheet was consulted (an internal police study undertaken in 
199621).  If these two sources were incapable of identifying a single assailant who was 
most responsible for delivering the lethal blow/s, the event was excluded from the 
proposed comparison. 
                                                 
20 Although great effort is put into ensuring that the all homicides investigated by the police are included in 
the C.I.B. Murder Books, the current writer is concerned with the way these events are identified.  It is 
understood that the initial identification of a homicide by the compilers of the C.I.B. Murder Books is 
based on a media database search.  Once identified, then a survey form is sent to the officer in charge.  
Therefore, the accuracy of the C.I.B. Murder Books is totally dependent on a homicide being published in 
the media.  As long as homicide continues to be highly newsworthy in New Zealand, then the media based 
search will probably remain accurate.  Nevertheless, due to the susceptibility of an event not being 
identified by the media, this media based method of identification is highly questionable.  Considering the 
statistics collected have been used to provide the United Nations with information on homicide in New 
Zealand, this method of identifying homicides is in need of improvement.  It is suggested that a 
standardised form is developed and kept in all police stations that, as part of procedures, is filled out and 
sent to the Office of the Commissioner.   
21 A more detailed description of the Miller Survey will be presented following the sample selection 
process. 
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 Events Involving Multiple Victims: In such events all victim specific information (for 
example, number of wounds inflicted and weapon used), was solely based on the first 
victim killed.  Identifying the first victim killed was based on the ‘case summary’ section 
in the C.I.B Murder Books.  If this source of information was incapable of supplying the 
required data, then the event was excluded from the proposed comparison. 
 
Events Involving Multiple Weapons: In such events all weapon information was based on 
the weapon identified as being most responsible for killing the first or only victim.  
Identifying this weapon was based on the information in the C.I.B Murder Books or the 
Coroner's Files information in the Miller Survey Sheet.  If these two sources of 
information were incapable of identifying what this weapon was then the event was 
excluded from the proposed comparison. 
 
The 584 events were then separated into 13 different weapon/method categories.  These 
included Firearm, Knife, Bludgeon, Manual Beating, Strangulation, Suffocation, 
Drowning, Poison, Fire, Carbon Monoxide, Motor Vehicle, Other and Unknown22.  Table 
1 demonstrates the results obtained when the 584 events were separated by the principal 
weapon judged to be most responsible for killing the first victim. 
 
Table 1: The type of weapons/methods used in all events investigated as murder by the 
New Zealand Police between 1988 and 1998. 
 
ALL EVENTS INVESTIGATED AS  
                                                 
22 For the definitions of each of these weapons or methods of homicide refer to Appendix 1. 
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MURDER 
Year Firearm Knife Bludgeon Manual Beating Strangulation Suffocation Drowning Poison Fire Carbon 
Monoxide 
Motor Vehicle23 Other Unknown Total 
1988 22 17 8 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 60
1989 13 27 5 3 2 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 58
1990 11 24 9 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53
1991 11 30 4 6 1 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 60
1992 11 16 8 13 3 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 58
1993 6 19 9 4 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 46
1994 9 17 11 8 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 51
1995 6 17 6 7 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 42
1996 9 16 5 12 2 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 51
1997 7 20 3 8 6 4 3 2 1 0 2 0 0 56
1998 4 18 11 6 3 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 2 49
Total 109 221 79 84 24 22 6 6 9 5 6 3 10 58
4
 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that firearms and knives were the principal weapons used to kill the 
first victim in 330 out of 584 events, making up 56.5 percent of all homicides.  This 
included 109 and 221 events involving firearms and knives (respectively).  From all 
events involving firearms and knives, 13 had to be excluded from further analysis.  This 
related to 5 of the 109 events involving firearms and 8 of the 221 events involving 
knives.  That is, for reasons that will follow, 13 out of 330 events were removed from the 
proposed comparison, giving an exclusion rate of 3.94 percent24.  This left 317 events to 
undergo final analysis.  The general reason for exclusion was that this study was only 
concerned with the assailant who was most responsible for inflicting the lethal injuries on 
the first or only victim.  However, in a small proportion of events it was not or could not 
                                                 
23 That is, physically struck by a moving motor vehicle (includes one jet-ski). 
24 Table One demonstrates there were 10 events between 1988 and 1998 where the actual weapon was 
‘unknown’.  With knives and guns being the most common weapons of homicides in New Zealand 
(respectively), it would be fair to say that, statistically, it was likely that some unknowable proportion 
would have involved knives or guns.  Therefore, the exclusion rate pertaining to knife and firearm 
homicides is likely to be slightly higher than this figure of 3.94 percent. 
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be established by police who this exact person was.  More specific reasons for exclusion 
included: 
 
• Victim shot but assailant unknown (n=3) 
• Victim stabbed but assailant unknown (n=3) 
• Multiple assailants all using knives (assailant most responsible for killing the victim 
was not or could not be established) (n= 5) 
• Multiple assailants all using guns (assailant most responsible for killing the victim 
was not or could not be established) (n=2) 
 
The most distinguishing characteristic of the 13 excluded events was that a large 
proportion were likely to have been gang-related.  In three of the 13 events the victims 
and assailants were definitely gang members.  Furthermore, in another two events the 
victims were gang members and the police suspected but could not sufficiently 
demonstrate that the assailant/s were gang members.  The reason for a large proportion of 
excluded events being gang-related is that gang members are less willing to communicate 
with the police in comparison to non-gang-related assailants.  When gang members do 
communicate, the police tend to be apprehensive regarding the reliability of the 
information received.  Furthermore, in fear of their own safety, non-gang-related 
witnesses to gang-related homicides are often apprehensive in supplying the police with 
information.  Regardless of this lack of witness information, the police frequently 
charged a group of assailants who attacked a victim.  However, sometimes the police (or 
Coroner's files) did not or could not identify which assailant was most responsible for 
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delivering the lethal blows.  Such events had to be excluded because as mentioned, this 
study is only concerned with the principal assailant.  In short, a large proportion of the 
excluded events were gang-related because the police typically have less information 
with which to establish who exactly killed the victim25.   
 
In conjunction with this low exclusion rate of 3.94 percent, another powerful aspect of 
the current study is that it is actually based on a population (and not a sample).  Where 
possible, this thesis includes all homicides involving guns or knives occurring in New 
Zealand between 1988 and 1998.  However, there do exist a number of other reasons that 
may slightly inhibit the current study from being a true statistical population.  For 
example, Kapardis (1993) has identified that the misclassification of suicides that are 
actually homicides; unreported missing people; unidentified skeletons and missing people 
never found are all likely to affect the accuracy of any homicide statistics.  Therefore, this 
thesis is unlikely to be based on a true statistical population.  Nevertheless, all avenues to 
secure as true a statistical population as possible have been explored. 
 
In conclusion of the sample selection process section, between the 1st of January1988 and 
the 31st of December 1998 the New Zealand Police investigated 584 homicide events.  
                                                 
25 One anticipated potential methodological criticism of the proposed comparison is that a significant 
proportion of the homicides excluded from analysis were gang-related homicides.  Although the author 
feels justified in excluding these events from the comparison, this exclusion potentially may have increased 
the chances of finding a statistically significant difference in support of Hypothesis 1.  The reason being 
was that it could be argued that gang members often have a preference to kill with firearms, yet due to their 
violent social lives, they are more likely than other types of assailants to have serious violent non-firearm 
related convictions.  Although this would be a valid criticism, this author does not believe it to have 
distorted the results.  This is because of the five events likely to have been purely gang-related, only two of 
them involved guns.  Therefore, even if the police were able to establish the actual assailant responsible for 
the two events involving guns and both assailants had serious non-firearm related convictions – two events 
would have little statistical impact on a sample size of 317 events. 
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With the current study only intending to compare events involving firearms and knives as 
the principal lethal weapon, all other weapons/methods were excluded.  Of these 584 
events, 109 and 221 involved a firearm or a knife as the principal lethal weapon 
(respectively) (n=330).  After 13 events had to be excluded, the proposed comparison 
was based on 104 firearm and 213 knife events (n=317). 
 
Sources Of Data 
 
With Hypothesis 1 requiring a variety of questions to be answered, multiple sources of 
police data were often required.  Each of these sources of data will be briefly described in 
the following. 
 
I. C.I.B Murder Books 26: As mentioned earlier, since 1988 the Criminal 
Investigation Branch of the New Zealand Police have collected annual demographic 
information and an overall outline on every homicide where the police charged an 
assailant/s with committing murder27.  Since their first publication in 1988, the C.I.B 
Murder Books have continuously improved in terms of the quantity of information 
supplied - this was particularly noticeable from the 1993 publication onwards.  This 
source of information included accurate demographic characteristics of both assailants 
and victims.  Also, from 1993 onwards, the 'case summary' section, provided an excellent 
overview of events leading up to and during the actual attack.  Its weaknesses included a 
                                                 
26 Furthermore, for an actual example of the information given in the C.I.B Murder Books see Appendix 2. 
 
27 Included in the books were events where the assailant had committed a ‘homicide suicide’ or had not yet 
been apprehended by the police. 
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lack of detailed information before the 1993 publication, particularly in 1988 and 1989.  
However, the accurate demographic information (for example, names, birth dates, file 
numbers and personal reference numbers), overcame the weaknesses of the earlier 
publications because this data enabled access to other information sources (presented 
below), that were capable of answering any questions of interest.  
 
II. Miller Survey Sheet: In 1996, Dr. Ian Miller (who at the time was the New 
Zealand Police Psychologist) collected data across a wide variety of variables on all 
homicides occurring between 1988 and 1995.  The sample was based on all events 
published in the C.I.B Murder Books and used all of the sources of information 
mentioned below (except the last two).  However, for one variable this research obtained 
information from a source outside the police.  For the 'Cause of Victim's Death' variable, 
the Miller Survey Sheet has the exact ‘cause of death’ quote taken from the Coroner's 
Files28.  This information was not always mentioned in sufficient detail in the C.I.B. 
Murder Books before 1993.  Having these quotes by the Coroner were also valuable in 
multiple weapon attacks for identifying the actual lethal weapon.  Furthermore, these 
quotes typically provided detailed information on the number of wounds inflicted, which 
was vital for identifying those most likely to be determined assailants. 
 
                                                 
28 For an actual example of the information taken from the Coroner’s Files as found in the Miller Survey 
Sheet see Appendix 3. 
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III. The Wanganui Computer29: This source of information is the New Zealand 
Police's national crime database.  By entering an assailant's personal reference number or 
their name and birth date (obtained from the C.I.B Murder Books), an assailant’s 
previous criminal conviction history, if they had one, could be accessed.  As well as 
previous conviction information, this source also provided highly reliable demographic 
information that may have been missing from the C.I.B Murder Books.  If the assailant 
did have a previous criminal record, on the printout of this record was a 'dossier number' 
(see Appendix 4).  A 'dossier number' enabled access to the 'Dossier Microfiche System' 
(discussed below). 
 
IV. Dossier Microfiche System: Contained within each assailants’ criminal conviction 
history was a 'dossier number'.  This number enabled access to the local police reports 
relating to an assailant's criminal convictions (often including in-depth information like 
the actual police interviews with the assailant).  This information source often included a 
more in-depth case summary than that provided in the C.I.B Murder Books for events 
occurring before 1993.  The main weakness of the Dossier Microfiche System was that 
some police officers in charge of a case did not submit this information to the Office of 
the Commissioner so it was not entered onto the microfiche system.  If a homicide had 
occurred before 1993 and no paperwork had been submitted to the Office of the 
Commissioner to be placed on the Dossier Microfiche System, this typically meant there 
was an insufficient amount of information to cover all the questions of interest.  In such a 
                                                 
29 During the completion of this thesis the name and location of the Wanganui Computer changed.  It is 
now called the Law Enforcement System (L.E.S) and it is located in Auckland.  For simplicities sake the 
former term will be used.  Furthermore, for an actual example of the criminal conviction information given 
in the Wanganui Computer see Appendix 4. 
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scenario, a phone interview was conducted with the 'first officer in charge' of a particular 
murder investigation (discussed below). 
 
V. Phone Interview: If the above sources of information did not prove to be 
sufficient in providing answers to the questions of interest, a phone interview was 
conducted with the 'first officer in charge' of a case.  If the first officer in charge had left 
the police, then the second officer in charge was contacted.  Phone calls proved to be a 
highly reliable (although time consuming) source of information.  Officers involved in 
such events typically spent a whole year preparing for the ensuing court case and were 
able to readily recall relevant information.  The main weakness in the phone interviews 
was if the event was a homicide/suicide.  Typically in homicide/suicides the scene 
examination undertaken by the police establishes that an assailant killed the victim and 
then themselves and the case is quickly closed.  Because there is no ensuing court case, 
few officers interviewed by phone were totally confident in their answers to many of the 
questions posed.  Furthermore, no paper work was sent to the Office of the Commissioner 
to be put on the Dossier Microfiche System in homicide/suicides because the assailant 
was no longer alive.  Therefore, the only way to gain complete and reliable information 
on the homicide/suicides (particularly before 1993 when the C.I.B Murder Books were 
sometimes lacking in detail), was to order the Official Murder File from national or local 
archives (see below). 
 
VI. Official Murder File: This source of information is a highly detailed account of all 
aspects of the police investigation into a homicide.  These files include all of the data 
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obtainable from the above sources of information conveniently stored in one place.  
Ordering all of the Official Murder Files would have been the quickest and most reliable 
way to collect the required data (especially considering that from 1989 the Official 
Murder File numbers were published in the C.I.B Murder Books).  Unfortunately, it was 
not financially viable to order several hundred Official Murder Files.  However, for the 
few homicides where there were large gaps in the previous five sources of data, the 
Official Murder Files were ordered.   The most common type of homicides that produced 
gaps in the data were homicide/suicides occurring before 1993 (when the C.I.B Murder 
Books were sometimes lacking in detail).  As a result, the Official Murder File was 
ordered for all the homicide/suicides that occurred before 1993.  
 
Specific Data Collected For Hypothesis 1. 
 
The reader will recall that in Hypothesis 1 it was predicted that those most likely to be 
determined knife assailants (over 19 years old) would be more likely to have previous 
serious violent non-firearm convictions in comparison to those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants (over 19 years old).  To enable Hypothesis 1 to be tested it 
was necessary to isolate which firearm and knife assailants were most likely to be 
determined killers.  Then it was necessary to isolate those assailants who were over the 
age of 19 years old.  Once this had been achieved, it was then necessary to identify which 
of these firearm and knife assailants had previous serious violent non-firearm conviction 
histories.  The following will describe the definitions and data collection processes used 
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to identify those most likely to be determined firearm and knife assailants both over the 
age of 19 who had serious non-firearm convictions before they killed their victims.  
 
1.  Most likely to be a determined assailant: The definition used to identify those 
assailants who were most likely to have been determined to kill their victims was based 
on the method used by Zimring (1968).  That is, the definition of an assailant who was 
most likely to have been a determined killer was when a firearm or knife assailant 
inflicted two or more wounds with their respective weapons.  The data collection process 
used to obtain this information was typically based on what the C.I.B Murder Books 
stated as being the number of wounds inflicted.  If this source did not clearly state the 
required information then the Coroner’s File information in the Miller Survey Sheet was 
consulted.  If both of the above sources proved to be fruitless, the Dossier Microfiche 
System, if available, was often capable of providing the required data.  If all the above 
sources failed to provide reliable data on the number of wounds inflicted, then the event 
was categorised as 'unknown' on the Data Collection Survey Sheet (see Appendix 5). 
 
2.  Assailant was old enough to have developed a representative criminal history: As 
mentioned earlier, an assailant was considered old enough to have developed a criminal 
conviction history that was representative of their non-firearm weapon capabilities if they 
were over 19 years of age.  Therefore, the definition of an assailant having had a 
reasonable amount of exposure to the criminal justice system was any assailant over 19 
years old.  As a result, all assailants under the age of 20 were removed from the proposed 
comparison. 
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 The data collection process used to obtain this information was typically taken from the 
C.I.B Murder Books.  Other equally reliable sources for the assailant's age included the 
Dossier Microfiche System and the Wanganui Computer criminal conviction histories.  If 
these sources failed to provide an answer then the event was categorised as ‘unknown’ on 
the Data Collection Survey Sheet (see Appendix 5). 
 
3.  Previous serious non-firearm convictions: The definition of when an assailant had a 
previous serious non-firearm conviction was any violent conviction not involving a 
firearm that was judged by two experienced police prosecutors to have been likely to 
have resulted in serious to fatal injuries to the victim before they committed their 
homicide.  A ‘serious’ injury was defined as any physical injury likely to have required at 
least two days treatment at a hospital, up to fatal injuries.  After being presented with 82 
different types of violent non-firearm related crimes committed by all the firearm and 
knife assailants, the two prosecutors specifically identified 33 of which they believed 
were most likely to have resulted in serious injuries to the victim (see Appendix 6) – (this 
process is explained in greater detail below).   If an assailant was found to have 
committed one or more of these 33 violent crimes that was likely to have resulted in 
serious injuries to the victim before they committed their homicides, then they were 
identified as having a previous violent serious non-firearm conviction. 
 
The data collection process for identifying which assailants did, and did not, have serious 
non-firearm convictions was initiated by firstly establishing whether or not the assailant 
 63
had a previous criminal conviction history on the Wanganui Computer.  If so, this history 
was printed out and every specific type of violent non-firearm related crime and the 
number of times it had been committed by the assailant before they committed their 
homicide was recorded (see Appendix 4).  This information was then recorded on a 
separate survey sheet for each individual assailant and was called the 'Actual Assailant's 
Previous Violent Convictions sheet (non-firearm only)’.  Each time this writer came 
across a previously un-encountered non-firearm related violent crime on a previous 
criminal conviction history, the title of the crime was added to the bottom of both the 
individual assailant’s ‘Actual Assailant's Violent Conviction Sheet (non-firearm only)’ 
and to a master copy of the ‘Actual Assailant’s Violent Conviction Sheet (non-firearm 
only)’.  So, as the data collection process progressed further through the population of 
assailants, the larger the master copy became.  After about half the population of the 
assailants had had their violent criminal histories processed, the master copy of the 
'Actual Assailant's Previous Violent Conviction Sheet (non-firearm only)' looked like the 
sheet presented in Appendix 7.  At the end of this data collection process the master copy 
of the 'Actual Assailant's Previous Violent Convictions Sheet (non-firearm only)’ was in 
the form shown below in Table 2.  
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Table 2: The master copy of the completed ‘Actual Assailant’s Previous Violent 
Conviction Sheet (Non-Firearm Offences Only)’. 
 
ACTUAL OFFENDER'S PREVIOUS VIOLENT CONVICTION SHEET (NON-FIREARM ONLY)
Event Number: Serious? Offenders name: Serious?
Offense as written in Wanganui computer No. 1=yes ,2=no Offense as written in Wanganui computer No. 1=yes, 2=no
Agg Rob Com Asslt (Domestic) Cr Act (Manually)
Aggravated Assault (Manual) Common Assault
Aggravated Assault (Other Weapon) Common Assault - Domestic (Manually)
Aggravated Assault Stabbing/Cutting Weap Common Assault (Crimes Act) Manually
Aggravated Assaults Common Assault (Crimes Act) Other Wpn
Aggravated Injury (Other Weapon) Common Assault (Domestic Cr Act)(Manually)
Aggravated Robbery Common Assault (Domestic) Oth Wpn
Aggravated Robbery (Manually) Common Assault (Manually)
Aggravated Robbery (Other Weapon) Common Assault-Taxi Driver (Manually)
Aggravated Robbery (Stab/Cut Weapon) Demands To Steal Verbal/Letter Ect)
Aggravated Wounding (Other Weapon) Demands With Intent
Asl Int Com Sexual Violation (No Weapon) Disorderly Behaviour Likely To Cause Viol
Asl Int Com Sexual Violation (Weapon) Fighting in a Public Place
Assault Incite Violence/Disorder/Lawlessness
Assault (Other) Crimes Act Infanticide (Manually)
Assault Beat And Illtreat Injures - Intent To GBH (Manually)
Assault By Male On Female Injures - Intent To GBH (Other Weapon)
Assault Child (Manually) Injures - Intent To Injure Other Weapon
Assault Intent Commit/Facil/Crime Injuring With Intent
Assault On Enforcement Officer Injures Intent To Injure (Manually)
Assault On Female Intent Avoid Arrest Kidnaps (For Gain)
Assault on Female Using Knife Kidnaps (No Gain)
Assault Person Show Intent To Use Weapon Lik/Cau Viol Unlawfl Intmdt/Thrt (Oth Wpn)
Assault Person With Stab/cutting Instumnt Male Assaults Female (Manually)
Assault Police - (Manual) Manslaughter (Other Means) No Legal Duty
Assault Traffic Officer Manslaughter (Weapon) Legal Duty
Assault W/Intent to Facil Escape Non Agg Robbery (Threats To Person)
Assault With Intent To Injure Offensive Behaviour - (Likely to Cause Viol)
Assaults Intent To Rob (Manually) Other Manslaughter
Assaults Intent To Rob (Other Weapon) Other Wounding With Intent
Assaults Person With Blunt Instrument Resist Police
Assaults Police - (Other Weapon) Robbery
Assaults Police (Crimes Act) Robbery (By Assault)
Assaults Police (Crimes Act) Manually Robbery (By Threats to Property)
Assaults Prison Officer Threatening Behaviour
Assaults With Intent To Injure (Manually) Threatening Behaviour - Lke Cause Viol
Assaults With Intent To Injure (Other Wpn)  Threatens To Kill/Do GBH (Manually)
Attempted Agg Robbery Threatens To Kill/Do GBH (Other Weapon)
Attempted Aggravated Robbery Threatens to Kill/Do GBH (Verbally)
Attempts To Murder (Other Weapon) Unlawful Intimidate Threat (Oth Wpn)
Behave Threateningly (Other Weapon) Unlawful Intimidate/Threat (Verbal)
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The next step in the process was to identify which of the above violent crimes were likely 
to have resulted in serious injuries to the victim.  However, the Wanganui criminal 
conviction printouts do not indicate the probable seriousness of the injuries received by 
the victim.  A previous conviction for 'Manslaughter Stab/Cut Weapon (Legal Duty)' 
demonstrated an obvious ability of an assailant to inflict serious injuries to a victim with 
a non-firearm weapon.  However, with regards to the more frequent non-fatal previous 
violent conviction, this assessment of probable seriousness of injuries was not as obvious.  
For example, it was impossible for the author to understand the seriousness of injuries 
that were likely to have been received by the victims of crimes like 'Common Assault 
(Domestic) Crimes Act (Manually)'.   
 
Therefore, this writer had to seek out an alternative way of identifying the probable 
seriousness of injuries that were likely to be associated with the different types of violent 
crimes.  The most suitable way of resolving this problem was to identify people who are 
not only directly involved in the legal processes associated with such violent crimes, but 
are also confronted with the evidence surrounding the physical injuries received by the 
victims of such crimes.  Arguably, the most suitable such people would be police officers 
with substantial experience working in front-line prosecutions. 
 
Therefore, in December 1999 this writer contacted Wellington Central Police Station and 
organised to have a meeting with the Manager of the Prosecutions Section and his most 
experienced front-line prosecutor.  Before attending the meeting, all the violent crimes 
collected on the completed master copy of the 'Actual Assailant's Previous Violent 
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Conviction sheet non-firearm only’ (see Table 2 above), were individually separated with 
scissors.  This resulted in a small pile of strips with every individual type of violent crime 
committed by assailants in the comparison.  Present at the meeting was the Manager of 
Prosecutions for the Central District, Inspector Grant Middlemiss.  Inspector Middlemiss 
had been a police officer for 23 years (with 13 of these years spent as a front-line 
prosecutor).  His colleague was Sergeant Colin McGillivray (with 11 years front-line 
prosecuting experience).   
 
During this meeting the small pile of strips was presented on the meeting table and it was 
explained to the officers what was written on each of the strips of paper.  They were then 
asked: "I would like you to read each of the strips, and based on your extensive 
experience in prosecutions, on average, what kind of physical injuries, whether they be 
'serious’ or 'not serious' injuries do you think the victims of these crimes were most likely 
to have received".  Then they were presented with the following definitions of 'serious’ 
and 'not serious' injuries: 
 
1. Serious Injuries Received: Physical injury likely to have required at least two 
days treatment at a hospital, up to fatal injuries. 
 
2. Not Serious Injuries Received: No physical injury received up to a physical injury 
resulting in no more than one days treatment at a hospital. 
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After agreeing that their assessment would be based solely on their subjective but 
experienced opinions, they quickly started to divide the pile of strips into two separate 
piles.  When one officer was not sure which pile to put a certain strip of paper, they 
consulted with each other and eventually came to an agreement on the most appropriate 
pile.  After they completed this task, both piles were placed into separate envelopes 
labelled Serious Injuries Received and Not Serious Injuries Received.  There were 33 
individual previous violent convictions placed in the Serious Injuries Received envelope 
and 49 individual previous violent conviction placed in the Not Serious Injuries Received 
envelope (see Appendix 6). 
 
Based on the two new categories (‘serious’ and ‘not serious’ injuries received), each 
assailant’s 'Actual Assailant's Previous Violent Convictions non-firearm only’ sheet was 
updated.  Updating these sheets involved coding each assailants’ previous violent non-
firearm convictions as likely to have or have not resulted in serious injuries to the victim 
(see the columns titled ‘serious?’ in Table 2 above).  Importantly, this process enabled the 
identification of those gun and knife assailants who, before they killed their victim, had a 
previous violent conviction that involved a non-firearm weapon and was likely to have 
resulted in serious injuries to the victim.  
 
All data collected for the variables of interest in Hypothesis 1 were recorded on each 
assailants’ survey questionnaire sheet (see Appendix 5).  The data collected on this 
survey questionnaire was later transferred to an Excel data spreadsheet for analysis, 
which produced the results presented in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESULTS AND INITIAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
In the previous chapter Hypothesis 1 predicted that those most likely to be determined 
knife assailants (over 19 years old) would be more likely to have previous convictions for 
serious violent non-firearm offences in comparison to those most likely to be determined 
firearm assailants. 
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Figure 1: A comparison of previous ‘serious’ non-firearm convictions between those 
most likely to be determined knife and firearm assailants. 
 
 69
 Figure 1 demonstrates that 25.23 percent of those most likely to be determined knife 
assailants (over 19 years old) and only 2.94 percent of those most likely to be determined 
firearm assailants (over 19 years old) had previous serious violent non-firearm 
convictions.  Therefore, these results are in support of the prediction made in Hypothesis 
1.  That is, those most likely to be determined knife assailants over the age of 19 were 
more likely to have serious violent non-firearm convictions than those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants over the age of 19.  Furthermore, the difference of 22.29 
percent was statistically significant to the p< 0.005 (Z score = 2.84).  For an insight into 
exactly how these percentage differences presented in Figure 1 were calculated refer to 
Appendix 8. 
 
Initial Implications 
 
What are the important implications that stem from the above results surrounding 
Hypothesis 1?  Earlier it was mentioned that depending on the results obtained from the 
proposed comparison, there were three potential outcomes that a significant reduction in 
the availability of firearms would be likely to have on a society’s rate of homicide.  Due 
to the results surrounding Hypothesis 1 demonstrating that those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants were significantly less likely to have serious violent non-
firearm convictions in comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants, 
this finding suggests that the third outcome and its subsequent effects on the homicide 
rate would be most applicable.  That is, these results suggest that determined firearm 
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assailants are unlikely to be as capable as determined knife assailants at inflicting serious 
injuries with non-firearm weapons.  Therefore, restricting determined firearm assailants 
from accessing firearms would result in the homicide rate decreasing.  The rate of 
homicide would be expected to decrease because determined firearm assailants would not 
appear to be as capable as determined knife assailants at inflicting serious injuries with 
non-firearm weapons.  In short, determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be as 
capable as determined knife assailants at seriously hurting people in the absence of 
guns30. 
 
This writer would argue that the results surrounding Hypothesis 1 are likely to be due to 
non-firearm weapons being both physically and/or psychologically more difficult to use 
in comparison to a firearm (as previously mentioned by Eggers and Peters, 1993).  As a 
result of this increased difficulty, some proportion of ‘determined’ assailants who were 
capable of killing with a gun will not necessarily be capable of successfully killing 
someone with one of the common non-firearm alternative weapons of homicide.   
 
However, irrespective of the above conclusion surrounding the homicide rate 
and the statistically significant evidence that it is based on, there still exist 
reasons to believe that determined firearm assailants may still be as capable as 
determined knife assailants of engaging in lethal weapon substitution.  If these 
reasons proved to be valid this would open up the possibility that, in the absence 
of guns, the rate of homicide may still remain the same.  As a result of these 
possibilities, the following chapter will test the validity of any possible 
alternative reasons to believe that, in the absence of guns, determined firearm 
assailants might, irrespective of the results surrounding Hypothesis 1, still 
                                                 
30Interestingly, it is important to note that this writer believes there exists some variables that once taken 
into consideration, are likely to increase the 22.29 percent difference in serious violent non-firearm 
convictions obtained in the results surrounding Hypothesis 1.  Two of these variables are identified and 
thoroughly tested in Hypothesis 2 in Appendix 9 for the interested reader.  
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engage in lethal weapon substitution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WEAPON AVAILABILITY AND WEAPON SUBSTITUTION TO ‘EASIER’ 
WEAPONS/METHODS OF HOMICIDE 
 
In the previous chapter the results surrounding Hypothesis 1 demonstrated that those 
most likely to be determined firearm assailants were significantly less likely to have 
previous serious violent convictions for non-firearm assaults in comparison to those most 
likely to be determined knife assailants.  This result was initially interpreted as 
demonstrating that determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be as capable as 
determined knife assailants at inflicting serious injuries with non-firearm weapons.  
Therefore, it was concluded that inhibiting determined firearm assailants from accessing 
firearms would be likely to reduce the overall rate of homicide.  However, there may be 
other possible interpretations as to why those most likely to be determined firearm 
assailants had significantly less previous serious violent non-firearm convictions in 
comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants.  Importantly, if these 
other possible interpretations to the results obtained in the previous chapter are valid, 
then inhibiting determined firearm assailants from accessing guns may not reduce the 
overall rate of homicide.   
 
This chapter will explore the validity of two other possible interpretations as to why those 
most likely to be determined firearm assailants had significantly less serious violent non-
firearm convictions in comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants.  
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These two other alternative interpretations to the results obtained focus on weapon 
availability and weapons substitution to physically and/or psychologically easier 
weapons/methods of homicide.   
 
First Alternative Interpretation To The Results Obtained For Hypothesis 1: Determined 
Firearm Assailants Have Access To Guns To Use In Violent Situations 
 
The first other possible interpretation as to why the firearm assailants had significantly 
fewer previous serious violent non-firearm convictions than their counterparts who used 
knives may have been because they had access to firearms to settle any of their violent 
encounters.  This possible interpretation to the results obtained would suggest that, in 
terms of violent non-firearm capabilities, determined firearm and knife assailants are 
equally capable.  However, because determined firearm assailants had access to firearms, 
they did not need to engage in previous acts of non-firearms violence.  However, if 
access to firearms is why those most likely to be determined firearm assailants had 
significantly fewer previous convictions for serious non-firearm related assaults, then 
evidence should be able to support the following assertions: 
 
i) Those most likely to be determined firearm assailants should have greater access 
to firearms in comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants. 
ii) Due to not having access to firearms, those most likely to be determined knife 
assailants should have a greater dependency on non-firearm weapons. 
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In relation to the first point, assuming that when a person has been granted legal access to 
firearms they would have the easiest and most convenient means of acquiring such 
weapons, it is obvious that determined firearm assailants with firearm licenses were 
likely to have greater access to firearms than the determined knife assailants without 
firearm licenses.  However, the accessibility of firearms to determined firearm assailants 
without such licenses is not so obvious.  One potential measure of such peoples' access to 
firearms in comparison to determined knife assailants (without firearm licenses) may be 
found in both groups’ previous convictions for the illegal possession and carrying of 
firearms.  If the argument that having access to firearms explains why the firearm 
assailants had significantly fewer serious violent non-firearm offences is true, then 
determined firearm assailants (without licenses) should have significantly more previous 
convictions for the illegal possession and carrying of firearms in comparison to 
determined knife assailants (without licenses).   
 
In relation to the second point, if determined knife assailants do not have access to guns, 
this alternative interpretation would also suggest that determined knife assailants (without 
licenses) should have had a greater dependency on non-firearm weapons than determined 
firearm assailants (without licenses).  A potential measure that may demonstrate a 
determined knife assailant’s apparent greater dependency on non-firearm weapons in 
comparison to determined firearm assailants might be found in their previous convictions 
for the illegal possession and carrying of non-firearm weapons.  If the argument that 
having access to firearms explains why the firearm assailants had significantly fewer 
serious violent non-firearm offences is true, then determined knife assailants, unable to 
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access firearms, should have significantly more previous convictions for the illegal 
possession and carrying of non-firearm weapons.   
 
Therefore, if this first possible alternative interpretation to the results obtained from 
Hypothesis 1 relating to issues of weapon access is likely to be correct, then evidence 
should be found in support of the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 331: Those most likely to be determined firearm assailants (without firearm 
licenses) will be more likely to have previous convictions for the illegal possession and 
carrying of firearm weapons in comparison to those most likely to be determined knife 
assailants (without firearms licenses). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Those most likely to be determined knife assailants (without firearm 
licenses) will be more likely to have previous convictions for the illegal possession and 
carrying of non-firearm weapons in comparison to those most likely to be determined 
firearm assailants (without firearm licenses). 
 
Method 
 
The following method will be used to test the validity of Hypotheses 3 and 4.  The 
specific data collected for each of the hypotheses will be described.  These descriptions 
will include the definitions of any key variables and the actual sources of information 
used in the data collection process. 
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 Specific Data Collected For Hypothesis 3 
 
In Hypothesis 3 the first possible alternative interpretation predicted that those most 
likely to be determined firearm assailants (without licenses) will be more likely to have 
previous convictions for the illegal possession and carrying of firearm weapons in 
comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants (without licenses).  To 
enable Hypothesis 3 to be tested it was necessary to isolate which firearm and knife 
assailants did not hold a current firearms license, which were determined to kill, and if 
the two types of assailants had at least one previous conviction for the illegal possession 
or carrying of a firearm.  The following will describe the definitions and data collection 
process used to identify each of the above mentioned variables.  
 
1.  Firearm and knife assailants without firearm licenses: The definition of an assailant 
without a firearm license was all the assailants left in the population when all the 
assailants with firearm licenses had been removed.  Therefore, those assailants with 
firearm licenses had to be ascertained first.  An assailant with a firearm license was 
defined as any assailants who held a current New Zealand firearms license (of any type) 
at the time they killed their victim. 
 
The data collection process used to obtain this firearm license information for events 
occurring after 1992 was based on searches using the Wanganui Computer which 
accurately indicated an assailant’s firearm license history.  However, for events occurring 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 If the reader is wondering what happened to Hypothesis 2, refer to Footnote 30. 
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from 1988 until the end of 1992, occasionally all traces indicating that an assailant held a 
firearm license were wiped from the Wanganui Computer.  This 'purging from the 
system' as it is referred to by the police, typically occurred when local Arms Officers 
revoked an assailant’s license because they had shot somebody.  Therefore, the firearm 
license status of all assailants responsible for events occurring before 1993 had to be 
ascertained by using alternative sources of information to those events occurring after 
1992.  The first alternative source of firearm license status information was to search the 
Dossier Microfiche System.  If this failed to reveal the assailant’s license status then a 
personal phone call was made to the Arms Officer where the event took place.  The Arms 
Officers were asked to manually research their own records to ascertain the firearm 
license status of the assailant.  If this failed then the assailant's firearm license status was 
categorised as unknown.  Once the firearm license status of all the assailants had been 
clarified, those who held such licenses or those whose firearm license status was 
unknown were removed from the comparison leaving only assailants who did not hold a 
firearm license.  
 
2.  Most likely to be a determined assailant: The definition and data collection process 
used to ascertain whether an assailant was most likely to have been a determined killer 
was based on the same as that used in Hypothesis 1 (presented earlier on page 62). 
 
3.  Previous conviction for the illegal possession or carrying of a firearm: An assailant 
was defined as having had a previous conviction for the illegal possession or carrying of 
firearms when an assailant had one or more criminal conviction for possessing or 
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carrying a firearm on their criminal conviction history before they killed their victim.  
More specifically, these crimes, as spelt in the Wanganui Computer included; 'Possess 
F'arm W/out License (16 Or Over)'; 'Possess Offensive Weapon (Firearm)'; ‘Possess 
Pistol Unlawfully'; 'Possess/Carry F/arm Ect - No Lawful Purp'; ‘Unlawful Possession Of 
Firearm'; 'Unlawful Possession Of Pistol'.  If an assailant had one or more of these 
convictions, then they met the criteria of having a previous criminal conviction for the 
illegal possession or carrying of a firearm. 
 
The data collection process used to obtain this information was solely based on the 
Wanganui Computer criminal conviction history printouts. 
 
Specific Data Collected For Hypothesis 4 
 
In Hypothesis 4 the first alternative interpretation predicted that those most likely to be 
determined knife assailants (without licenses) will be more likely to have previous 
convictions for the illegal possession and carrying of non-firearm weapons in comparison 
to those most likely to be determined firearm assailants (without licenses).  To enable 
Hypothesis 4 to be tested it was necessary to isolate which firearm and knife assailants 
did not hold a current firearms license, which were most likely to be determined to kill 
and if the two types of assailants had at least one previous conviction for the illegal 
possession or carrying of a non-firearm weapon.  The following will describe the 
definitions and data collection process used to identify each of the above mentioned 
variables.  
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 1.  Firearm and knife assailants without firearm licenses: The definition and data 
collection process used to ascertain whether an assailant did not hold a firearms license 
was the same as that used in Hypothesis 3 (as mentioned above). 
 
2.  Most likely to be a determined assailant: The definition and data collection process 
used to ascertain whether an assailant was most likely to have been a determined killer 
was based on the same as that used in Hypothesis 1 (presented earlier on page 62). 
 
3.  Previous conviction for the illegal possession or carrying of a non-firearm weapon: 
An assailant was defined as having had a previous conviction for the illegal possession or 
carrying of a non-firearm weapon when they had one or more criminal conviction for 
possessing or carrying a non-firearm weapon on their criminal conviction history before 
they killed their victim.  More specifically, these crimes, as spelt in the Wanganui 
Computer, included; 'Possess Offensive Weapon (Other)'; 'Carry Offensive Weapon 
(Other Weapon)'; 'Offensive Weapon'; 'Possess Knife In Public Place (Summ Off)'.  If an 
assailant had one or more of these convictions, then they met the criteria of having a 
previous criminal conviction for the illegal possession or carrying of a non-firearm 
weapon. 
 
The data collection process used to obtain this information was based solely on the 
Wanganui Computer criminal conviction history printouts. 
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All data collected for the variables of interest in Hypothesis 3 and 4 were recorded on 
each assailant’s survey questionnaire sheet (see Appendix 5).  The data collected on this 
survey questionnaire was later transferred to an Excel data spreadsheet for analysis which 
produced the following results. 
 
Results 
 
As mentioned previously, it was thirdly hypothesised that those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants (without firearm licenses) would be more likely to have 
previous convictions for the illegal possession and carrying of firearm weapons in 
comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants (without firearm 
licenses).   
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Figure 3: Those most likely to be determined knife and firearm assailants (both without 
firearm licenses) who did and did not have at least one previous conviction for the illegal 
possession or carrying of a firearm.  
 
 
The results presented in Figure 3 demonstrate that 4.54 percent of those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants (without licenses) and 5.51 percent of those most likely to 
be determined knife assailants (without licenses) had previous convictions for the illegal 
possession and carrying of firearms32.  This finding is not consistent with the direction of 
Hypothesis 3 and the difference of 0.97 percent was not statistically significant to the 
p>0.06 (Z score = 0.0022).  Therefore, the results do not support hypothesis 3.  The 
implications stemming from this result will be discussed following the presentation of the 
results surrounding Hypothesis 4. 
 
                                                 
32 For an insight into exactly how these percentage differences presented in Figure 3 were calculated, refer 
to Appendix 11. 
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As mentioned earlier, it was fourthly hypothesised that those most likely to be determined 
knife assailants (without firearm licenses) would be more likely to have previous 
convictions for the illegal possession and carrying of non-firearm weapons in comparison 
to those most likely to be determined firearm assailants (without firearms licenses).  
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Figure 4: Those most likely to be determined knife and firearm assailants (both without 
firearm licenses) who did and did not have at least one previous conviction for the illegal 
possession or carrying of a non-firearm weapon. 
 
 
The results presented in Figure 4 demonstrate that 13.64 percent of those most likely to 
be determined firearm assailants (without licenses) and 15.75 percent of those most likely 
to be determined knife assailants (without licenses) had previous convictions for the 
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illegal possession and carrying of non-firearm weapons33.  Although this finding is 
consistent with the direction of the hypothesis, the difference of 2.11 percent was not 
statistically significant to the p> 0.05 (Z score = 0.0041).  Therefore, the results do not 
support Hypothesis 4. 
 
So what do the results surrounding both Hypothesis 3 and 4 mean?  As discussed earlier, 
the first possible alternative interpretation suggested that determined firearm assailants 
had less previous serious violent non-firearm convictions because they had access to guns 
to be violent with.  Furthermore, it was asserted that knife assailants did not have similar 
access to firearms and therefore would have to rely on non-firearm weapons to be violent 
with.  The above results would appear to refute this first possible alternative 
interpretation of the results surrounding Hypothesis 1.  This is because those most likely 
to be determined knife and firearm assailants (both without firearm licenses) would 
appear to have remarkably similar access to firearms (see Figure 3). 
 
However, particularly damning of the first possible alternative interpretation is the 
finding that those most likely to be determined firearm assailants (without licenses) were 
just as likely to carry or possess non-firearm weapons as determined knife assailants 
(without licenses).  Yet, as demonstrated in Figure 1 (presented earlier), those most likely 
to be determined firearm assailants are much less likely to have used such weapons to 
inflict serious injuries in comparison to those most likely to be determined knife 
assailants.  In short, the firearm assailants were just as likely to carry non-firearm 
                                                 
33 For an insight into exactly how these percentage differences presented in Figure 4 were calculated, refer 
to Appendix 12. 
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weapons as the knife assailants, except they were much less likely to have used such 
weapons on victims to inflict serious injuries.  Interestingly, this observation would 
appear to further strengthen this writer’s initial interpretation regarding the results 
surrounding Hypothesis 1.  That is, determined knife assailants are more likely to be 
capable of inflicting serious injuries with non-firearm weapons in comparison to 
determined firearm assailants. 
 
Therefore, this observation is in conflict with one of the prominent historical arguments 
in this area of the firearms debate.  That is, the mere availability of any lethal weapon is 
apparently an important factor in an attack ending fatally.  For example, Topping (1952, 
cited in Wolfgang, 1958: 79) points out that in 70 years of homicide in Canada ‘the most 
significant factor was the presence of a suitable weapon’ – whether it be a firearm or non-
firearm weapon.  However, if those most likely to be determined firearm assailants 
(without firearm licenses) are just as likely to carry non-firearm weapons as those most 
likely to be determined knife assailants (without licenses) – why are they much less likely 
to use them to seriously hurt anybody?  This observation would suggest that factors far 
more powerful than the mere possession and availability of non-firearm weapons are 
involved in homicide. 
 
In sum, the above results demonstrate that those most likely to be determined firearm 
assailants are unlikely to have significantly fewer previous serious non-firearm violent 
convictions in comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants because 
they had access to guns to use in any violent confrontations they might encounter.  This 
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is because those most likely to be determined firearm assailants (without firearm licenses) 
seem to have remarkably similar access to firearms to those most likely to be determined 
knife assailants (without firearm licenses).  Furthermore, those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants are just as likely to carry and possess non-firearm weapons 
as assailants who actually killed with such weapons – however, the firearm assailants are 
much less likely to have previously used such weapons to seriously hurt anybody with 
them.  As a result, this writer discredits the validity of the first possible alternative 
conclusion that could be drawn from the results surrounding Hypothesis 1.  
 
Second Alternative Interpretation To The Results Obtained For Hypothesis 1: Engaging 
In Physically And/Or Psychologically Easier Methods Of Lethal Weapon Substitution 
 
If it is assumed that determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be as capable as 
determined knife assailants at inflicting serious injuries with the commonly used close-
contact non-firearm weapons of homicide, is it possible that in the absence of guns 
determined firearm assailants would seek out physically and/or psychologically easier 
ways of killing?  The following will explore the validity of this second possible 
alternative interpretation that could be drawn from the results surrounding Hypothesis 1.  
For example, in the absence of guns, would assailants who are incapable of stabbing, 
bludgeoning or beating their victims to death just substitute guns with physically and/or 
psychologically less demanding methods, like, poisoning or committing an act of arson 
on their victim's house?  If this is how those with a preference for using firearms would 
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act in the absence of guns, irrespective of the results surrounding Hypothesis 1, the rate 
of homicide may not decrease but remain the same.   
 
However, for the following reasons, this second possible alternative interpretation would 
be unlikely to occur.  As pointed out by Wolfgang (1958:80): ‘Our cultural prescriptions 
dictate a relatively narrow range of weapons from which an individual assailant makes 
his choice.’  In other words, there are a small variety of weapons that the vast majority of 
assailants will make their selection from and it is unusual for assailants to consider 
weapons and methods of homicide outside this narrow range.  In developed nations this 
narrow range of culturally prescribed weapons predominantly involves knives, guns, 
bludgeoning objects and manual beating (see Wolfgang (1958) for the United States; 
Chapdelaine, Samson, Kimberley and Viau (1991) for Canada, and Vinson (1974) and 
Strang (1993) for Australia).  Even in the current study Table 1 (presented earlier) 
demonstrates that 86 percent (or 493 out of 574) of all events where the weapon type was 
known involved a knife, gun, manual beating or bludgeoning object (respectively).  Of 
importance is that in the absence of guns, none of the three remaining commonly used 
close contact weapons of homicide are the type that would be associated with being 
physically and/or psychologically easier to use in comparison to a firearm.   
 
Further reinforcing the above argument is an observation earlier presented by Lester 
(1991) and Killias (1993).  That is, both authors noticed that countries with low rates of 
firearm homicide did not experience a compensatory increase in any types of non-firearm 
homicide.  If there was any form of weapon substitution towards what might be thought 
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to be physically and/or psychologically harder or easier methods of homicide - they were 
obviously not ending in fatalities.  Reinforcing this observation, but using a time-series 
approach (as opposed to the cross-sectional methods employed by Lester and Killias), is 
the data from Table 1 (presented earlier).  
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Figure 5: Homicide by weapon/method in New Zealand between 1988-1998 (n=57434)35. 
 
                                                 
34 Excludes ‘weapon unknown’ category from Table One (n=10).  Furthermore, the Suffocation, Drowning, 
Poison, Fire, Carbon Monoxide, Motor Vehicle and Other categories presented in Table 1 have collectively 
been termed as ‘Other’ in Figure 5. 
35 This graph demonstrates an obvious decrease in the rate of firearm related criminal homicide.  However, 
it should be kept in mind that this graph is based on single ‘events’ and not the number of victims killed per 
event.  Because firearm related criminal homicides are much more likely to result in multiple fatalities in 
comparison to non-firearm related events - if the graph was based on the number of actual victims killed, 
the above decrease would not be as pronounced. 
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Figure 5 demonstrates that between 1988 and 1998 there has been a gradual and 
consistent decrease in firearm homicide in New Zealand.  More specifically, out of the 
six different weapons/methods of attack presented in Figure 5, the firearm was the most 
commonly used weapon in 1988 (with 22 events involving firearms), yet by 1998 it had 
dropped to second to last place (with only 4 such events).  Regardless of its probable 
cause, the above graph reinforces the earlier conclusion made by Lester (1991) and 
Killias (1993).  That is, as the rate of firearm homicide has experienced a rapid decrease, 
there has not been an obvious compensatory increase in both common and/or uncommon 
methods of homicide.  This relative absence of a compensatory increase in non-firearm 
methods of criminal homicide is reflected in the gradual overall decrease in the total 
number of events from 60 in 1988 to 49 in 1998 (see Figure 5 above) 36.  As a result of 
the above information, this writer discredits the validity of the second possible alternative 
conclusion that could be drawn from the results surrounding Hypothesis 1.  That is, in the 
absence of guns assailants with a preference for firearms are unlikely to substitute to 
physically and/or psychologically easier weapons or methods of homicide. 
 
To conclude this chapter, determined firearm assailants are unlikely to have significantly 
fewer serious violent non-firearm convictions in comparison to those most likely to be 
determined knife assailants because they had access to guns to use in any violent 
confrontations they encountered.  Furthermore, the above information demonstrates that 
in the absence of guns, determined firearm assailants are unlikely to lethally substitute 
                                                 
36 This decrease predominantly appears to be due to the decline in firearm related criminal homicides.  
Although there only seems to be about 10 less events it is important to remember that because firearm 
homicides are more likely to result in multiple victim homicides (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997), the actual 
number of victims killed is likely to be greater than the number of events. 
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guns with physically and/or psychologically less demanding weapons or methods of 
homicide.  The following chapter will discuss the implications that the elimination of the 
above two possible alternative interpretations has on the results obtained surrounding 
Hypothesis 1.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
With the elimination of the only two possible alternative interpretations that could be 
identified surrounding the results obtained for Hypothesis 1, this author favours the 
original interpretation of these results.  That is, based on arguably the most reliable 
predictor of future violent non-firearm capabilities, determined firearm assailants are 
unlikely to be as capable as determined knife assailants at inflicting serious injuries with 
the commonly used non-firearm weapons of homicide.  As a result, in the absence of 
guns, this writer is persuaded that a proportion of determined firearm assailants would 
not be capable of lethal weapon substitution.  Therefore, this thesis concludes that 
inhibiting determined firearm assailants from accessing guns in the future would be likely 
to reduce the overall rate of homicide.  
 
Firstly, this conclusion has important implications regarding the validity of Wolfgang’s 
(1958) weapon substitution hypothesis.  For example, if determined firearm assailants 
are, as the results surrounding Hypothesis 1 suggest, unlikely to be as capable of lethal 
weapon substitution as determined knife assailants, then it would not matter if all firearm 
assailants are, as Wolfgang had argued, ‘determined to kill’.  It would not matter because 
as these results demonstrate, in the absence of guns, not all determined firearm assailants 
are likely to be as capable of lethal weapon substitution as their counterparts who used 
knives.  Therefore, inhibiting determined firearm assailants from accessing firearms 
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would still be likely to reduce the rate of homicide.  Therefore, the results surrounding 
Hypothesis 1 would appear to discredit the validity of Wolfgang’s weapon substitution 
hypothesis.  By more directly discrediting the validity of Wolfgang’s hypothesis, this 
thesis has (assuming it is correct) achieved its main aim.  
 
Secondly, if Wolfgang’s hypothesis has been discredited, then the consensually held 
belief that Wolfgang’s study initiated will also have been discredited37.  Therefore, in 
conflict with the consensually held belief formed by authors including Wolfgang (1958), 
Zimring (1968), Cook (1981), Kleck (1991) and Kopel (1992) – not all determined 
firearm assailants are likely to be capable of lethal substitution.  Therefore, the results 
from this thesis, which demonstrate that not all determined firearm assailants are likely to 
be capable of lethal weapon substitution, conflict with both Wolfgang’s weapon 
substitution hypothesis and the consensually held belief. 
 
Subsequently, if some proportion of determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be 
capable of lethal weapon substitution, what effect would inhibiting access to guns have 
on those firearm assailants not so determined to ensure their victims died?  Obviously the 
answer to this question is that if some proportion of determined firearm assailants are 
unlikely to be capable of killing in the absence of guns, the remaining proportion of those 
not so determined to kill are likely to be even less capable. Therefore, the above 
conclusion that suggested inhibiting determined firearm assailants from accessing guns in 
                                                 
37 As mentioned earlier, the consensually held belief differs from Wolfgang’s weapon substitution 
hypothesis in that Wolfgang believed all firearm assailants were determined.  In the consensually held 
belief some proportion of assailants were believed to be determined.  The proportion depended on a 
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the future would be likely to reduce the overall rate of homicide requires updating.  That 
is, this thesis now concludes that restricting firearm access to all potential firearm 
assailants would be likely to reduce the overall rate of homicide.  Based on this 
conclusion it is therefore recommended that those people most at risk of committing 
homicide with guns need to be identified and such people must be inhibited from 
accessing these deadly weapons.   
 
Importantly, is this thesis able to generalise this conclusion and its corresponding 
recommendation onto the focus of this thesis – the United States?  This possibility will be 
explored later.  However, what is more certain is that this conclusion is most applicable to 
the country that the evidence in this thesis is based on.  Due to the data in this thesis 
being based on a New Zealand population, the strongest possible conclusion is that 
restricting firearm access to all potential firearm assailants is likely to reduce the overall 
rate of homicide in New Zealand.  Therefore, it is recommended that those most at risk of 
committing homicide with guns in New Zealand need to be identified and such people 
need to be inhibited from accessing firearms.  However, as the following will 
demonstrate, reflected in a number of policies introduced throughout the early 1990s, it 
would appear the New Zealand Government has already seriously attempted to move in 
the direction of this recommendation. 
 
 
New Zealand And Gun Control In The 1990s 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular author’s subjective definition of who was and who was not likely to be determined to kill their 
victim/s. 
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 Due to the mass murder of 13 people in Aramoana in 1990 and a number of similar 
overseas tragedies, mounting public pressure was placed on the New Zealand 
Government to introduce more effective and restrictive gun control measures.  By the end 
of 1992 this pressure had materialised into legislation with the Arms Amendment Act 
1992.  This legislation aimed to ensure that those who were to have the easiest and most 
convenient access to firearms (that is, those to be granted firearm licenses), were both fit 
and proper.  Fit and proper meant that they were unlikely to use their firearms to hurt 
themselves and/or others and that they were likely to be responsible with their weapons 
and prevent them from falling into unfit and/or irresponsible hands.  More specifically the 
Amendment resulted in the previous lifetime license being changed to a 10-year license 
system (where a more rigorous selective vetting process would screen out those people 
believed to be unsuitable).  In addition, military style semi-automatics rifles had to be 
registered.  The new legislation introduced policies aimed at restricting firearm access to 
those believed to be at highest risk of using such weapons to hurt themselves and/or 
others. The high-risk groups targeted tended to be those with violent tendencies and 
mental health histories.  By attempting to eliminate gun access to those believed to be 
most at risk of using guns to hurt others, the Arms Amendment Act was already aiming 
to achieve the above recommendation made by this thesis.   
 
Indicators suggest that some policies evolving out of the new legislation have been 
successful in restricting gun access to such high-risk groups.  For example, and as 
mentioned, one of the policies that aimed to restrict such people from having easy access 
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to firearms was by developing a more systematic, selective and rigorous police vetting 
system for re-applying licensees and new applicants.  This thesis has identified that the 
new police vetting system seems to have been successful in meeting this aim of the 
legislation because high-risk groups, like people with violent criminal histories, became 
even less likely than before the legislation to receive a firearms license.  For example, 
before the legislation was introduced, eight out of the 24 licensees who committed a 
firearm homicide between 1988 and 1992 had one or more violent non-firearm related 
convictions (all of which were in the ‘not serious’ injuries received category).  However, 
after the new legislation became law in mid-December 1992, none out of the 10 licensees 
who committed a firearm homicide between 1993 and 1998 had such convictions.  This 
observation demonstrates both that the required standard had increased and that the New 
Zealand Government (via the New Zealand Police) had become much more careful in 
who they granted the easiest means of accessing firearms38.  Interestingly, other 
indicators suggest that the legislation may have been successful in keeping guns out of 
the hands of people at ‘high-risk’ of using guns to hurt others.  Take for example data 
taken from this thesis in Figure 6 (below). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Thorp’s (1997: 115) independent firearms review also found the vetting system to be rigorous, describing 
it as ‘outstandingly the most useful feature of the present system.’ 
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Figure 6: Firearm assailants with and without firearm licenses who committed a homicide 
(n=104).  
 
Excluding the most obvious feature of Figure 6 – that firearm homicide in New Zealand 
has decreased, also noticeable is the sudden difference in the rate of firearm homicide 
before and after the legislation became law.  Another indicator possibly demonstrating 
the success of the legislation is that firearm assailants were much more likely to hold a 
current firearms license before rather than after the introduction of the legislation.  
However, this observation should be viewed with caution because this reduction in 
firearm assailants with licenses appeared to be declining before the legislation was 
introduced.  Furthermore, this pattern could also be due to the declining licensee 
population.  For example, according to Thorp (1997), in 1991 there were 327,000 
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licensed firearm owners, however by 1997 this number had reduced to 210,000 (a 36 
percent decrease).   
 
Irrespective of what may have caused the proportion of firearm assailants with firearm 
licenses to diminish, the proportion of firearm assailants without licenses has, except for 
1995 and 1998, remained relatively constant (see Figure 6 above).  One possible 
explanation for this constant pattern is that irresponsible storage and handling practice by 
licensed owners has directly or indirectly enabled unlicensed users to access firearms.  
Support for the ‘irresponsible storage’ possibility is provided by Alpers and Walters 
(1998: 93) who found that out of the 88 incidents of incidents of firearms theft they 
investigated, 52 percent of the weapons were insecurely stored by the licensed owner.  As 
a result, the authors concluded that: ‘[licensed] New Zealand gun owners, either 
accidentally or intentionally, continue to leave firearms unsecured.’  And in relation to 
irresponsible handling practices, Thorp (1997) discovered that a significant proportion of 
a small sample of licensees were willing to sell their firearms to a buyer who said they 
held a firearm license39.  Based on the above information it is of little surprise that Alpers 
(1996) identified that a large proportion of assailants who committed firearm homicides 
who did not have firearm licenses unlawfully acquired their guns from the collections of 
licensed owners.  This observation is reinforced by Newbold’s (1999: 75) survey on the 
acquisition of illegal firearms by prison inmates when he said ‘It appears that the bulk of 
                                                 
39 More specifically, three out of 14 licensees who had advertised their firearms for sale in a local 
newspaper were prepared to sell their weapons to a person who said they held a firearms license. 
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sporting guns available on the black market have originally been stolen from legitimate 
owners40.’ 
 
Therefore, although indicators suggest that the Arms Amendment Act has 
possibly improved the ‘fitness’ of those who have the easiest access to firearms, 
other indicators suggest it may be failing to ensure licensees are as ‘responsible’ 
as they could be in regards to the storage and handling of their firearms.  
Importantly, with the identification of this potential deficiency in the legislation 
regarding irresponsible storage and handling practices by some licensees, 
independent advisors have already provided the New Zealand Government with 
potential solutions to these problems, (which are currently being debated in 
Parliament)41.  
                                                 
40 It is important to note that Newbold does not totally blame illegal firearm access on licensed owners.  
Newbold (1999: 76) points out that even if licensees were abiding by the 1992 amendments by securely 
storing their weapons, the guns were still at risk of falling into the hands of unlicensed users.  This, 
Newbold argues, is because ‘much of the time these [gun] cabinets are easily broken into and the locks on 
them may serve as an advertisement that guns are contained within.’  As a result, Newbold supports 
Thorp’s (1997) recommendation to the New Zealand Government that the firearm storage provision in the 
1992 Amendment be tightened (for example, guns should be stored in a strong room or safe). 
41 To encourage licensees to be more responsible in regards to their firearm 
storage and handling practices, Thorp (1997) has recommended that every 
legally owned firearm be individually registered with the New Zealand 
Government.  This is believed to encourage more responsible storage and 
handling practices of licensed owners because should their firearms 
irresponsibly fall into the hands of an unlicensed user and the police obtain the 
weapon, it is highly likely that the firearm will be traced back to a possibly 
negligent legal owner.  The probable effectiveness of introducing a national 
registration system appears to be supported by the main academic contributors 
in New Zealand (see Alpers and Walters, 1998; Newbold, 1999).  However, 
Newbold has questioned whether the benefit would justify the expense.  This is 
an important point considering there were only four firearm homicide events in 
New Zealand in 1998 (see Table One).  If registering all legally owned firearms in 
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 Importantly, what the above information demonstrates is that for the past decade the New 
Zealand Government has already undertaken measures that are consistent with the 
principal recommendation stemming from this thesis.  That is, over the past decade the 
New Zealand Government has introduced a number of gun control measures in an 
attempt to restrict firearm access to those believed to be most at risk of hurting others 
with guns.  This point is reinforced by Newbold (1999: 77) who said ‘Although access to 
firearms has been restricted in this country for many years, it is more restricted now than 
ever’.  Furthermore, where research and independent inquiries have identified potential 
deficiencies in the 1992 legislation, the New Zealand Government has at least been 
willing to consider introducing the most effective potential solutions.  Therefore, with the 
main recommendation of this thesis already being considered by the nation for which it is 
most applicable, can the results, conclusion and recommendation stemming from this 
thesis be generalised to the focus of this thesis – the United States?   
 
Generalising And Applying The Results, Conclusion And Recommendations Of This 
Thesis To The United States Of America 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
New Zealand is very expensive, the money spent may be better utilised in other 
areas where there may be a greater potential to save more lives.  For example, the 
money spent might save more lives if utilised on road safety.  However, if 
registration is relatively inexpensive, then it may be well worth introducing such 
policies (especially considering that, irrespective of there only being four events 
in 1998, there will always be the risk that the rate of firearm homicide by 
assailants without licenses in New Zeland could significantly increase in the 
future). 
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Due to this thesis being based on a population of New Zealand homicides, its results, 
conclusion and recommendation cannot simply be generalised onto other nations like the 
United States.  This will not be possible until the methodology used in this thesis is 
undertaken on an American sample.  However, due to the focus of this thesis being on the 
American gun control debate, what kind of results do any present indicators suggest 
would be found if the current study was undertaken on an American sample?  More 
specifically, would an American sample of those most likely to be determined firearm 
assailants have significantly less previous serious violent non-firearm convictions in 
comparison to those most likely to be determined knife assailants (as they did with the 
New Zealand population in Hypothesis 1)?  Or is it possible they could have the same or 
even more such convictions? 
 
One present indicator suggests that, per-capita, Americans are likely to be more capable 
of inflicting serious non-firearm injuries than New Zealanders because their rate of non-
firearm homicide is more than twice that of New Zealand's rate (2.71 versus 1.13 per 
100,000 respectively) (United Nations International Study of Firearm Regulations, 1998).  
Therefore, with or without guns, this statistic demonstrates that Americans are more 
likely to be capable than New Zealanders of engaging in lethal weapon substitution with 
non-firearm weapons.  However, this difference in non-firearm homicide between New 
Zealand and the United States appears less impressive when one considers that the rate of 
firearm homicide in the United States is over 28 times higher than that in New Zealand.  
More specifically, the rate of firearm homicide in the United States and New Zealand is 
6.24 versus 0.22 per 100,000 (respectively) (United Nations International Study of 
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Firearm Regulations, 1998).  Therefore, based on the relatively similar rates of non-
firearm homicide between New Zealand and the United States, this writer is persuaded 
that undertaking a similar study to this thesis using an American sample would be likely 
to reveal fairly similar results to those found in support of Hypothesis 1. 
 
Based on the likelihood of an American sample producing similar results to those found 
in this thesis, it is suggested that inhibiting all potential firearm assailants from accessing 
guns would be likely to reduce the rate of homicide in the United States.  Therefore, it is 
recommended that those most at risk of killing with firearms in the United States need to 
be identified and inhibited from accessing these weapons. 
 
Based on the above recommendation, it is important to identify who is most at risk of 
killing with firearms in the United States.  As in New Zealand, the United States 
Government has already introduced policies aimed at identifying and inhibiting firearm 
access to those believed to be most at risk of killing with firearms.  For example, 
according to Jacobs and Potter (1995: 93) ‘Keeping firearms out of the hands of 
dangerous and irresponsible persons is one of, if not the primary goal of the United States 
gun control policy.’  So who is targeted as being dangerous and irresponsible?   
 
Wintemute, Wright, Parham, Drake and Beaumont (1999) research on a Californian 
sample reinforced other American studies when it demonstrated that the vast majority of 
applicants denied legal firearm access were declined because of previous criminal 
convictions (mostly for violence).  Therefore, it would seem the United States 
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Government has identified people with prior criminal convictions (particularly for 
violence) as being the most heavily targeted dangerous and irresponsible risk group.   
According to Wintemute and others, with 80,000 ineligible applicants per year, the 
federal screening process appears to be somewhat successful in identifying and denying 
legal firearm access to this targeted high-risk group.  Therefore, employing a similar 
logic to that used in New Zealand, the United States has attempted to restrict the legal 
supply of firearms to the group they have identified as being those most likely to hurt 
others with guns42. 
 
However, irrespective of these measures, Morgan (1997) has argued that Americans with 
prior criminal convictions still have easy illegal access to firearms.  This statement is 
reinforced by prison inmate surveys investigating criminal access to firearms (Wright and 
Rossi, 1986; Zawitz, 1995).  Considering that 13 percent of those surveyed in Zawitz’s 
inmate study were in possession of a firearm for the crime that they were presently in 
prison for – these assertions of easy firearm access cannot be discounted as mere 
exaggerations by the inmates.  Furthermore, with 94.5 percent of gang-related homicides 
in Los Angeles in 1994 involving firearms and most of these assailants being too young 
to legally own the most common type of firearm used in such events (handguns) – this 
                                                 
42 However, the American federal vetting system does not appear to be as strict as the New Zealand system.  
For example, Wintemute et al. (1998: 22) points out that ‘No jurisdiction denies firearms purchase to all 
persons having a history of prior criminal activity, and many thousands of persons with such histories pass 
background checks and purchase firearms legally.’  In New Zealand such people would be strictly deemed 
ineligible to obtain a handgun license (a common type of firearm purchased in the United States).  In fact, 
having such a past would significantly reduce the chances of a prospective licensee getting a long-gun 
license.  Furthermore, the American federal vetting system does not involve a reference check with a close 
associate of the prospective licensees (a pre-requisite for any type of firearm license in New Zealand) 
(Thorp, 1997).  Finally, it is not unusual for the vetting system in the United States to fail in identifying all 
ineligible applicants due to deficiencies with the criminal conviction databases (Jacobs and Potter, 1995).  
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high risk group obviously has easy access to firearms (Hutson, Anglin, Kyriacou, Hart 
and Spears, 1995).  
 
If measures have been put in place to inhibit people with prior criminal convictions from 
legally accessing guns in the United States, then how is this high-risk group able to 
access firearms?  As in New Zealand, evidence suggests that this high-risk group is 
directly and indirectly illegally accessing the weapons of legal owners (Cook, Molliconi 
and Cole, 1995).  Again, like New Zealand, it appears the American system may have 
improved the fitness of those who legally own firearms, but is failing to reduce or inhibit 
irresponsible handling and poor storage practices by legal owners.  For example, in 
relation to irresponsible handling practices, legal firearm owners in America are able to 
give or sell their weapons on to ineligible people (Cook et al., 1995).  Because legally 
owned weapons can be passed on to ineligible people with little chance of reprimand or 
accountability this creates a great opportunity for the highest risk group (particularly 
ineligible violent criminals), to obtain guns.  Exacerbating this potential source of 
weapons supply to high-risk ineligible groups in the United States is that in many states 
eligible owners are able to buy more than one firearm per purchase.  In the Multinational 
Monitor (1998: 17), Professor David Kairys highlighted this common source of weapons 
supply when he stated that law enforcement officials had discovered: 
[T]hat 30 percent of the handguns purchased in the Philadelphia area were 
purchased by someone who bought three or more in that period and averaged over 
five…..  What are people doing with three cheap, rapid-firing, quite lethal, small 
handguns?  These are not collectors’ items.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
In a small country like New Zealand, this ‘slipping through the cracks’ is, relatively speaking, much less 
likely to occur. 
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Furthermore, Kairys (1998) has argued that lax gun laws are enabling gun manufacturers 
to indirectly supply weapons to ineligible ‘high-risk’ owners43.  When typically ineligible 
owners use these weapons in violent crimes the resulting fear of lethal violence further 
promotes legitimate and illegitimate gun sales.  And more guns means more violent 
crimes (a perpetuating cycle) (see Harding (1983) and Zimring & Hawkins (1997) for a 
similar argument).  Interestingly, supporting the validity of Kairys’ (1998: 7) argument 
was an affidavit made by Robert Hass, a former Senior Vice President of Marketing and 
Sales for Smith and Wesson (the largest handgun manufacturer in the world), when he 
said:  
 
The company and industry as a whole are fully aware of the extent of the criminal 
misuse of firearms.  The company and the industry are also aware that the black 
market in firearms is not simply the result of stolen guns but is due to the seepage 
of guns into the illicit market from multiple thousands of unsupervised federal 
firearms licensees.  In spite of their knowledge, however, the industry’s position 
has consistently been to take no independent action to insure responsible 
distribution practices. 
 
In relation to poor storage, Weil and Hemenway (1992) found that one-third of legal 
firearm owners kept their weapons insecurely stored.  This statistic makes Wright and 
Rossi’s (1986) discovery, that the bulk of guns stolen by prison inmates came from the 
collections of private residents, unsurprising.  Importantly, the legally owned weapons in 
Weil and Hemenway’s sample were stored insecurely so they could be readily accessed 
to provide protection.  This is because for a firearm to be effective in the provision of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43 Kairys (1998) has even argued that the advertising and marketing campaigns have specifically targeted 
the high-risk violent criminal.  For example, it is quite obvious which market is being targeted when a 
poster explicitly promotes one of the key features of a particular brand of firearm as having ‘excellent 
resistance to finger prints’ (see Appendix 13 for this poster). 
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protection is must be, by definition, insecurely stored (for example in a bedside cabinet).  
However, having guns for protection creates a dilemma because insecure storage creates 
a great opportunity for the highest risk group of hurting others with guns (ineligible 
criminals) to directly gain access to firearms (or indirectly by the stolen guns feed into 
the black market (see Cook et al. (1995)). 
 
Irrespective of the latest research that has been used to condemn the usefulness of 
nationally registering all firearms44, such gun control measures are an internationally 
popular way to reduce irresponsible handling and poor storage habits by licensees is to 
introduce a national firearm register (see Zimring and Hawkins, 1987; Thorp, 1997, 
United Nations International Study of Firearm Regulations, 1998).  As mentioned, this is 
because a legal owner’s irresponsible handling and storage practices can be identified and 
they can therefore potentially be held accountable for their negligence.  However, unlike 
in New Zealand, at this stage, the United States Government is unwilling to even consider 
a gun control measure such as a national firearms registration system.  This is due to a 
public perception that enabling the introduction of one significant gun control measure 
will enable the introduction of others until guns are prohibited and are no longer available 
for their most popular use - protection45.  Since most Americans obtain guns mainly for 
                                                 
44 Mouzos (2000: 1) has written what has been described as a ‘path-breaking’ study which investigates the 
licensing and registration status of firearms used in homicide.  This study may have been interpreted by 
some gun control critics as evidence that Australia’s recently implemented national firearm registration 
system has had little effect on reducing the rate of homicide.  Appendix 14 provides a critique of this study 
that identifies a fundamental flaw that should inhibit this study from being misused in the gun control 
debate in the future. 
45 ‘In the case of registration, the principal potential villain is public and gun-owner perception that 
accountability measures are merely one further step towards prohibition.’ (Zimring, 1981: 4). 
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the purpose of protection46, insecure storage is a much greater problem in the United 
States than in New Zealand.  This is because in New Zealand it is illegal to own guns for 
the explicit purpose of protection, therefore when guns are not being used (predominantly 
for hunting), legal owners are aware that by law their guns must be securely stored.   
 
Although Cook and Moore (1995: 286) have argued that the key to successfully 
restricting firearm access involves finding a way ‘to keep guns out of the hands of “bad 
guys” without denying access to the “good guys”, the gun crimes would fall without 
infringing on legitimate uses of guns’.  However, this appears to be impossible because 
the most popular legitimate purpose of guns for the ‘good guys’ in the United States is to 
provide protection, and for reasons just mentioned, having guns for protection, by 
definition, often directly and indirectly results in putting guns in the hands of ‘bad guys’. 
 
Therefore, building on the works of Kairys (1998), Zimring and Hawkins (1997) and 
Harding (1983), this writer would argue that an unwillingness to introduce a national gun 
registration system and enabling guns to be legitimately purchased for the purpose of 
protection, places the United States in a unique and perpetuating cycle of lethal violence.  
This is because without a national registration system and allowing guns to be 
legitimately purchased for protection directly and indirectly results in supplying firearms 
to those most likely to use them to kill others (violent criminals).  This avenue of weapon 
supply results in a high rate of homicide, which promotes a national fear of lethal 
violence.  A fear of lethal violence encourages an increase in the legal and illegal demand 
                                                 
46 Guns are typically purchased legally or illegally by both eligible and ineligible users for the use of 
protection (see Lott (1998) and Wright and Rossi (1986) respectively). 
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for firearms for the purpose of protection and when violent criminals are able to access 
guns, then they are able to use them to hurt others – completing the cycle.  To more 
specifically demonstrate the general characteristics of this cycle, consider the theoretical 
diagram in Figure 7 (below).   
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Figure 7 demonstrates that there are two independent cycles; not having a national 
firearms register is likely to enable one cycle to perpetuate, and, enabling guns to be 
purchased for the legitimate purpose of providing protection perpetuates another.  It 
could be argued that the carrying of concealed firearms would inhibit the above cycle 
from perpetuating because licensees carry their guns on themselves personally and 
therefore their weapons are securely stored.  However, concealed firearm permit holders 
are unlikely to be willing and/or able to carry a concealed firearm when they are, for 
example, sleeping, bathing or playing sports.  And unless all such people can be trusted 
to store these weapons in a secure environment when they are not being personally 
carried, then the weapons are susceptible to theft (as Weil and Hemenway (1992) found).  
Because these weapons are specifically used for protection, when they are not being 
carried on the owners’ body, they are more likely to be insecurely stored near by and 
ready for action.  For example, in the bedside table when sleeping or bathing and in a 
sports bag or the glove box of a car when playing sport.   
 
In fact, encouraging greater numbers of people to carry guns for the purpose of protection 
(as the popular ‘carry and conceal’ handgun legislation has), only increases the statistical 
probability that these weapons will end up in the hands of those most likely to use them 
in lethal acts of violence.  This is because more guns means the greater likelihood of an 
opportunistic burglar or thief stumbling across an insecurely stored weapon in, say a 
house or motor car.  Consequently, in conflict with the title of Lott’s (1998) book ‘More 
Guns, Less Crime’, from a statistical perspective a more accurate title might be ‘More 
Guns, More Homicide’.  Although the United States Government has undertaken some 
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measures to inhibit the highest risk groups from legally accessing guns, illegal avenues of 
weapons supply are still enabling such groups to obtain firearms.  Due to a fear of 
restrictive gun control measures and an obsession with protection, these identified 
sources of weapons supply to high-risk groups is likely to continue.  As a result, the 
United States is unlikely to experience the low rates of homicide maintained by all the 
other developed nations (and the majority of undeveloped ones too).       
 110
CHAPTER SIX 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has argued that the lack of consensus that has continued to plague the 
homicide area of the gun control debate in the United States, in part, stems from 
Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis.  The weapon substitution hypothesis 
argued that in the absence of guns, all firearm killers would have lethally substituted guns 
with non-firearm alternatives.  Firstly, this thesis demonstrated how the weapons 
substitution hypothesis inhibited both academic and political progress from the 1960s 
through to the early 1990s.  The hypothesis inhibited progress in the academic debate 
because it could not be directly discredited.  If it could not be discredited then restricting 
firearm access could still potentially result in all assailants who would prefer to use a gun 
to engage in lethal weapon substitution.  This possibility flowed over into the political 
gun control debate inhibiting progress via the political slogan ‘guns don’t kill people, 
people kill people’.  By the early 1990s the majority of academic evidence suggested that 
after 30 years of inhibiting academic and political progress, Wolfgang’s hypothesis was 
unlikely to be true.  However, because research was incapable of directly and irrefutably 
discrediting the hypothesis, although declining in strength, it could still be found exerting 
its influence in the political/public debate (and occasionally in the academic literature47). 
 
                                                 
47 For example, Cook and Moore (1995) make reference to the possible, although unlikely, validity of 
Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis. 
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Although, by the 1990s, firearm researchers were finally freed of the confounding effects 
of the weapon substitution hypothesis, academic progress has still not been able to 
irrefutably clarify whether less guns in the United States would increase, decrease or have 
no effect on the current rate of homicide.  This thesis asserts that the weapon substitution 
hypothesis may still be having an influence on the modern debate and could, in part, be 
implicitly responsible for the continued lack of progress in this research area.  Initiated by 
Wolfgang (1958), most of the main contributors to this area of the gun debate formed a 
‘consensually held belief’: assailants who are determined to kill with firearms would be 
more than capable of killing with non-firearm weapons.  Interestingly, the consensually 
held belief implies that the best predictor of lethal weapon substitution is whether a 
person was determined to kill their victim.   
 
However, based on Mischel’s (1968) logic, it was argued that the best possible predictor 
of lethal weapon substitution was more likely to be whether or not firearm assailants were 
as capable of killing as non-firearm assailants using non-firearm weapons.  With the 
intention of thoroughly and directly testing the validity of Wolfgang’s weapon 
substitution hypothesis and the consensually held belief it initiated, a workable 
methodology was developed which eventually produced the following comparison.  The 
thesis intended to undertake a comparison between those most likely to be determined 
firearm assailants to those most likely to be determined knife assailants both over 19 
years old.  These two types of assailants were to be compared on their previous abilities 
to engage in acts of violence involving non-firearm weapons that were likely to have 
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resulted in serious injuries to the victims (based on the assailants’ previous violent 
criminal convictions).   
 
Based on the above proposed comparison, Hypothesis 1 predicted that those most likely 
to be determined knife assailants (over 19 years old) would be more likely to have 
previous serious violent non-firearm convictions in comparison to those most likely to be 
determined firearm assailants (over 19 years old).  The results demonstrate that 25.23 
percent of those most likely to be determined knife assailants but only 2.94 percent of 
those most likely to be determined firearm assailants had previous serious non-firearm 
convictions48.  Therefore, this statistically significant difference was clearly in support of 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
So what conclusions were drawn from this result?  After eliminating any possible 
alternative interpretations to the results surrounding Hypothesis 149, the results indicated 
that determined firearm assailants were unlikely to be as experienced as determined knife 
                                                 
48This result is in stark contrast to Zimring’s (1968: 726) data that demonstrated that ‘guns and knives are 
used by the same sorts of people’.  The data in this thesis suggests that people who use guns and knives to 
kill with seem to differ in the most important way – an ability to inflict serious injuries with non-firearm 
weapons. 
49 Firstly, it was possible that the reason the determined firearm assailants were less likely to have previous 
serious non-firearm convictions in comparison to the determined knife assailants was because they had 
access to guns and therefore could use these weapons in any violent situation they encountered.  However, 
this possibility was eliminated because firearm and knife assailants (both without licenses) seemed to have 
remarkably similar access to firearms (see Figure 3 presented earlier).  Furthermore, the determined firearm 
assailants (without firearm licenses) were just as likely to carry non-firearm weapons as determined knife 
assailants (without licenses), however they were much less likely to use them to seriously hurt anybody.  
The second potential alternative conclusion to be explored was that even if determined firearm assailants 
were less likely to be capable of lethal weapon substitution with the physically and/or psychologically more 
demanding common alternative weapons – they may just substitute to less demanding alternative weapons.  
For example, those incapable of stabbing, bludgeoning or physically beating a victim to death, would just 
poison or set fire to their victim’s house.  This possibility was eliminated because replicated cross-sectional 
research has demonstrated that countries with low firearms availability do not experience compensatory 
increases in homicide involving any types of weapons or methods of attack.  Furthermore, using a different 
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assailants at engaging in non-firearm related assaults causing serious injuries to the 
victim.  Based on the assumption that a person’s previous capability to cause serious 
injuries with non-firearm weapons would tend to be the best predictor of whether they 
were capable of engaging in lethal weapon substitution, the following conclusion was 
presented.  The results surrounding Hypothesis 1 suggest that determined firearm 
assailants were unlikely to be as capable as determined knife assailants at engaging in 
lethal weapon substitution.  In short, the results suggested that without guns, determined 
firearm assailants were less likely to be as capable of lethal weapon substitution in 
comparison to determined knife assailants.  Therefore, it was initially concluded that 
inhibiting determined firearm assailants from accessing guns would be likely to reduce 
the rate of homicide. 
 
Importantly, this initial conclusion implied that if determined firearm assailants were, as 
the results surrounding Hypothesis 1 suggested, unlikely to be as capable of lethal 
weapon substitution as determined knife assailants, then it would not matter if all firearm 
assailants are, as Wolfgang (1958) has argued, ‘determined to kill’.  It would not matter 
because as these results suggested, in the absence of guns, not all determined firearm 
assailants were likely to be as capable of lethal weapon substitution as their counterparts 
using knives.  Therefore, preventing determined firearm assailants from accessing 
firearms would still be likely to reduce the rate of homicide.  Therefore, the results 
surrounding Hypothesis 1 appeared to discredit the validity of Wolfgang’s weapon 
                                                                                                                                                 
research technique (time-series), results from this thesis have further reinforced the validity of this 
conclusion. 
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substitution hypothesis.  By more directly discrediting the validity of Wolfgang’s 
hypothesis this thesis, assuming it is correct, therefore achieved its main aim.  
 
Furthermore, if Wolfgang’s hypothesis has been discredited, then the consensually held 
belief that Wolfgang’s hypothesis initiated will also have been discredited50.  Therefore, 
in conflict with the consensually held belief formed by authors including Wolfgang 
(1958), Zimring (1968), Cook (1981), Kleck (1991) and Kopel (1992) – not all 
determined firearm assailants are likely to be capable of lethal substitution.  Therefore, 
the results from of this thesis, which demonstrate that not all determined firearm 
assailants are likely to be capable of lethal weapon substitution, conflict with both 
Wolfgang’s weapon substitution hypothesis and the consensually held belief. 
 
Importantly, if some proportion of determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be 
capable of lethal weapon substitution, what effect would inhibiting firearm access have 
on those firearm assailants not so determined to ensure their victims died?  This thesis 
concludes that if a proportion of determined firearm assailants are unlikely to be capable 
of killing in the absence of guns, the remaining proportion of those not so determined to 
kill are likely to be even less capable.  As a result, this thesis updated its initial 
conclusion to the following: inhibiting all potential firearm assailants from accessing 
guns would be likely to reduce the overall rate of homicide.  Based on this conclusion it 
was therefore recommended that those most at risk of committing homicide with guns 
                                                 
50 As mentioned earlier, the consensually held belief differs from Wolfgang’s weapon substitution 
hypothesis in that Wolfgang believed all firearm assailants were determined.  In the consensually held 
belief some proportion of assailants were believed to be determined.  The proportion depended on a 
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need to be identified and such people must be prevented from accessing these deadly 
weapons.   
 
Since this thesis was based on a New Zealand population, this recommendation was most 
applicable to the New Zealand gun control debate.  However, due to the New Zealand 
Government currently debating the viability of a gun registration system, arguably, the 
most important final loop-hole that had previously prevented them from inhibiting gun-
access to those most at risk of fatally using such weapons may be overcome.   
 
However, were the results, conclusion and recommendation stemming from this thesis 
applicable to the focus of this thesis, the United States?  Due to the United States having 
a relatively similar rate of non-firearm homicide, it was suggested that a replication of the 
methodology used in this thesis using an American sample would be likely to produce 
similar results.  Therefore, this writer felt justified in generalising the results, conclusion 
and final recommendation of this thesis onto the United States.  That is, inhibiting gun 
access to those most at risk of using such weapons is likely to reduce the rate of homicide 
in the United States.   
 
Currently, the United States is unwilling to introduce those policies that would be most 
effective in inhibiting firearm access to those at greatest risk of hurting others with guns.  
This is because the United States is not prepared to introduce a national firearms 
registration system or prohibit the ownership of firearms for the legitimate purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular author’s subjective definition of who was and who was not likely to be determined to kill their 
victim/s. 
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protection.  Although some may view policies to reduce homicide that focus solely on 
firearms as being over-simplistic, other would not.  For example, Zimring and Hawkins 
(1997: 200) have argued: 
 
No program for the prevention of lethal violence can possess even superficial 
credibility without paying sustained attention to guns.  Without strategies for the 
reduction of firearm use in assaults, no policy can be accurately characterized as 
directed at the reduction of American lethal violence. 
 
With Americans currently unwilling to consider the recommended policies, irrespective 
of any recent decreases in the overall rate of homicide51, the United States looks likely to 
maintain a rate of homicide that most European nations have not had since some time 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Spierenburg, 1994)52.   
 
Therefore, to conclude this thesis with an answer to the quote at the beginning of Chapter 
One - would a ‘no guns’ condition in the United States increase, decrease or have no 
effect on the homicide rate?  Based on the assumption that the similar results would be 
obtained for Hypothesis 1 if a similar study was undertaken on an American sample53, in 
conjunction with the argument that citizens using unregistered guns for the purpose of 
protection directly or indirectly supplies guns to those most likely to use such weapons in 
                                                 
51 See Blumstein & Rosenfeld (1998). 
52 Based on the collective findings of a number of research projects, the rate of homicide in England in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was 15 and 7 per 100,000 (respectively) (see Stone, 1983; Beattie, 1986; 
Robert-Gurr, 1981; all cited in Spierenburg, 1994).  Since the early 1970s, the rate of homicide in the 
United States has typically hovered around the 10 per 100,000 mark (Zimring & Hawkins, 1997). 
53 Which would demonstrate that a proportion of firearm assailants in America are unlikely to be capable of 
lethal weapon substitution. 
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violent situations: Then, this thesis concludes that a ‘no-guns’ condition would reduce the 
rate of homicide in the United States54.  
 
Recommendations For Future Research 
 
Based on the main limitation of this thesis being that it has used a New Zealand 
population to shed light on an American problem, the first recommendation for future 
research would be to replicate the methodology used in this thesis using an American 
sample.  Such research would overcome the biggest limitation that has inhibited the 
current study from more confidently predicting what would happen to the rate of 
homicide in the United States if those most at risk of killing with firearms were inhibited 
from accessing such weapons.  Furthermore, because American researchers are more 
likely to have access to much larger samples of homicide than the current study, the 
following more robust comparison to the one undertaken in this thesis is recommended55.  
A larger sample should undertake a comparison between those most likely to be 
determined firearm and knife assailants regarding their previous capabilities to kill with 
non-firearm weapons. 
 
The second recommendation for future research relates to the wider application of 
Mischel’s (1968) predictor of future behaviour.  Possibly the most important contribution 
                                                 
54However, the strength of this final conclusion is weakened by the assumption that an American sample 
would produce similar results to this thesis.  Although this writer has argued that this would be unlikely, it 
is still a possibility.  As a result, this assumption is believed to be a major limitation of this thesis. 
55This thesis originally intended to compare those most likely to be determined knife and firearm assailants 
in regards to their previous capabilities to kill with non-firearm weapons.  However, as mentioned, this 
comparison could not be undertaken because this thesis did not have access to a big enough sample that 
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of this thesis is that it has introduced what tends to be the most accurate predictor of 
future behaviour to the American gun control debate.  By applying Mischel’s (1968) 
predictor to this highly controversial research area, this thesis was able to demonstrate 
how powerful it was in discrediting the validity of what this author would argue is likely 
to be the most resistant and influential pieces of literature affecting the homicide area of 
the gun debate in the United States – Wolfgang’s (1958) weapon substitution hypothesis.  
With what this writer believes is a solid result from its first application to the gun control 
debate, the question begs – what potential does Mischel’s predictor hold in contributing 
to other highly controversial areas of this research area?  As the following will 
demonstrate, arguably, one such area is the highly controversial ‘defensive use of 
firearm’ research. 
 
This thesis would argue that Mischel’s (1968) predictor may have the potential to shed 
light on a currently un-testable aspect surrounding the ‘defensive uses of firearms’ 
research.  As mentioned earlier, Kleck and Gertz (1995) have pointed out that 400,000 of 
the two and a half million defensive gun users believed that their guns ‘almost certainly’ 
saved a life.  The difficulty in criticising the accuracy of these beliefs is that it is 
impossible to know if, in the absence of guns, whether or not these apparently thwarted 
‘criminal attacks’ would have actually ended in a fatality.  Or as Wolfgang (1995: 188) 
said in relation to Kleck and Gertz’s (1995) study: ‘it is hard to believe.  Yet it is hard to 
challenge the data collected.  We do not have contrary evidence.’  It is possible that these 
beliefs are accurate or alternatively, as Cook and Moore (1995: 272) have argued ‘It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
could detect a difference in the fairly unusual behaviour of having previously killed with a non-firearm 
weapon. 
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quite possible that most “self-defense” uses occur in circumstances that are normatively 
ambiguous…..encounters with groups of young men who simply appear threatening.’  
The point is, it is currently not known if defensive gun uses are saving the lives of 
innocent citizens or unnecessarily promoting and escalating the overall rate of homicide.   
 
A potential way of shedding light on this dilemma would be to adapt the methodology 
used in this thesis by comparing the previous serious violent convictions of the ‘criminal 
predators’ who were killed in defensive firearm and non-firearm uses.  This writer would 
hypothesise that the ‘criminal predators’ killed in defensive non-firearm uses would have 
significantly more previous serious violent convictions in comparison to ‘criminal 
predators’ killed in defensive firearm uses.  The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that a 
defensive non-firearm user must really fear for their lives if they are prepared to 
overcome great physical and/or psychological barriers that would normally inhibit them 
from engaging in such a brutal and close-contact attack.  Reinforcing the likelihood of 
evidence supporting this hypothesis is McDowall, Loftin and Wiersema’s (1992b, cited 
in Cook and Moore, 1995) research that demonstrated that defensive non-firearm uses 
would appear to differ in important ways to defensive firearm uses.  For example, the 
defensive use of a non-firearm weapon typically occurs after an assailant attacks or 
threatens to attack.  However, with the defensive use of a firearm, typically it is the 
defender who is first to threaten or attack.  This finding would suggest that many 
defensive gun uses may have been against ‘criminal predators’ who had no intentions of 
attacking the ‘victims’ who used guns to protect themselves.  However, McDowall and 
others research only demonstrated that people who use guns to protect themselves are 
 120
more likely to introduce a firearm at an earlier stage of their threatening situation than 
people who use non-firearm weapons to protect themselves.  It is still possible that all 
defensive gun uses could have resulted in the defender being attacked if the defender 
introduced the gun at a later stage in the conflict.  It is impossible to say one way or the 
other.   
 
However, comparing the previous violent convictions between the ‘criminal predators’ 
killed in defensive firearm and non-firearm attacks may indicate whether the ones killed 
by guns were either more, less or of the same violent capabilities to those killed by non-
firearm weapons.  Therefore, the second recommendation for future research would be to 
compare the previous violent convictions between the ‘criminal predators’ killed in 
defensive firearm and non-firearm attacks.  This comparison would identify whether or 
not defensive firearm users were likely to have been in as much danger of being seriously 
attacked as defensive non-firearm users were. 
 
The final recommendation for future research relates to a question that may 
naturally stem from the conclusion reached regarding the results surrounding 
Hypothesis 1.  That is, why are determined firearm assailants less likely to be as 
capable of lethal weapon substitution in comparison to determined knife 
assailants?  With the general acceptance of Zimring’s (1968, 1972) weapon 
instrumentality effect56, the answer to this question is likely to relate to various 
instrumental characteristics unique to the firearm weapon.  Zimring (1972) has 
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presented a variety of potential characteristics, mostly revolving around the 
‘power’ instrumental characteristics.  For example, probably an important factor 
is that unlike with other weapons or methods of homicide, one quick and light 
touch of a firearm’s trigger can unleash a massive and incomparable blow.  But 
since Zimring’s study there has been a relative absence of further progress on 
more specifically and rigorously identifying what these characteristics might be.  
This is reflected in Cook’s (1991: 18) statement: ‘the various mechanisms that are 
responsible for the instrumentality effect have not been completely analyzed or 
documented.’  This writer would argue that a probable reason for this lack of 
progress may be explained by an important point made by Wolfgang and 
Ferracuti (1982: 1) who said: ‘as specialization increases, scholars reach the point 
where they begin to ask significant questions that cannot be answered 
satisfactorily within their own framework.’  As a result, this writer would argue 
that the more scientific identification of the instrumental characteristics of 
firearms may lie in other academic disciplines.  Therefore, the final 
recommendation for future research is to challenge other academic disciplines 
outside law and criminology to contribute ideas that may identify why some 
people may be able to kill with guns but be incapable of killing with non-firearm 
weapons57. 
                                                                                                                                                 
56 That is, becoming a victim of homicide is largely a matter of chance and the more lethal the weapon 
involved, the more likely an attack will end in a fatality. 
57 This writer has already taken up his own challenge.  However, most of what has been found is work in 
progress.  Nevertheless, Appendix 15 will present the work in progress from one of the three other 
academic disciplines that is currently being explored by this writer. 
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APPENDIX 1: The 13 Different Weapon Category Definitions 
 
FIREARM: A firearm was defined as any weapon that was capable of expelling a 
projectile that was initiated by an explosive charge.   
 
KNIFE: A knife was defined as any type of piercing or cutting instrument.  For example, 
if used to pierce or cut, a machete, pencil, screwdriver, butchers knife, all meet the 
definition of what will, for simplicity’s sake, from now on be generically termed 'knives'.   
 
BLUDGEON: A bludgeoning weapon was defined as any hand-held blunt object that was 
external of the human body that was used to beat the victim with, for example, a softball 
bat, golf club, a brick.   
 
MANUAL BEATING: A manual beating weapon was defined as any part of the 
assailant's body that was used in a punching, kicking and/or striking fashion. 
 
STRANGULATION: Strangulation was defined as any technique, whether done 
manually or with some external object, that blocked the airway passages around the 
victim's neck area, for example, grabbing the victim around the throat and throttling 
them.  Also included was tying panty hose around the victim's neck and squeezing 
tightly. 
 
SUFFOCATION: Suffocation is defined as inhibiting the victim from breathing by 
covering the mouth and nose using any external object excluding water, for example, 
smothering somebody with a pillow. 
 
DROWNING:  Drowning was defined as inhibiting the victim from breathing through the 
mouth or nose by submerging their head in water. 
 
POISON: Poison was defined as any gas (excluding carbon-monoxide poisoning or 
smoke inhalation), liquid or solid substance internally taken by the victim eventually 
resulting in death. for example, gas poisoning or drugs overdose. 
 
FIRE: Fire was defined as being burnt to death or when the victim is killed due to smoke 
inhalation (as a result of a fire). 
 
CARBON MONOXIDE: Carbon Monoxide poisoning is defined as being when a victim 
is forced to breath the carbon monoxide fumes that typically come from a motor vehicle. 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE: Motor vehicle was defined as being physically struck by such an 
object.  It did not include being poisoned by the carbon monoxide fumes generated by a 
motor vehicle. 
 
OTHER: Other was defined as any other way a victim may have been killed excluding 
any of the above categories. 
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UNKNOWN:  The weapon category of an event was termed 'Unknown' if the police or 
the Coroner did not know what kind of weapon was used or involved multiple weapons 
and the principal weapon most responsible for killing the first victim could not be 
established.  
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APPENDIX 2: An Actual Example Of An Event Selected From The C.I.B Murder Books  
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APPENDIX 3: An Actual Example Of The Type of Information Given In The Coroner’s 
Files As Found In The Miller Survey (Two Examples Given) 
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APPENDIX 4: An Actual Example Of The Type of Information Given In The Wanganui 
Computer (Two Examples Given) 
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APPENDIX 5: Data Collection Survey Sheet For Variable Of Interest58
 
 
OFFENDER AND EVENT INFORMATION
Event Number:
Question Codes C.I.B Murder Microfiche Wanganui Miller Survey Phone Official
Books Dossier Computer Sheet Interview Murder File
Gun or Knife? 1=knife, 2=gun
Multiple wounds? 1=yes, 2=no, 99=u/k x x
Victim precipitated? 1=yes, 2=no, 99=u/k x x
Offender over 19 years? 1=yes, 2=no, 99=u/k x x
Mental health history mentioned? 1=yes, 2=no x x x
Firearm license? 1=yes, 2=no, 99=u/k <1993 >1992 <1993
Prev. convic. poss./carry firearm? 1=yes, 2=no
Prev. convic. poss./carry non-firearm weap? 1=yes, 2=no
Serious non-firearm conviction? 1=yes, 2=no
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 The black boxes basically mean that the corresponding source of data was unable to provide data on the 
particular question of interest.  Also, the last two questions (the ‘serious non-firearm convictions’ had to 
undergo the data collection process mentioned in the first method sections before it could be answered. 
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APPENDIX 6: Previous Violent Non-Firearm Criminal Convictions Categorised As 
Likely To Have Resulted In Serious And Not Serious Injuries To The Victim59. 
 
1. SERIOUS INJURY (n=33): Agg Rob; Aggravated Robbery; Aggravated Assault 
(Manual); Aggravated Assault (Other Weapon); Aggravated Assaults; Aggravated 
Injury (Other Weapon); Aggravated Robbery (Other Weapon); Aggravated 
Robbery (Stab/Cut Weapon); Aggravated Wounding (Other Weapon); Asl Int 
Com Sexual Violation (No Weapon); Asl Int Com Sexual Violation (Weapon); 
Assault on Female Using Knife; Assault Person With Stab/cutting Instumnt; 
Assault With Intent To Injure; Assaults Intent To Rob (Manually); Assaults Intent 
To Rob (Other Weapon); Assaults Person With Blunt Instrument; Assaults Police 
- (Other Weapon); Assaults With Intent To Injure (Manually); Assaults With 
Intent To Injure (Other Wpn); Attempts To Murder (Other Weapon); Infanticide 
(Manually); Injures - Intent To GBH (Manually); Injures - Intent To GBH (Other 
Weapon); Injures - Intent To Injure Other Weapon; Injures Intent To Injure 
(Manually); Injuring With Intent; Manslaughter (Other Means) No Legal Duty; 
Manslaughter (Weapon) Legal Duty; Other Manslaughter; Other Wounding With 
Intent; Robbery (By Assault); Aggravated Assault Stabbing/Cutting Weap. 
 
2. NOT SERIOUS (n=49): Behave Threateningly (Other Weapon); Demands With 
Intent; Disorderly Behaviour Likely To Cause Viol; Fighting in a Public Place; 
Incite Violence/Disorder/Lawlessness; Aggravated Robbery (Manually); Assault 
Intent Commit/Facil/Crime; Assault On Enforcement Officer; Assault On Female 
Intent Avoid Arrest; Assaults Police (Crimes Act); Assaults Prison Officer; 
Attempted Agg Robbery; Common Assault (Crimes Act) Other Wpn; Male 
Assaults Female (Manually); Assault Beat And Illtreat; Assault Child (Manually); 
Assaults Police (Crimes Act) Manually; Robbery; Assault (Other) Crimes Act; 
Assault By Male On Female; Kidnaps (For Gain); Kidnaps (No Gain); Lik/Cau 
Viol Unlawfl Intmdt/Thrt (Oth Wpn); Non Agg Robbery (Threats To Person); 
Offensive Behaviour - Likely to Cause Viol); Resist Police; Robbery (By Threats 
to Property); Threatening Behaviour; Threatens To Kill/Do GBH (Manually); 
Threatens To Kill/Do GBH (Other Weapon); Threatens to Kill/Do GBH 
(Verbally); Unlawful Intimidate Threat (Oth Wpn); Demands To Steal 
Verbal/Letter Ect); Threatening Behaviour - Lke Cause Viol; Unlawful 
Intimidate/Threat (Verbal); Assault W/Intent to Facil Escape; Assault Person 
Show Intent To Use Weapon; Assault Police - (Manual); Attempted Aggravated 
Robbery; Com Asslt (Domestic) Cr Act (Manually); Common Assault; Common 
Assault - Domestic (Manually); Common Assault-Taxi Driver (Manually); 
Common Assault (Crimes Act) Manually; Common Assault (Manually); Assault; 
Common Assault (Domestic) Oth Wpn; Common Assault (Domestic Cr Act) 
(Manually); Assault Traffic Officer. 
                                                 
59 The two envelopes contained the following individual violent convictions (spelt as they were in the 
criminal conviction histories taken from the Wanganui Computer). 
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APPENDIX 7: Actual Assailants Previous Violent Conviction Sheet For Non-Firearm 
Offences Only (Halfway Through The Data Collection Process). 
 
ACTUAL OFFENDER'S PREVIOUS VIOLENT CONVICTION SHEET (NON-FIREARM ONLY)
Event Number: serious? Offenders name: serious?
Offense as written in Wanganui computer No. 1=yes, 2=no Offense as written in Wanganui computer No. 1=yes, 2=no
Agg Rob Resist Police
Aggravated Assault Stabbing/Cutting Weap Robbery
Aggravated Assaults Robbery (By Assault)
Aggravated Robbery (Other Weapon) Robbery (By Threats to Property)
Aggravated Wounding (Other Weapon) Threatening Behaviour
Asl Int Com Sexual Violation (Weapon) Threatening Behaviour - Lke Cause Viol
Assault Threatens To Kill/Do GBH (Manually)
Assault By Male On Female Threatens to Kill/Do GBH (Verbally)
Assault on Female Using Knife Behave Threateningly (Other Weapon)
Assault Person Show Intent To Use Weapon Threatens To Kill/Do GBH (Other Weapon)
Assault Person With Stab/cutting Instumnt Assault Intent Commit/Facil/Crime
Assault Police - (Manual) Injures - Intent To GBH (Other Weapon)
Assault With Intent To Injure Assaults Person With Blunt Instrument
Assaults Intent To Rob (Manually)
Assaults Intent To Rob (Other Weapon)
Assaults Police - (Other Weapon)
Assaults Police (Crimes Act)
Assaults With Intent To Injure (Manually)
Assaults With Intent To Injure (Other Wpn)  
Attempts To Murder (Other Weapon)
Com Asslt (Domestic) Cr Act (Manually)
Common Assault
Common Assault - Domestic (Manually)
Common Assault (Crimes Act) Manually
Common Assault (Domestic Cr Act) (Manually)
Common Assault (Domestic) Oth Wpn
Common Assault (Manually)
Common Assault-Taxi Driver (Manually)
Disorderly Behaviour Likely To Cause Viol
Fighting in a Public Place
Injures - Intent To GBH (Manually)
Injuring With Intent
Injures Intent To Injure (Manually)
Lik/Cau Viol Unlawfl Intmdt/Thrt (Oth Wpn)
Male Assaults Female (Manually)
Manslaughter (Weapon) Legal Duty
Non Agg Robbery (Threats To Person)
Offensive Behaviour - Likely to Cause Viol)
Other Manslaughter
Other Wounding With Intent
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APPENDIX 8: How The Percentage Differences For Figure 1 Were Calculated 
 
 
Weapon: Knife and 
Gun  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Knife 
     (n=213) 
        Determined to kill? 
(two or more wounds 
inflicted) 
No 
(n=67) 
31.46 % 
        Determined to kill? 
(two or more wounds 
inflicted) 
Yes 
(n=134) 
62.91% 
Unknow
n 
(n=12) 
Over 19 years old? 
No 
(n=27) 
20.15% 
Yes 
(n=107) 
79.85% 
No 
(n=62) 
59.62 % 
Yes 
(n=38) 
36.54% 
Unknow
n 
(n=4) 
Over 19 years 
ld? 
Unknow
n 
(n=0) 
No 
(n=4) 
10.52% 
Yes 
(n=34) 
89.48% 
Unknow
n 
(n=0) 
Did the offender have one or 
more 
‘serious’ non-firearm offences 
before 
Did the offender have one or 
more 
‘serious’ non-firearm offences 
before 
Yes 
(n=2
7) 
Yes 
(n=1
) 
No 
(n=80) 
74 77 
No 
(n=33) 
97 06 
       Gun 
     (n=104) 
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APPENDIX 9: Other Potential Variables That Are Inhibiting The Statistically Significant 
Difference Surrounding Hypothesis 1 From Increasing Further 
 
 
Although a statistically significant difference was found for Hypothesis 1, this writer 
would argue that there exists a number of other variables that were inhibiting this 
difference in previous serious non-firearm offences between those most likely to be 
determined firearm and knife assailants over 19 years old from increasing further.  These 
variables are justifiable reasons for why a person with no previous serious non-firearm 
violent history may suddenly be capable of killing with the physically and/or 
psychologically more demanding knife.  The main justifications are presented below. 
 
The first reason why an assailant with no previous serious non-firearm violent 
convictions may suddenly kill using a knife is because the incident was what is termed 
'victim-precipitated'.  This is where the victim initiated then engaged in physically 
assaulting the assailant first (Lunde, 1975).  As a result of being physically attacked, the 
assailant reaches for a knife and stabs the victim multiple times.  Due to concerns they 
held surrounding their own safety, it could be argued that such assailants are likely to 
have been able to overcome their normal physical and/or psychological inhibitions to 
engaging in such an attack.  It is this very scenario that may explain how a female with 
no official (or even unofficial) history of violence can suddenly brutally stab her male 
partner to death.  This assertion is supported by the consistent research finding that the 
vast majority of the male victims of domestically related homicide had previously 
subjected the females who eventually killed them to repeated acts of domestic violence 
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(see Lloyd, 199560; Naylor, 1993; Easteal, 1993).  Further reinforcing this point is the 
finding that, based on previous criminal records for violent assault, the male victims of 
victim-precipitated homicide tend to resemble the assailants of non-victim-precipitated 
homicides (Lunde, 1975).  Therefore, this writer would argue that the first reason why an 
assailant with no previous serious non-firearm violent convictions may suddenly kill 
using a knife is because they were involved in a victim precipitated attack. 
 
The second reason why a person with no previous serious non-firearm violent convictions 
may suddenly kill using a knife is because they suddenly lose control of the normal 
restraints that inhibit them from reacting in such a way.  A loss of one's normal restraints 
is often due to a sudden onset of psychosis.  The typical scenario relating to this type of 
attack is where an assailant suddenly experiences a powerful urge to kill their parent or 
child using the nearest available weapon because they believe them to be, say, ‘the devil’.  
Typically, when such assailants return to the frame of mind that predominates their lives, 
often by taking the right medication, such people are completely harmless and incapable 
of undertaking such an attack.  Therefore, the reason why this type of assailant is unlikely 
to have any previous serious violent non-firearm related criminal convictions, but was 
still capable of lethally using a knife to kill, is due to a sudden onset of psychosis.  
Arguably, this onset of psychosis made them uncharacteristically lose control of the 
restraints that normally inhibit them from acting in such a way.  
                                                 
60 According to Lloyd (1995: 76) ‘Angela Browne, an American social and forensic psychologist, quotes 
various researchers to show that around 70 per cent of women who killed their husbands had been 
physically abused by them.….Research in Australia backs up Browne's contention.  Bacon and Lansdowne 
investigated cases of women who had been convicted of killing their husbands and boyfriends.  They found 
that in fourteen out of sixteen cases the women had been physically assaulted and subjected to repeated 
violence.’ 
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 By eliminating the above confounding variables from the comparison undertaken in 
Hypothesis 1, this writer proposes Hypothesis 2.  
 
Hypothesis 2: When those most likely to be determined knife assailants (over 19 years 
old) who: 
 
• physically initiated the attack (non-victim precipitated); 
• were unlikely to be mentally ill; 
 
are compared to those most likely to be determined firearm assailants (over 19 years old) 
who: 
 
• physically initiated the attack (non-victim precipitated); 
• were unlikely to be mentally ill; 
 
This author would hypothesise that the actual percentage difference found in Hypothesis 
1 for previous serious violent non-firearm convictions will increase further.  
 
 
 
Specific Data Collected For Hypothesis 2. 
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To enable the testing of Hypothesis 2 it was necessary to identify those assailants who 
physically initiated the attack (non-victim precipitated) and were unlikely to be mentally 
ill.  Then it was necessary to identify the firearm and knife assailants who were most 
likely to be determined to kill.  Finally, those assailants who had previous serious violent 
non-firearm conviction histories had to be identified.  In the order just presented, the 
following will describe the definitions and data collection process used to identify those 
assailants who met the above criteria. 
 
1.  Non-victim precipitated assailants (attacks physically initiated by the assailant): The 
definition of a ‘non-victim precipitated assailant’ was those assailants left in the 
population when all the victim precipitated assailants had been removed.  Therefore, 
‘victim precipitated’ events had to be ascertained first.  An event was defined as being 
victim precipitated if the victim had initiated the event by physically attacking the 
assailant.  It was also considered victim precipitated if the victim was physically 
attacking a third person intimately related to the assailant (a child, close relative or 
partner), who the assailant felt a desperate need to protect.  Furthermore, for an attack to 
be defined as victim precipitated the assailant had to react to the victim's physical attack 
during or immediately after it had ceased (within a matter of seconds).  Once the victim 
precipitated events had been identified, they were removed from the proposed 
comparison leaving the non-victim precipitated events. 
 
The data collection process used to obtain this information was typically based on the 
‘case summary’ section in the C.I.B Murder Books.  If this information was missing then 
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the Dossier Microfiche System was searched.  If both of these sources failed, then a 
Phone Interview was conducted.  If this source failed to provide an answer then the event 
was categorised as 'unknown' on the Data Collection Survey Sheet (see Appendix 5). 
 
2.  Assailant unlikely to be mentally ill: The definition of an ‘assailant unlikely to be 
mentally ill’ was all the assailants who were left in the population when all those who 
were likely to have been mentally ill had been removed.  Therefore, ‘assailants likely to 
be mentally ill’ had to be ascertained first.  However, to eliminate subjective 
interpretations it was decided to base this variable on whether the principal assailant was 
likely to have had an official mental health history before they killed the victim.  Due to 
time limitations, the current writer did not choose to access official mental health records 
through the Ministry of Health.  However, it was not unusual to encounter information 
that strongly suggested that an assailant had a previous official mental health history.  
The criteria for an assailant to be defined as likely to have had an official mental health 
history was: 
 
i) If an assailant's close relative, intimate partner or a mental health professional 
stated in the Dossier Microfiche System that the assailant had, before the 
homicide, officially been diagnosed as having a mental health disability. 
Furthermore, this condition related to the serious end of mental health disabilities 
(that is, it was an Axis I disorder).  An example taken from the current study that 
met this criteria was a woman, whose husband had been killed by her son.  She 
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said in a statement later made to the police that her son "has been a diagnosed 
Schizophrenic for the last 6 years". 
 
ii) Having a "Health Alert" warning on the Wanganui Computer criminal conviction 
history.  This is a warning to police that the assailant in question is well known or 
understood to have had regular contact with mental health services (see the 
second example given in Appendix 4). 
 
Any mention of an Axis II mental health disorder (personality disorders), or any 
hindsight mental health diagnosis (after the event diagnosis), was not considered 
sufficient to meet the criteria of having a previous official mental heath history.  This 
methodology is not considered to be an accurate indicator of the exact proportion of 
assailants who had official mental health histories61, but it is considered to be a 
reasonable and conservative estimate. 
 
The data collection process used to obtain this information was based on reviewing the 
Dossier Microfiche System (for statements by close relatives, intimate partners or mental 
health professionals) and the assailant's criminal history on the Wanganui Computer for a 
'Health Alert' warning found at the top of the printout (see Appendix 4).   
 
                                                 
61 This is especially so considering that a ‘Health Alert’ warning does not indicate whether or not an 
assailants had an Axis I disorder. 
 144
3.  Most likely to be a determined assailant: The definition and data collection process 
used to ascertain whether an assailant was most likely to have been a determined killer 
was based on the same as that used in Hypothesis 1 (mentioned earlier on page 62). 
 
4.  Assailant was old enough to have developed a representative criminal history: The 
definition and data collection process used ascertained that an assailant that an assailant 
was over 19 years old was the same as that used in Hypothesis 1 (mentioned earlier on 
page 63) 
 
5. Serious non-firearm conviction: The definition and data collection process used to 
ascertain whether an assailant had a serious non-firearm conviction was the same as that 
used in Hypothesis 1 (mentioned earlier on page 63). 
 
All data collected for the variables of interest in Hypothesis 2 were recorded on each 
assailants’ survey questionnaire sheet (see Appendix 5).  The data collected on this 
survey questionnaire was later transferred to an Excel data spreadsheet for analysis, 
producing the results presented below. 
 
Results  
 
In Hypothesis 2 it was predicted that when those most likely to be determined knife 
assailants (over 19 years old) who physically initiated the attack (non-victim precipitated) 
and were unlikely to be mentally ill, were compared to their exact equivalent assailant 
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using a firearm, that the percentage difference for serious violent non-firearm convictions 
found in Hypothesis 162 would increase further.  Furthermore, this increased gap would 
remain statistically significant.   
 
 
 
 
GRAPH WOULD NOT SEND VIA EMAIL 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A comparison of previous ‘serious’ violent non-firearm convictions between 
those most likely to be determined knife and firearm assailants (over 19 years old) who 
initiated the attack and were not likely to be mentally ill. 
 
By eliminating the two aforementioned variables from the comparison in Hypothesis 1, 
the results in Figure 2 demonstrate that 31.5 percent of the knife assailants and 3.44 
percent of the firearm assailants had previous serious non-firearm related violent 
convictions63.  This comparison produced a difference of 28.06 percent.  Because this 
percentage difference in Hypothesis 2 is greater than that found in Hypothesis 1 (28.06 
                                                 
62 Which was 22.29 percent. 
63 For an insight into exactly how these percentage differences presented in Figure 2 were calculated refer 
to Appendix 10. 
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versus 22.29 percent, respectively) – the results support the prediction made in 
Hypothesis 2.  Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2. 
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APPENDIX 10: How The Percentage Differences For Figure 2 Were Calculated 
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APPENDIX 11: How The Percentage Differences For Figure 3 Were Calculated 
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APPENDIX 12: How The Percentage Differences For Figure 4 Were Calculated 
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APPENDIX 13: Kairys (1998) Example Of Gun Manufacturers Targeting 
Criminals 
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APPENDIX 14: Critique Of Mouzos (2000): The Licensing And Registration 
Status Of Firearms Used In Homicide 
 
By May of 1997 all jurisdictions in Australia had implemented the new firearm 
regulations which evolved out of the Nationwide Agreement on Firearms (NAF).  
One of these regulations was the introduction of a national firearm registration 
system.  Due to the controversial nature and the scepticism surrounding the 
national registration of all legally owned Australian firearms, Mouzos (2000: 1) 
intended to identify whether or not ‘those offenders who have committed 
firearm-related homicides in Australia [are] the [same] individuals who 
complied with legislation introduced as part of the NAF [by obtaining]…..a 
firearms license, and [registering] their firearm(s)’.  After reviewing all firearm 
related homicides occurring between 1 July 1997 and 30 June 1999, Mouzos (2000: 
4) concluded that ‘the overwhelming majority of these firearms [used in 
homicides] were not registered and the offenders were not licensed firearm 
owners’.  More specifically, the abstract states that this study found that ‘[m]ost 
(over 90%) firearms used to commit homicides were not registered and their 
owners not licensed.’ (Mouzos, 2000: 1).  It would be quite understandable that 
some may have interpreted this conclusion to mean that gun control, which 
continue to solely impinge on the freedoms of licensed shooters, are having no 
impact on the real problem – unlicensed assailants.  
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For reasons that will follow, the current thesis will demonstrate that Mouzos 
(2000) is unlikely to be correct in her conclusion that most firearms used in 
Australia were not registered.  In fact, using the same data, the following will 
demonstrate that Mouzos’ has unintentionally misrepresented her own data 
which, in conflict with her above conclusions, will actually demonstrate most 
firearms used in homicide were likely to be registered.  Furthermore, it will be 
argued that irresponsible storage and handling by the ‘law abiding’ licensed 
shooter may have contributed to the unlicensed assailants accessing firearms in 
the first place. 
 
As evidence to the conclusion that the majority of firearms were not registered 
Mouzos (2000) refers the reader to a graph on page six of the article called ‘Figure 
6’ (presented below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important piece of information absent from her conclusion but present in 
Figure 6 is the last two words in the statement under the graph ‘Firearms 
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Registered to Offender’.  What this graph demonstrates is that 90.6 percent of 
firearms used in homicides were not registered to the offender.  However, is it 
possible that although this 90.6 percent of firearms were not registered to the 
offender - could these weapons have been registered to another person?  As the 
following will demonstrate, there is reason to believe that a significant 
proportion of this 90.6 percent figure of ‘unregistered guns’ may have been 
registered to another person.   
 
Earlier in this paper Mouzos (2000: 5) points out that ‘this study did not 
specifically examine whether the firearms used to commit homicide had been 
stolen from licensed owners’.  Then the reader is presented with her own 
research, ‘Mouzos, 1999’, and a New Zealand study which is used to imply that 
most of the unregistered guns used in firearm homicides in the Mouzos (2000) 
study probably did originate from the collections of licensed users.  Implying that 
most unlicensed guns originated from the collections of licensed owners would 
explain why Mouzos (2000: 5) repeatedly recommends that ‘it is important that 
firearms owners comply and store their firearms according to set regulations64.  
If it can be assumed that a gun originating from the collection of a licensed 
                                                 
64 If unlicensed assailants were not accessing the guns of licensed owners why would Mouzos continually 
need to recommend a greater need for enforcement and compliance in relation to the storage of legally 
owned firearms? 
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owner will have been registered, and this may be a safe assumption65, then it is 
therefore likely that at least a significant proportion of the guns that Mouzos has 
categorised as unregistered are actually likely to be registered.  It is just that the 
guns are registered to a person other than the offender who did not hold a 
license. 
 
So why is the above argument so important?  Identifying that many of the guns 
in Mouzos’ population were probably registered (just not registered to the 
unlicensed assailant) is important because this study is being promoted in the 
media and possibly in anti-gun control circles as evidence that the registering of 
firearms does not reduce homicide66.  And, assuming the above argument is 
correct – Mouzos’ study does not demonstrate this at all.  If Mouzos (2000) does 
not demonstrate that registration is not reducing homicide, what does this study 
tell us? 
 
What Mouzos’ study has explicitly discovered is that all people who have 
illegally acquired firearms are not willing to register these weapons with the 
police before they used them to commit a homicide with.  Is it at all surprising 
that people who acquire guns illegally (either directly stolen or indirectly 
                                                 
65 Figure 6 in Mouzos (2000), presented above demonstrates that of the 9.4 percent of assailants who held a 
firearms license – all the firearms used were registered.  Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume 
that guns originating from the collection of licensed owners are likely to be registered. 
66 For example, the title of one article was called ‘Tougher arms laws don’t work – report’ (see The 
Dominion, 06/08/00). 
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obtained from the black market) are not willing to take their illegal firearms to 
the police to be registered?  
 
In summary, what Mouzos’ (2000) study is likely to have demonstrated is that, 
like in New Zealand and the United States, those most likely to use guns to kill 
with are unlicensed.  Furthermore, these unlicensed assailants are typically able 
to access legally owned but irresponsibly stored firearms.  Therefore, Mouzos’ 
(2000: 5) interpretation of her results to mean that ‘those who commit homicide 
in Australia are individuals who have circumvented legislation and will be least 
likely to be affect if further restrictions on firearms ownership are introduced.  
Any further restrictions will most likely affect individuals who are law-abiding 
shooters who have already “made significant sacrifices in furtherance of public 
safety”’, is probably incorrect.  It is likely to be incorrect because is likely to be 
poor storage and handling practices by licensees that is, in part, supplying the 
unlicensed assailants with firearms that are later used in homicides. 
 
One question of interest to the current author is – if most guns used in homicides 
in Australia are in fact registered to someone, are the firearms used by unlicensed 
assailants being traced back to a potentially negligent legal owners?  And, if not 
why not?  If illegally possessed weapons obtained by police are not being traced 
back to a potentially negligent and irresponsible owners (which Mouzos has 
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implies that they may not be67) – what use is there in having a gun register in the 
first place? 
                                                 
67 Mouzos (2000: 5) has argued that ‘preventative efforts would need to be directed at curtailing the supply 
of firearms to…..[assailants without licenses].  In other words, policy would need to consider the following: 
Greater enforcement relating to the storage of legal firearms’. 
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APPENDIX 15: Psychology And The Weapon Instrumentality Effect.  
 
The following is a laboratory experiment that Myers (1993) has described as the most 
famous and controversial experiment ever undertaken in social psychology – Milgram’s 
(1963) Obedience Experiments.  The actual relevance of this experiment to the weapon 
instrumentality effect has been discounted by commentators in the gun control debate  
before (see Kleck, 1991).  This is because the relevance of the experiment is not overtly 
obvious, that is until a closer inspection is undertaken.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
Milgram’s experiment be described in detail. 
 
Milgram’s (1963) experiment basically tested a subject’s willingness to obey 
orders from an authority in the face of evidence which suggested that the 
subject’s compliance to those orders was inflicting great pain or injury on 
another person.  The experiment more specifically involved a confederate (an 
actor) and an unsuspecting subject, who enters a laboratory where a scientist-
type person (another actor) wearing a white laboratory coat, meets them.  The 
scientist informs both men that the experiment that they have volunteered to 
take part in is investigating the effects of punishment on learning.  One person is 
required to be the teacher and the other the learner.  Using deception, the 
confederate was always made the learner and the subject the teacher (from now 
onwards the confederate and the subject will be referred to as the learner and 
teacher respectively). 
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 The teacher then watches as the scientist attaches an electrode to the learner’s 
arm while the learner comments that he has a slight heart condition.  Then the 
teacher is taken into an adjacent room and placed in front of a ‘shock generator’.  
This device has a line of switches that range from 15 to 450 volts that increase in 
15-volt increments.  The switches have other labels indicating the probable shock 
intensity, for example, ‘slight shock’, ‘very strong shock’, ‘danger: severe shock’ 
with the last two switches (435 and 450 volts) having the labels ‘XXX’.  Starting 
from the lowest shock level, the teacher is instructed by the near-standing 
scientist to give the learner a shock each time they give an incorrect answer to the 
questions posed.  And for each subsequent incorrect answer the teacher is 
encouraged to give the learner a shock from one level higher than before, thus 
increasing the shock intensity for the learner.  As the shocks increase, the pain 
experienced by the subject can be heard to have intensified.  For example, at 120 
volts the subject is heard to say “Ugh!  Hey this really hurts”.  Typically, early on 
in the experiment the teacher becomes stressed and informs the scientist of their 
discomfort to hurting the learner.  The scientist continuously responds to these 
pleas by saying “It is absolutely essential that you continue” or “You have no 
other choice; you must go on”.  If the teacher obeys these commands, by 270 
volts the learner, in obvious agony, is heard to scream “let me out of here.  Let 
me out of here.  Let me out of here.  Let me out.  Do you hear?  Let me out of 
here”.  At 300 volts the learner states that he refuses to answer and is basically 
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only heard in the form of agonising screams.  The scientist tells the teacher to 
treat any further unanswered questions as incorrect and to give the learner shock 
from the next shock intensity.  After 330 volts the learner suddenly goes silent, 
giving the impression that the shocks have, at least, rendered him unconscious.  
Again the teacher is told to treat the unanswered questions as incorrect and to 
continue administering shocks of increasing intensity.  The experiment is 
stopped after the teacher has administered three 450-volt shocks in a row.   
 
Before it was undertaken, Milgram (1963) described the above experiment to 110 
psychiatrists and asked how many ‘teachers’ did they think would proceed 
through to the 450-volt switch.  The consensus was that may be one in 1000 
teachers might complete the experiment.  However, 25 out of his sample of 40 
men (or 63 percent), obeyed the demands of the scientist by administering shocks 
to the last 450-volt switch.  Disturbingly, only 15 of the subjects had the courage 
to defy the demands of the scientist and stop before the last switch was reached.   
 
As a result of the above disturbing findings, Milgram (1974) became interested in 
the conditions that breed and inhibited obedience.  Therefore, he repeated the 
above experiment with a number of variations.  It was one of these variations 
that this writer would argue might have important implications into the possible 
greater psychological difficulty in using close contact weapons, like a knife, over 
a gun.  The logic behind this variation stemmed back to observation that 
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occurred in the pilot studies of the original experiment.  Milgram noticed in the 
pilot studies that if the teacher could see the learner in the adjacent room through 
a window, typically the teacher would awkwardly divert their eyes – yet still 
continue to administer the shocks.  It appeared that clearly seeing the learner in 
agony caused obvious discomfort to the teacher.  Explaining why they would not 
watch yet still continue to deliver shocks, one teacher later pointed out that he 
did not want to see the consequences of what he was doing. 
 
This observation led Milgram (1974) to hypothesise that the level of obedience 
might be determined by how clearly the learner’s suffering is perceptually 
communicated.  For example, Milgram hypothesised that as the learner’s 
suffering is perceptually made more obvious to the teacher (by making the 
learner’s agony visually, auditorially and tactilely more difficult to ignore), the 
level of obedience would decrease.  Or in his own words, Milgram (1974: 34) 
wondered: ‘If the…..[learner]…..were rendered increasingly more salient to the 
…..[teacher]…..would obedience diminish?’   
 
To test this hypothesis Milgram (1974) repeated the aforementioned experiment 
with three slight variations.  In Experiment 1, called the ‘remote’ condition, the 
learner is placed in another room and could not be seen or heard at all.  The 
learners’ responses to the questions were transmitted silently to the teacher.  
However, at 300 volts a hand pounding in protest could be heard through the 
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wall, then at 315 volts the pounding suddenly stopped.  Experiment 2, called the 
‘voice feedback’ condition, is an exact replication of the original experiment.  
That is, the learner’s agonising responses to the increasingly intense shocks could 
be clearly heard.  Experiment 3, called the ‘proximity’ condition was the same as 
Experiment 2 except the learner was placed in the same room, and sitting only a 
few feet away from the teacher.  So not only could the teacher hear the learner’s 
agonising responses, they could see them too.  Experiment 4, called the ‘touch-
proximity’ condition, was similar to Experiment 3 except when the 150-volt 
switch was reached the learner took their hand off the shock plate and would 
refuse to continue.  As a result the scientist would demand that the teacher force 
the learner’s hand on the shock plate for each subsequent incorrect answer.  
Therefore, to remain obedient the teacher had to physically touch the learner.  
Taken from Milgram (1974: 35), the results from these four experiments are 
presented below in Table 3. 
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Milgram (1974: 35) 
                                                Experiment 1         Experiment 2         Experiment 3         
Experiment 4        
Shock        Verbal designation              Remote                   Voice-                  Proximity                 Touch- 
 Level           and voltage level                (n=40)                  Feedback                  (n=40)      
Proximity 
                                                                                              (n=40)                                            
(n=40) 
                      Slight Shock 
1 15 
2 30 
3 45 
4 60 
                     Moderate Shock 
5 75 
6 90 
7 105                                                                                             1 
8 120 
                       Strong Shock 
9 135                                                               1                                                            1 
10 150                                                               5                          10                            16 
11 165                                                               1 
12 180                                                               1                            2                              3 
                  Very Strong Shock 
13 195 
14 210                                                                                                                             1 
15 225                                                                                             1                              1 
16 240 
                       Intense Shock 
17 255                                                                                                                             1 
18 270                                                                                             1 
19 285                                                               1                                                             1 
20 300                               5*                            1                            5                               1    
               Extreme Intensity Shock 
21 315                               4                              3                            3                               2 
22 330                               2 
23 345                               1                              1                            1 
24 360                               1                              1 
                Danger: Severe Shock 
25 375                               1                                                            1 
26 390 
27 405 
28 420 
                   XXX 
29 435 
30 450                            26                            25                           16                             12 
                    Mean maximum 
                       shock level                     27.0                       24.53                      20.80                        17.88 
                  
                  Percentage obedient 
                          Subject                      65.0%                     62.5%                     40.0%                       30.0% 
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* Indicates that in Experiment 1, five subjects administered a maximum shock of 
300 volts. 
 
Table 3: Maximum Shocks Administered in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that 65 percent of all teachers went to the very end of the 
experiment in the ‘remote’ condition.  It is interesting that it was not until the 
learner banged on the wall at the 300-volt switch that the few teachers who were 
disobedient could be distinguished from those who were obedient teachers.  Due 
to the complete absence of disobedience before the 300-volt switch, it would 
seem obvious to this author that if the learner did not bang on the wall, all of the 
teachers would probably have completed the experiment to the end.  In 
Experiment 2 when the learner could be heard from the beginning, obedience 
dropped slightly to 62.5 percent.  And, when the victim could clearly be heard 
and seen because the learner was sitting next to him in Experiment 3, the rate of 
obedience dropped to 40 percent.  Finally, the rate of obedience dropped to 30 
percent when the teacher had to touch the learner.  Therefore, the above results 
appear to strongly support the hypothesis that as the perceptual salience of the 
victim increased there was a corresponding decrease in the rate of obedience.  
The following will discuss what relevance a study on obedience has on why a 
proportion of firearm assailants who were capable of killing with guns are 
unlikely to be capable of killing with the commonly used non-firearm weapons. 
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 The More Perceptually Salient The Victim Becomes The Harder It Is To Hurt A Person 
 
The most striking feature of Table 3 was that something was having an increasingly 
powerful effect on the rate of disobedience at the 150-volt switch in Experiments 2, 3 and 
4 (respectively).  More specifically, the rate of disobedience at the 150-volt switch 
resulted in the sudden disobedience of 5, 10 and 16 learners in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
(respectively).  This demonstrates that by Experiment 4 (the ‘touch’ condition), nearly 
half of all the subjects at this early stage of the experiment suddenly refused to go on.  It 
would seem to this writer that what the learner was saying was partially responsible.  
According to Milgram (1974: 56), at the 150-volt switch, the learner is heard to say: 
‘Ugh!!!  Experimenter!  That’s all.  Get me out of here.  I told you I had heart trouble.  
My heart’s starting to bother me now.  Get me out of here please.  My heart’s starting to 
bother me.  I refuse to go on.  Let me out.’  However, the above statement was held 
constant throughout Experiments 2 to 4 yet the rate of disobedience was increasing at an 
exponential rate with 12.5, 25 and 40 percent of all teachers suddenly refusing to 
continue at this early stage of experiments 2, 3 and 4 (respectively).  It seems that as the 
learner’s perceptual salience increased, what they were saying had a heightened effect on 
teacher disobedience.   
 
Why exactly did disobedience suddenly increase at an exponential rate at such 
an early stage?  There are probably two main related reasons for the dramatic 
increase in disobedience.  Firstly, it was very difficult, (arguably traumatic) for 
 169
the teacher to slowly hurt somebody with a heart condition who you could see 
and hear (high perceptual salience).  At the 150-volt switch you then had to touch 
(very high perceptual salience), especially in comparison to slowly hurting 
someone who you could only hear.  As Milgram (1974: 38) has argued ‘It is 
possible that the visual cues associated with the victim’s suffering trigger 
empathic responses in the subject and give him a more complete grasp of the 
victim’s experience.’   
 
How does this relate to the instrumental characteristics of firearms over the 
commonly used non-firearm weapons?  Absent in all the common alternative 
weapons of homicide is both the incomparable damage that is inflicted by a 
firearm and that this damage is released instantaneously.  By the time a gun 
assailant is traumatically affected by a wounded and pleading victim to stop, the 
fatal damage is, comparatively speaking, likely to have already been inflicted. 
However, with the commonly used non-firearm weapons/methods of homicide 
not being as instantaneous or as lethal as firearms - there is a greater amount of 
time for a more perceptually salient victim to plead for their attacker to stop.  
Furthermore, a gun does not require the assailant to touch their victim – a 
prerequisite of all the common alternative weapons.  This is an important point 
considering that the Touch-Proximity condition resulted in the highest rate of 
disobedience.   
 
 170
Closely related to this last point is the second reason why disobedience is likely 
to have increased as the learner became increasingly more salient.  That is, 
disobedience is much less likely to occur when the teacher could blame the near-
standing scientist as being responsible for their actions.  For example, the 
following exert is a conversation between one of the teachers and the scientist 
(Milgram, 1974: 73-74): 
 
[Teacher]: ‘I refuse to take the responsibility.  He’s in there hollering!’ 
[Scientist]: ‘It’s absolutely essential that you continue, Teacher.’ 
[Teacher]: ‘…..I mean who’s going to take the responsibility if anything 
happens to that gentleman?’ 
[Scientist]: ‘I’m responsible for anything that happens to him.  Continue, please.’ 
[Teacher]: ‘All right’ (Teacher completes the experiment). 
 
However, this excuse becomes much more difficult to justify when the teacher is 
the one forcing the learner’s hand on the shock plate.  The teacher would not 
sound very credible saying that the scientist ‘forced’ him to do it when the only 
‘force’ to be seen was coming from the teacher himself.  For example, saying ‘I 
had no choice, the scientist made me push your hand on the shock plate’ would 
hardly sound like a very credible justification for inflicting the shocks.  In short, it 
is much more difficult to deny responsibility for ones actions when directly 
connected to that action.  And, touching makes it very hard to justifiably deny 
responsibility.  As pointed out by Milgram (1974: 39): 
 
In the Remote conditions it is more difficult for the subject to see a connection 
between his actions and their consequences for the victim. There is a physical 
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separation of the act and its effect…..The two events are in correlation, yet they 
lack a compelling unity.  The unity is more fully achieved in the…..Touch-
Proximity [condition].   
 
How does this relate to the instrumental characteristics of firearms?  Presented in 
an earlier footnote was a statement that was taken by the New Zealand Police 
that provided this thesis with a good example of an assailant who was likely to 
be an ‘impulsively’ motivated assailant.  The assailant desperately attempted to 
justify what he had done by saying “I didn’t mean to kill him, I just pulled the 
trigger”.  This assailant would certainly appear to have had problems seeing the 
direct connection between the act of pulling a trigger and the effect it had on 
instantly killing his victim.  Interestingly, if this firearm assailant had used say, a 
crowbar, instead of a firearm to attack his victim, he would have been unlikely to 
have provided the police with a similar justification for his actions.  For example, 
‘I didn’t mean to kill him, I just swung the crowbar and smashed his scull in’.  
The unique instrumental characteristic of the firearm is that only a small amount 
of energy is required to unleash an incomparable blow.  Having no control over 
the intensity of this blow, a firearm assailant is less likely to see the connection 
between their actions being fully responsible for the consequences.  Accentuating 
this lack of unity between cause and effect is that, unlike with all the common 
alternative weapons of homicide, a firearm does not require the assailant to 
touch the victim.  However, having to touch someone to hurt them heightens 
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both ones awareness of the force being exerted and on them being solely 
responsible for the consequences of these actions.    
 
Therefore, from a psychological perspective it could be argued that Milgram’s (1963, 
1974) obedience experiments indirectly reinforces and sheds greater light on some of the 
probable instrumental characteristics identified by Zimring (1968, 1972) which are 
unique to the firearm.  The points below combines all of the above points made by 
Milgram by applying them to the firearm and the commonly used non-firearm weapons 
of homicide: 
 
• Common non-firearm weapons/methods: Having to touch a victim and being in 
control of the force exerted on them increases the unity between cause and 
effect.  This unity increases the chances of the assailant feeling empathetically 
towards the victim or guilty and responsible for their actions.  Due to the less 
efficient and lethal nature of such weapons there is more time for these 
intense feelings to be expressed which may inhibit the attack from continuing 
further. 
 
• Firearm: Not having to touch a victim and not being in control of the incomparable 
force that is exerted decreases the unity between cause and effect.  This lack of unity 
reduces the chances of the assailant feeling as empathetically towards the victim or 
guilty and responsible for their actions (relative to what they would have felt if they 
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used one of the close contact non-firearm weapons).  Due to the more efficient and 
lethal nature of firearms there is less time for these less intense feelings to be 
expressed to inhibit the attack from continuing further.  However, even if these, 
relatively speaking, less intense feelings of guilt or responsibility inhibit the attack 
from continuing further, the instantaneous and incomparably lethal nature of a firearm 
attack means that it is statistically more likely to result in a fatality relative to the 
other common weapons/methods of homicide.  
 
In summary, the instrumental characteristics unique to the firearm are likely to make 
undertaking an attack less perceptually salient relative to the commonly used alternative 
weapons of homicide.  Therefore, from a psychological perspective, guns are likely to be 
easier to hurt somebody with in comparison to using any of the common alternative 
weapons of homicide.  However, as pointed out by Kleck (1991), the applicability of an 
artificial laboratory experiment on real life homicidal events will always be a valid 
limitation of Milgram’s (1963) experiment. 
 
Interestingly, one of the most historically respected academic contributors to the 
field of psychology, Albert Bandura (1973: 177) used evidence from the above 
experiment by Milgram (1963) to reinforce his following statement: 
 
It is relatively easy to hurt a person when his suffering is not visible and 
when causal actions seem physically or temporally remote from their 
deleterious effects.….When the injurious consequences of one’s actions are 
fully evident, vicariously aroused distress and loss of self respect serve as 
restraining influences over aggressive conduct. 
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As a result of the above information, this writer would feel safe in asserting that both 
Milgram (1974) and Bandura (1973) would both agree that the vast majority of people in 
society are likely to be affected, to some degree, by the relationship between perceptual 
salience and resistance to hurting another human being.  However, this would imply that 
a tiny minority of society are unlikely to be affected by this relationship.  If such a 
minority could be identified, accompanied with information surrounding their homicidal 
behaviour, is it possible that the weapons used by such people are more likely to be of the 
close contact variety?  In other words, at the complete opposite end of the spectrum, what 
are the weapon preferences of the minority of people who are not so affected by the 
relationship between perceptual salience and resistance to inflicting pain or injury on 
another human being?   
 
Interestingly, criminal psychologists have identified psychological factors influencing 
weapon selection in a minority group that fits the above characteristics.  For example, in 
regards to one of the rarest types of violent assailants in society, Levin and Fox (1985: 
58) point out that sexually motivated serial killers typically do not like to kill with 
weapons that, relatively speaking, physically remove them from the act they so enjoy.  
This is more clearly stated by Levin and Fox themselves when they said: 
 
Among serial murders that are sexually inspired, the use of a gun, is in 
fact, remarkably rare.  For those killers, physical contact is so crucial to 
satisfying their murderous sexual impulses that a gun robs them of the 
pleasure they receive from killing with their hands. 
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Levin and Fox (1985: 58-59) then point out how a firearm may be less repugnant than 
using other common weapons of homicide because a ‘gun distances the killer from his 
victims.  Not only effective as a deadly weapon, it is psychologically effective for those 
who don’t want to get their hands dirty.’  Due to the observation that many firearm 
homicides involve close range attacks, Kleck (1991) has discounted this ‘killing at a 
distance’ argument.  However, the important point is that guns do not require an assailant 
to touch their victim, which Milgram (1974) demonstrated would significantly reduce the 
level of perceptual salience. 
 
In conclusion, this section has argued that there are likely to exist a variety of 
psychological factors contributing to Zimring’s (1968, 1972) weapon 
instrumentality effect.  Generally speaking, an important instrumental 
characteristic of firearms is that they are unlikely to be as perceptually salient as 
the commonly used non-firearm weapons of homicide. 
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